What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it. Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone to increase their understanding (...) of X. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both. (shrink)

Preregistration has been proposed as a useful method for making a publicly verifiable distinction between confirmatory hypothesis tests, which involve planned tests of ante hoc hypotheses, and exploratory hypothesis tests, which involve unplanned tests of post hoc hypotheses. This distinction is thought to be important because it has been proposed that confirmatory hypothesis tests provide more compelling results (less uncertain, less tentative, less open to bias) than exploratory hypothesis tests. In this article, we challenge this proposition and argue that there (...) are several advantages of exploratory hypothesis tests that can make their results more compelling than those of confirmatory hypothesis tests. We also consider some potential disadvantages of exploratory hypothesis tests and conclude that their advantages can outweigh the disadvantages. We conclude that exploratory hypothesis tests avoid researcher commitment and researcher prophecy biases, reduce the probability of data fraud, are more appropriate in the context of unplanned deviations, facilitate inference to the best explanation, and allow peer reviewers to make additional contributions at the data analysis stage. In contrast, confirmatory hypothesis tests may lead to an inappropriate level of confidence in research conclusions, less appropriate analyses in the context of unplanned deviations, and greater bias and errors in theoretical inferences. (shrink)

There is considerable disagreement about the epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. when a scientist predicts an unexpected phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the field on this question, noting both fully articulated views such as weak and strong predictivism, and more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for the instrumental value of prediction. By examining the various reasons offered for the value of prediction across a range of inferential contexts , we (...) can see that neither weak nor strong predictivism captures all of the reasons for valuing prediction available. A third path is presented, Pluralist Instrumental Predictivism; PIP for short. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

Scientific theories are developed in response to a certain set of phenomena and subsequently evaluated, at least partially, in terms of the quality of fit between those same theories and appropriately distinctive phenomena. To differentiate between these two stages it is popular to describe the former as involving the accommodation of data and the latter as involving the prediction of data. Predictivism is the view that, ceteris paribus, correctly predicting data confers greater confirmation than successfully accommodating data. In this paper, (...) I take issue with a variety of predictivist theses, argue that their role for issues of confirmation is extremely limited, and attempt to account for the appeal that predictivism has enjoyed. Introduction Temporal Predictivism Heuristic Predictivism Weak Predictivism 4.1 Inference to better theories 4.2 Inference to better methods Arguments for Strong Heuristic Predictivism 5.1 Best explanations argument 5.2 Conditional support 5.3 Unique explanations Increased Explanatory Unification 6.1 Explaining what other theories can't 6.2 Contrived hypotheses 6.2 Strength and simplicity Conclusions CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The paper presents a further articulation and defence of the view on prediction and accommodation that I have proposed earlier. It operates by analysing two accounts of the issue-by Patrick Maher and by Marc Lange-that, at least at first sight, appear to be rivals to my own. Maher claims that the time-order of theory and evidence may be important in terms of degree of confirmation, while that claim is explicitly denied in my account. I argue, however, that when his account (...) is analysed, Maher reveals no scientifically significant way in which the time-order counts, and that indeed his view is in the end best regarded as a less than optimally formulated version of my own. Lange has also responded to Maher by arguing that the apparent relevance of temporal considerations is merely apparent: what is really involved, according to Lange, is whether or not a hypothesis constitutes an "arbitrary conjunction." I argue that Lange's suggestion fails: the correct analysis of his and Maher's examples is that provided by my account. (shrink)

This paper argues that the field of chemistry underwent a significant change of theory in the early twentieth century, when atomic number replaced atomic weight as the principle for ordering and identifying the chemical elements. It is a classic case of a Kuhnian revolution. In the process of addressing anomalies, chemists who were trained to see elements as defined by their atomic weight discovered that their theoretical assumptions were impediments to understanding the chemical world. The only way to normalize the (...) anomalies was to introduce new concepts, and a new conceptual understanding of what it is to be an element. In the process of making these changes, a new scientific lexicon emerged, one that took atomic number to be the defining feature of a chemical element. (shrink)

