- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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(1 other version)Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.Murat Aydede - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Consciousness, intentionality, and intelligence: Some foundational issues for artificial intelligence.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2000 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.details
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Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.details
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Conceptual role semantics, the theory theory, and conceptual change.Ingo Brigandt - 2004 - In Conceptual role semantics, the theory theory, and conceptual change. Murcia: pp. 30-34.details
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Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.details
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Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.details
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Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.details
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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.details
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Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought.Frances Egan - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):379 - 388.details
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(1 other version)Problems of representation I: nature and role.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 233.details
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Truth and meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.details
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The Riddle of Understanding Nonsense.Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):372–411.details
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There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-233.details
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Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systems.Carrie Figdor - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2793-2816.details
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Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Two dogmas of empirical justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):221-237.details
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Communication and Variance.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):147-169.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.details
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The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations.David Braun & Jennifer Saul - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (1):1 - 41.details
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Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
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Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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The Story About Propositions.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):635-674.details
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The content and acquisition of lexical concepts.Richard Horsey - 2006details
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Review. [REVIEW]Kent Bach & Robert M. Harnish - 1983 - Synthese 54 (3):469-493.details
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An alternative to Kitcher's theory of conceptual progress and his account of the change of the Gene concept.Ingo Brigandt - 2004details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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