- Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.details
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Cryptonormative Judgments.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3-24.details
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Valuing and believing valuable.Kubala Robbie - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):59-65.details
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How Collusion Perpetuates Racial Discrimination in Societies that Ostensibly Promote Equal Opportunity.Helen Lauer - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (1-2):75-101.details
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Belief, quasi-belief, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.Robert Noggle - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):654-668.details
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Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.details
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Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
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Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.details
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Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing.Marcel Jahn & Lukas Beck - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Understanding implicit bias: A case for regulative dispositionalism.Annemarie Kalis & Harmen Ghijsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (8):1212-1233.details
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Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Stereotyping Patients.Katherine Puddifoot - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (1):69-90.details
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Retracted article: Habits, priming and the explanation of mindless action.Ezio Di Nucci - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (4):795-795.details
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How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.details
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What is implicit bias?Jules Holroyd, Robin Scaife & Tom Stafford - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12437.details
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Self‐Knowledge and the Guise of the Good.Amir Saemi - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):272-281.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Automaticity.Alex Madva Michael Brownstein - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.details
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1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.details
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The Transparency of Mind.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):295-303.details
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Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception.José Eduardo Porcher - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20):67-84.details
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Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.details
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Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.details
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Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Everyday anxious doubt.Juliette Vazard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-19.details
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Radical embodied cognitive science and problems of intentionality.Eric Gordon Epstein - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):229-266.details
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Vices of the Mind: A Reply to ALFANO, PLAKIAS, TANESINI, and VIGANI.Quassim Cassam - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):881-888.details
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In Praise of Outsourcing.Neil Levy - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3):344-365.details
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Promote Scientific Integrity via Journal Peer Review Data.Carole J. Lee - 2017 - Science 357 (6348):256-257.details
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Mental Agency as Self-Regulation.Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.details
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Iteration and Fragmentation.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):656-673.details
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Mindreading, emotion-regulation, and oppression.Maria Doulatova - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-25.details
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Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and seeing‐as: An alternative to “alief” as an explanation of reason‐recalcitrant behaviours.Talia Morag - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):38-55.details
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(1 other version)The Unbearable Uncertainty Paradox.Sabine Roeser - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):640-653.details
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Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser.Neil Levy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):991-1006.details
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Deliberation and the First-Person Perspective.Jens Dam Ziska - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):35-57.details
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Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
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