Predictivism is the view that successful predictions of “novel” evidence carry more confirmational weight than accommodations of already known evidence. Novelty, in this context, has traditionally been conceived of as temporal novelty. However temporal predictivism has been criticized for lacking a rationale: why should the time order of theory and evidence matter? Instead, it has been proposed, novelty should be construed in terms of use-novelty, according to which evidence is novel if it was not used in the construction of a (...) theory. Only if evidence is use-novel can it fully support the theory entailing it. As I point out in this paper, the writings of the most influential proponent of use-novelty contain a weaker and a stronger version of use-novelty. However both versions, I argue, are problematic. With regard to the appraisal of Mendeleev’ periodic table, the most contentious historical case in the predictivism debate, I argue that temporal predictivism is indeed supported, although in ways not previously appreciated. On the basis of this case, I argue for a form of so-called symptomatic predictivism according to which temporally novel predictions carry more confirmational weight only insofar as they reveal the theory’s presumed coherence of facts as real. (shrink)

What does it mean for a hypothesis to be ad hoc? One prominent account has it that ad hoc hypotheses have no independent empirical support. Others have viewed ad hoc judgements as subjective. Here I critically review both of these views and defend my own Coherentist Conception of Ad hocness by working out its conceptual and descriptive attractions.

The periodic table represents and organizes all known chemical elements on the basis of their properties. While the importance of this table in chemistry is uncontroversial, the role that it plays in scientific reasoning remains heavily disputed. Many philosophers deny the explanatory role of the table and insist that it is “merely” classificatory (Shapere, in F. Suppe (Ed.) The structure of scientific theories, University of Illinois Press, Illinois, 1977; Scerri in Erkenntnis 47:229–243, 1997). In particular, it has been claimed that (...) the table does not figure in causal explanation because it “does not reveal causal structure” (Woody in Science after the practice turn in the philosophy, history, and social studies of science, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2014). This paper provides an analysis of what it means to say that a scientific figure reveals causal structure and it argues that the modern periodic table does just this. It also clarifies why these “merely” classificatory claims have seemed so compelling–this is because these claims often focus on the earliest periodic tables, which lack the causal structure present in modern versions. (shrink)

The problem of the peculiarcharacter of chemical laws and theories is a central topic in philosophy of chemistry. Oneof the most characteristic and, at the sametime, most puzzling examples in discussions onchemical laws and theories is Mendeleev''speriodic law. This law seems to be essentiallydifferent in its nature from the exact laws ofclassical physics, the latter being usuallyregarded as a paradigm of science byphilosophers. In this paper the main argumentsconcerning the peculiar character of chemicallaws and theories are examined. The laws ofchemistry (...) are natural laws to the same extentas are the laws of physics. The law discoveredby Mendeleev is a normal law of nature. It isnot a law of physics, nevertheless, it is exactin the same philosophical sense as are the lawsof physics. The periodic system of chemicalelements was established by constructing anidealized system of idealized elements. Thefundamental idealization substantiated byexperimental chemistry was the chemicalelement as a place in the periodicsystem. (shrink)

In the history of science, the birth of classical chemistry and thermodynamics produced an anomaly within Newtonian mechanical paradigm: force and acceleration were no longer citizens of new cited sciences. Scholars tried to reintroduce them within mechanistic approaches, as the case of the kinetic gas theory. Nevertheless, Thermodynamics, in general, and its Second Law, in particular, gradually affirmed their role of dominant not-reducible cognitive paradigms for various scientific disciplines: more than twenty formulations of Second Law—a sort of indisputable intellectual wealth—are (...) conceived after 1824 Sadi Carnot’s original statement and a multitude of entropy functions are proposed after 1865 Clausius’ former definition. Furthermore, at the end of nineteenth century, thermodynamics extended its cognitive domain to chemistry. Mainly thanks to Gibbs, a brand new discipline—chemical thermodynamics or physical chemistry—gradually affirmed its role inside the scientific community. This paper reports the former results of collaborative research program in the History and Epistemology of Science as well as Nature of Science Teaching aimed at retracing the foundations of the physical chemistry. Specifically, the research is structured in three parts: historical-epistemic reflections on fundamental thermodynamic concepts and principles—such as reversible process, heat, temperature, thermal equilibrium and Clausius’ Second Law—that play a structural role inside modern physical chemistry; panoramic overview on the entropy, whose polysemy makes it one of the most demanding concepts for scholars, teachers and students while approaching thermodynamics; conceptualization of chemical equilibrium as complex entity according to the dual epistemological approach offered by Gibbs’ thermodynamic model and the kinetic standpoint by Guldberg and Waage. In particular, the present work details an original reading of thermodynamic principles with the aim of setting forth a rationalized multidisciplinary substrate whereon the foundational concepts of reversible process and thermal equilibrium can be set. (shrink)

