- Forever fitting feelings.Christopher Howard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):80-98.details
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Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.details
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Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):787-816.details
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How there Could be Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):667-680.details
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A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.details
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The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way.Andrés G. Garcia - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):681-692.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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On Not Being “Worth It”.Andrew McKay Flynn - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.details
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Slaves of the Passions.David Enoch - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):423-446.details
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Brentano's Fallacy: Moore's Arguments Against Brentano's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Krister Bykvist - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):243-259.details
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Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.details
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Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics.Derek Baker - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):829-852.details
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Admiration and Motivation.Alfred Archer - 2019 - Emotion Review 11 (2):140-150.details
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Normative Resilience.Henrik Andersson & Jakob Werkmäster - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):195-208.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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Maximising Expected Value Under Axiological Uncertainty. An Axiomatic Approach.Stefan Riedener - 2015 - Dissertation, Oxforddetails
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No Kind of Reason is the Wrong Kind of Reason.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 261-276.details
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Can Beliefs Be Based on Practical Reasons?Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2019 - In Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: pp. 215-234.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Neo-sentimentalism and the bodily attitudinal theory of emotions.Chun Nam Chan - unknowndetails
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On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology.Kurt Sylvan - manuscriptdetails
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