- What are Theories of Desire Theories of?Tamar Schapiro - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):131-150.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Towards a semantics for metanormative constructivism.Jeremy M. Schwartz & Joel D. Velasco - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3061-3076.details
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Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default.Thomas Schmidt - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):17-27.details
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Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.details
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Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons, by T.M. Scanlon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. x + 132, US$35. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):195-198.details
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Minds and morals.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):393-408.details
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What if ideal advice conflicts? A dilemma for idealizing accounts of normative practical reasons.Eric Sampson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1091-1111.details
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Thin as a Needle, Quick as a Flash: Murdoch on Agency and Moral Progress.Jack Samuel - 2021 - Review of Metaphysics 75 (2):345-373.details
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Against Scanlon's Theory of the Strength of Practical Reasons.Eric Sampson - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-6.details
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Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.details
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Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.details
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Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
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Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):170-199.details
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In defence of good simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.details
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Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.details
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Reasons and practical possibility.Simon Robertson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1104-1135.details
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Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits.Simon Robertson - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (6):591-613.details
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Epistemic constraints on practical normativity.Simon Robertson - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):81-106.details
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Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.details
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The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.details
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Why I’m still a proportionalist.Travis N. Rieder - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):251-270.details
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Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).details
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Meeting constitutivists halfway.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2951-2968.details
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Rules of Use.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):566-583.details
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How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
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Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):103-120.details
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A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.details
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Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for the Right Reasons.Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins & Bradley J. Strawser - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):851-872.details
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Is reasoning responding to reasons?Franziska Poprawe - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):146-159.details
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The Ravens Paradox and Negative Existential Judgments about Evidence.David Plunkett - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):237-247.details
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Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity.David Plunkett - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):509-534.details
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III—Normative Facts and Reasons.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):53-75.details
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Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):73-91.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.details
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Ethical Non-naturalism and the Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):581-590.details
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The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.details
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Wrongfulness rewarded?: A normative paradox.David O’Brien & Ben Schwan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6897-6916.details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):459-484.details
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The Likelihood of Actions and the Neurobiology of Virtues: Veto and Consent Power.Claudia Navarini - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):309-323.details
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“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.details
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The possibility of fitting love: irreplaceability and selectivity.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):985-1010.details
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