There has been a lively debate in the philosophy of science over _predictivism_: the thesis that successfully predicting a given body of data provides stronger evidence for a theory than merely accommodating the same body of data. I argue for a very strong version of the thesis using statistical results on the so-called “model selection” problem. This is the problem of finding the optimal model (family of hypotheses) given a body of data. The key idea that I will borrow from (...) the statistical literature is that the level of support a hypothesis, _H,_ receives from a body of data, _D,_ is inversely related to the number of adjustable parameters of the model from which _H_ was constructed. I will argue that when _D_ is not essential to the design of _H_ (i.e., when it is predicted), the model to which _H_ belongs has fewer adjustable parameters than when _D_ is essential to the design of _H_ (when it is accommodated)_._ This, I argue, provides us with an argument for a very strong version of predictivism. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that a hypothesis is better confirmed by some data if the hypothesis was not specifically designed to fit the data. ‘Prediction’, they argue, is superior to ‘accommodation’. Others deny that there is any epistemic advantage to prediction, and conclude that prediction and accommodation are epistemically on a par. This paper argues that there is a respect in which accommodation is superior to prediction. Specifically, the information that the data was accommodated rather than predicted suggests that the (...) data is less likely to have been manipulated or fabricated, which in turn increases the likelihood that the hypothesis is correct in light of the data. In some cases, this epistemic advantage of accommodation may even outweigh whatever epistemic advantage there might be to prediction, making accommodation epistemically superior to prediction all things considered. (shrink)

A theory’s fertility is one of the standard theoretical virtues. But how is it to be construed? In current philosophical discourse, particularly in the realism debate, theoretical fertility is usually understood in terms of novel success: a theory is fertile if it manages to make successful novel predictions. Another, more permissible, notion of fertility can be found in the work of Ernan McMullin. This kind of fertility, McMullin claims, gives us just as strong grounds for realism. My paper critically assesses (...) McMullin’s notion of fertility and its realist rationale. It concludes that McMullin’s preferred example, namely the fertile development of the Bohr-Sommerfeld model of the atom, does not support McMullin’s argument for realism. Although the implications for the realism debate are as of yet unclear, the case study offers some important methodological lessons. (shrink)

This paper presents a new 'discontinuous' view of Popper's theory of corroboration, where theories cease to have corroboration values when new severe tests are devised which have not yet been performed, on the basis of a passage from The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Through subsequent analysis and discussion, a novel problem for Popper's account of corroboration, which holds also for the standard view, emerges. This is the problem of the Big Test : that the severest test of any hypothesis is (...) actually to perform all possible tests. But this means that Popper's demand for 'the severest tests' amounts simply to a demand for 'all possible tests'. The paper closes by considering how this bears on accommodation vs. prediction, with respect to corroboration. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., & Worrall, J. . Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel and use-novel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to (...) the acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise the latter on general grounds.Keywords: Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev; Noble gases; Use-novel predictions; Heuristic account; Ad hoc hypotheses. (shrink)

This article focuses on the Russian chemist Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev's assessment of certain representations of various aspects of the periodic system that employed more mathematical methodology. The equations of interest were created by E. J. Mills, B. N. Chicherin, and J. H. Vincent. The English chemist Mills tried to find a firmer numerical basis for the periodicity of the elements. The Russian lawyer and political philosopher Chicherin was convinced of the existence of a mathematical law underlying the periodic system. The (...) English physicist Vincent explored the connection between atomic weights and the elements' order in listings based on atomic weights—a project which he associated with the periodic system of elements. Although, for Mendeleev, the equations of Mills, Chicherin, and Vincent promised a more precise expression of the law of periodicity, he continued to invoke his earlier standards. In particular, Mendeleev wanted the equations to respect the individuality of the elements, and called for completeness in conveying the complexities of chemical phenomena. Thus, the very qualities that he had valued while developing his periodic system in 1869–1871 also characterised his evaluation of the new means of representing aspects of that system. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and critically examine the reasoning leading to the famous prediction of the ‘omega minus’ particle by M. Gell-Mann and Y. Ne’eman (in 1962) on the basis of a symmetry classification scheme. While the peculiarity of this prediction has occasionally been noticed in the literature, a detailed treatment of the methodological problems it poses has not been offered yet. By spelling out the characteristics of this type of prediction, I aim to underscore the challenges raised by (...) this episode to standard scientific methodology, especially to the traditional deductive-nomological account of prediction. (shrink)

Historians and philosophers of science generally conceptualize scientific progress to be dichotomous, viz., experimental observations lead to scientific laws, which later facilitate the elaboration of explanatory theories. There is considerable controversy in the literature with respect to Mendeleev’s contribution to the origin, nature, and development of the periodic table. The objectives of this study are to explore and reconstruct: a) periodicity in the periodic table as a function of atomic theory; b) role of predictions in scientific theories and its implications (...) for the periodic table; and c) Mendeleev’s contribution: theory or an empirical law? The reconstruction shows that despite Mendeleev’s own ambivalence, periodicity of properties of chemical elements in the periodic table can be attributed to the atomic theory. It is argued that based on the Lakatosian framework, predictions play an important role in the development of scientific theories. In this context, Mendeleev’s predictions played a crucial role in the development of the periodic table. Finally, it is concluded that Mendeleev’s contribution can be considered as an “interpretative” theory which became “explanatory” after the periodic table was based on atomic numbers.Author Keywords: Periodic table; Mendeleev’s contribution; Theory; Empirical law; Interpretative theory. (shrink)

In this paper I defend Kuhn’s view of scientific discovery, which involves two central tenets, namely that a scientific discovery always requires a discovery-that and a discovery-what, and that there are two kinds of scientific discovery, resulting from the temporal order of the discovery-that and the discovery-what. I identify two problems with Kuhn’s account and offer solutions to them from a realist stance. Alternatives to Kuhn’s account are also discussed.

In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, 'timeless' and 'historicized'. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall and Patrick Maher is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.

: In this paper I argue that belief in the greater confirmatory value of prediction over accommodation can best be understood as a function of the practice rather than the logic of science. Attempts to account for this asymmetry within the logic of science have revealed no non-arbitrary way to address the problem of underdetermination as it applies to prediction and thus have failed to account for the preference for prediction over accommodation on logical grounds. Instead, I propose a model (...) that not only justifies and explains this preference, but allows for a richer taxonomy of the types of evidential confirmation that are employed in scientific reasoning. (shrink)

This is a comment on the paper by Barnes and the responses from Scerri and Worrall, debating the thesis that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers of (...) science employ, rather I describe how scientists themselves use facts and predictions to support their theories. I find wide variations, and no support for the assumption that scientists use a single ‘Scientific Method’ in deciding whether to accept a proposed new theory.Keywords: Predictivism; Novel predictions; Accommodation; Periodic law; Periodic table; Dmitri Mendeleev. (shrink)

Predictivism asserts that novel confirmations carry special probative weight. Epistemic pluralism asserts that the judgments of agents (about, e.g., the probabilities of theories) carry epistemic import. In this paper, I propose a new theory of predictivism that is tailored to pluralistic evaluators of theories. I replace the orthodox notion of use-novelty with a notion of endorsement-novelty, and argue that the intuition that predictivism is true has two roots. I provide a detailed Bayesian rendering of this theory and argue that pluralistic (...) theory evaluation pervades scientific practice. I compare my account of predictivism with those of Maher and Worrall. Introduction Why construction is a red herring for pluralist evaluators The unvirtuous accommodator Virtuous endorsers and the two roots of predictivism The two roots in Bayesian terms: the priors and background beliefs of endorsers Who are the pluralist evaluators? Two contemporary theories of predictivism 7.1 Maher: Reliable methods of theory construction 7.2 Worrall: The confirmation of core ideas Conclusion. (shrink)

Dmitrii Mendeleev’s periodic system is known for its predictive accuracy, but talk of its completeness is rarer. This is surprising because completeness was a quality that Mendeleev saw as important for a systematization of the chemical elements. Here, I explain how Mendeleev’s valuing of completeness influenced the development of his periodic system. After introducing five indicators of its completeness, I zoom into one in particular: Mendeleev’s inclusion of a schematic row of oxides. I then show how it guided Mendeleev’s predictions (...) of indium and ekaboron, which suggests that the valuing of completeness was instrumental for making predictions. (shrink)

A not unpopular thesis, when it comes to the confirmation of scientific theories, is that data which were used in the construction of a theory afford poorer support for that theory than data that played no role. Some compelling thought experiments have been offered in favour of this view, not as proof but rather to add some intuitive plausibility. In this paper I consider such thought experiments and argue that they do not support the thesis; the perceived importance of prediction (...) over accommodation, at least in these cases, is illusory. Introduction Background assumptions Strong thesis Weak thesis Conclusions. (shrink)

Scientific hypotheses may either predict particular unknown facts or accommodate previously-known data. Although affirmed predictions are intuitively more rewarding than accommodations of established facts, opinions divide whether predictive hypotheses are also epistemically superior to accommodation hypotheses. This paper examines the contribution of predictive hypotheses to discoveries of several bio-molecular systems. Having all the necessary elements of the system known beforehand, an abstract predictive hypothesis of semiconservative mode of DNA replication was successfully affirmed. However, in defining the genetic code whose biochemical (...) basis was unclear, hypotheses were only partially effective and supplementary experimentation was required for its conclusive definition. Markedly, hypotheses were entirely inept in predicting workings of complex systems that included unknown elements. Thus, hypotheses did not predict the existence and function of mRNA, the multiple unidentified components of the protein biosynthesis machinery, or the manifold unknown constituents of the ubiquitin–proteasome system of protein breakdown. Consequently, because of their inability to envision unknown entities, predictive hypotheses did not contribute to the elucidation of cation theories remained the sole instrument to explain complex bio-molecular systems, the philosophical question of alleged advantage of predictive over accommodative hypotheses became inconsequential. (shrink)

Much has been said about the accuracy of the famous predictions of the Russian chemist Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev, but far less has been written on how he made his predictions. Here we offer an explanation on how Mendeleev used his periodic system to predict both physical and chemical properties of little-known and entirely unknown chemical elements. We argue that there seems to be compelling evidence in favour of Mendeleev genuinely relying on his periodic system in the course of issuing his (...) predictions—a point recently contested by Woody Science after the practice turn in the philosophy, history, and social studies of science, Routledge, Abington, 2014). In particular, by using the known properties of a number of near neighbours of the three entirely unknown elements, we seek to show how the very format of his table enabled it to function as a powerful tool for Mendeleev in arriving at his predicted values. We suggest that Mendeleev’s use of the periodic system in making his prediction gives an illuminative example of what Woody calls “theoretical practices” in science. (shrink)

In philosophy, the empirical success of a science is often explained by the fact that it has managed to discover some law(s) of nature. This line of thought has not been thoroughly explored with respect to chemistry. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by showing how we could think about laws in chemistry. Specifically, it briefly presents how laws of nature are understood in philosophy of science. It then discusses two case studies from chemistry—the periodic table (...) and chemical reactions—and explains how general ideas about law-hood can be applied to these cases. Lastly, it presents research questions and philosophical problems that arise by considering chemistry from the perspective of laws. This analysis illustrates that there is value in thinking about laws in chemistry. (shrink)

On the basis of Levin’s claim that truth is not a scientific explanatory factor, Michel Ghins argues that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) is not scientific, therefore scientific realism is not a scientific hypothesis, and naturalism is wrong. I argue that there are genuine senses of ‘scientific’ and ‘explanation’ in which truth can yield scientific explanations. Hence, the NMA can be considered scientific in the sense that it hinges on a scientific explanation, it follows a typically scientific inferential pattern (IBE), (...) and it is based on an empirical fact (the success of science). Scientific realism, in turn, is scientific in the sense that it is supported both by a meta-level scientific argument (the NMA), and by first level scientific arguments through semantic ascent and generalization. However, both the NMA and scientific realism are not purely scientific, since they go beyond properly scientific concerns, and require additional philosophical reasoning. In turn, naturalism is correct in the sense that philosophy is continuous with science, partly based on it, and potentially equally well warranted. Beside denying the scientific nature of the NMA, Ghins raises some objections to its cogency , to which I reply in the final section. (shrink)

In this paper, we will address a recurring problem in the field of the general philosophy of science but one that takes on particular relevance in the context of chemistry: the problem surrounding scientific laws. The main challenge is that the laws of chemistry are not universal; moreover, in practice, they are stated alongside numerous exceptions. Given that there are exceptions, we could argue that what the laws assert is neither universally true nor necessary. But if that's the case, are (...) they genuine scientific laws? And if so, what is the reason for such lawfulness? (shrink)

The theme surrounding scientific discoveries is quite neglected in and about the sciences, especially in terms of historical and epistemological understanding. Discoveries are often treated as simple information about dates, places, and people. This work presents discussions centered on historical episodes related to chemical elements and the Periodic Law, based on reflections by Thomas Kuhn and Norwood Hanson, aiming to highlight and contextualize specific scientific discoveries' conceptual and epistemological structure. With that in mind, issues related to the inseparability of the (...) contexts of discovery and justification are recovered, along with the complex intrinsic structures of the genesis of scientific knowledge and distinct types and categories of scientific discoveries. (shrink)

I critically examine Stewart’s suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.

The philosophical significance of Dmitri Mendeleev’s successful predictions of the properties of gallium and scandium vis a vis the acceptance of the Periodic Table 1874–1886 has been debated recently. This author presents evidence that De Boisbaudran and Cleve both respectively predicted the possible existence of gallium and scandium, but on the basis of the old TRIAD methodology. This suggests that these successful Mendeleev predictions were therefore not independent corroboration of the concept of the Periodic System. Instead the significantly independent predictive (...) successes for Mendeleev’s system were the determination of the atomic weight of the known element uranium as 240 instead of the previously accepted 120 in 1874 and the isolation of germanium by Winkler in 1886. (shrink)

In the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP) there are important features on the problem of prediction, especially regarding novel facts. In his approach, Imre Lakatos proposed three different levels on prediction: aim, process, and assessment. Chapter 5 pays attention to the characterization of prediction in the methodology of research programs. Thus, it takes into account several features: (1) its pragmatic characterization, (2) the logical perspective as a proposition, (3) the epistemological component, (4) its role in the appraisal of research (...) programs, and (5) its place as a value for scientific research. -/- The notion of “novel facts” is highly relevant in his conception, where several aspects are involved: the directions of novel facts, the different kinds of novelty, and the transition from six possible options of “novel facts” to four choices. Thereafter, the prediction of novel facts as the criterion of appraisal is considered. On the one hand, this requires analyzing the theoretical, empirical, and heuristic possibilities of appraisal; and, on the other, whether there is an overemphasis on the role of prediction in methodology of scientific research programs. As a consequence, there is an analysis of Lakatos’ criterion of appraisal in MSRP and economics. (shrink)

"Partial realism" is a common position in the contemporary philosophy of science literature. It states that the "essential" elements of empirically successful scientific theories accurately represent corresponding features the world. This thesis makes several novel contributions related to this position. Firstly, it offers a new definition of the concept of “empirical success”, representing a principled merger between the use-novelty and unification accounts. Secondly, it provides a comparative critical analysis of various accounts of which elements are "essential" to the success of (...) a theory, including structural realism and the divide et impera strategy. A novel account of essentialness, entitled the “empirically successful sub-theory "account", is defended. Thirdly, it is argued that the realism/anti-realism debate should put to the side metaphysical questions and focus instead on partial realism's commitment to the continuity of science. Because this commitment lacks metaphysical implications, it is referred to as "deflationary realism". Anti-realists cannot reject deflationary realism as a matter of a priori principle; its overall viability can therefore only be assessed by a careful examination of the history of science. Finally, another consequence of partial realism, named "partial rationalism", is defended. Partial rationalism states that, in cases where several competing theories have been suggested, scientists are rational just in case they accept the essential elements of each of the scientific theories on offer. This novel position subverts the existing literature on scientific "revolutions", as it sometimes demands that scientists devise a synthesis between competing scientific theories, instead of "choosing" only one. The philosophical points defended in this thesis are illustrated and supported by case studies from the history of science, including Fresnel’s wave theory of light, the Copernican revolution, the "neo-Darwinian synthesis" in evolutionary biology, the "prion revolution" in molecular biology, the miasma theory of disease, and the chemical revolution. (shrink)

The history of the diffusion and confirmation of Mendeleev’s periodic table of elements has proven to be a challenging testbed for contemporary philosophical debates on the role of predictions in science. More than ten years of fruitful literature came after Scerri and Worrall :407–452, 2001) versus Maher and Lipton ; nevertheless, such a long-lasting debate left quite a few open questions. The aim of this contribution is to go through the various cases that emerged during the debate, in an effort (...) to explain them coherently in a weak predictivist perspective. Maher’s early account—according to which the astounding success of the major predictions alone was enough to explain the confirmation of the periodic table—can now be replaced by a more balanced and thorough picture, where both predictions and accommodations do weight. (shrink)

Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our (...) scientific theories can still be defended. Selective realists thereby hope to secure the argument from success against apparent historical counterexamples. Independently of that objective, historical considerations have inspired a further argument for selective realism, where evidence for the retention of parts of theories is itself offered as justification for adopting a realist attitude towards them. Given the nature of these arguments from success and from retention, a reasonable expectation is that they would complement and reinforce one another, but although several theses purport to provide such a synthesis the results are often unconvincing. In this paper I reconsider the realist’s favoured type of scientific success, novel success, offer a revised interpretation of the concept, and argue that a significant consequence of reconfiguring the realist’s argument from success accordingly is a greater potential for its unification with the argument from retention.Keywords: Scientific realism; Pessimistic meta-induction; Success; Progress; Aether; Novelty. (shrink)

In this paper, domain-specificity is presented as an understudied problem in chemical education. This argument is unpacked by drawing from two bodies of literature: learning of science and epistemology of science, both themes that have cognitive as well as philosophical undertones. The wider context is students’ engagement in scientific inquiry, an important goal for science education and one that has not been well executed in everyday classrooms. The focus on science learning illustrates the role of domain specificity in scientific reasoning. (...) The discussion on epistemology of science presents ideas from the emerging field of philosophy of chemistry to highlight the much neglected area of epistemology in chemical education. Domain-specificity is exemplified in the context of chemical laws, in particular the Periodic Law. The applications of the discussion for chemical education are explored in relation to argumentation, itself an epistemologically grounded discourse pattern in science. The overall implications include the need for reconceptualization of the nature of teaching and learning in chemistry to include more particular epistemological aspects of chemistry. (shrink)

This paper addresses the conceptual as well as social origins of Mendeleev’s discovery of the periodic law and its reception by the chemical community by taking account of three factors: Mendeleev’s early research and its relevance to the discovery; his concepts of chemistry, especially that of the chemical elements; and the social context of the discovery and the reception in the chemical community. Mendeleev's clear distinction between abstract elements and simple bodies was a departure from Lavoisier’s famous definition of elements (...) as an endpoint of analysis and originated from his research in indefinite compounds. As a comparison, the paper also analyzes Lothar Meyer’s approach to the classification of the elements. Mendeleev’s new concept of chemical elements and the existence of an audience in the form of the newly established Russian Chemical Society, and his ``German connection'', helped Mendeleev in his discovery and its reception. (shrink)

Historically, hypotheses failed in most cases to correctly forecast the workings of complex biological systems. Francis Crick’s adaptor hypothesis, however, stands out as an exceptional case of a confirmed abstract prediction. This hypothesis presciently anticipated the existence of RNA adaptors that function as bridges between amino acids and the chemically different nucleic acid template for proteins. Crick conjectured that the adaptors are enzymatically charged with cognate amino acids, they bind to complementary protein-coding nucleic acid, and their liberated amino acids are (...) incorporated into growing protein chains. Independently from and concomitantly with Crick’s hypothesis, Mahlon Hoagland and Paul Zamecnik conducted experiments with no guiding theory that culminated in discoveries of the actual adaptors, transfer RNA (tRNA) molecules, and their amino acids charging enzymes. This paper traces the parallel histories of Crick’s adaptor hypothesis and of the experimental discovery of tRNA and compares their relative impacts on the scientific community. Remarkably, despite the brilliance of Crick’s confirmed prognostication, it had marginal impact on practicing scientists. Conversely, Hoagland and Zamecnik’s experimental discoveries and their evidence-based model of protein synthesis had immediate and enduring impact. I discuss possible explanations for the different impacts of the theoretical prediction and experimental identifications of the same entities. (shrink)