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Science, Perception and Reality

New York: Humanities Press (1963)

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  1. Philosophy Today: Cries of Alarm and Prospects of Progress.Paolo Parrini - 2020 - SATS 20 (2):97-116.
    Today’s critical state of philosophy is examined by considering two of its aspects: the way in which philosophy presently is ever more typically practised and the new challenges it has to face to keep up with the changed scientific, and more generally cultural and social context. The essay outlines some prospects of progress in the light of those which still now can be considered the proper tasks of philosophical inquiry. Such tasks are singled out through an historical survey of the (...)
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  • Scientific Perspectivism in the Phenomenological Tradition.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-27.
    In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it does have its forerunners. Figures that are (...)
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  • Scientific Philosophy and the Critique of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine.Sean Morris - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):773-799.
    In his “Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science,” Michael Friedman argues that Carnap’s philosophy of science “is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather [than] solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine”. In this paper, I take issue with this claim, arguing that Quine, too, is a part of this anti-metaphysical tradition. I begin in section I (...)
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  • Representations of the World: Memories, Perceptions, Beliefs, Intentions, and Plans.Paul Kockelman - 2006 - Semiotica 2006 (162):73-125.
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  • Relativismo epistemológico Y neopragmatismo.José Olimpo Suárez Molano - 2008 - Escritos 16 (36):116-168.
    El neopragmatismo ha renovado la vieja cuestión del relativismo epistemológico pero enfocándolo, ahora, desde el horizonte del lenguaje. En particular el profesor Richard Rorty ha avanzado algunas tesis que han conmovido al mundo académico, llevando la disuasión hacia un asunto pertinente: ¿Qué función debe cumplir la filosofía? ¿Verdad o solidaridad? ¿Universalismo o contextualismo? Rorty se muestra partidario, a partir de la crítica a la verdad como espejo de la naturaleza, a retomar el diálogo socrático en el que todas las voces (...)
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  • There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa.Amit Chaturvedi - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (2):255-314.
    This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...)
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  • Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The Serpent's Trail: William James, Object‐Oriented Programming, and Critical Realism.Larry J. Crockett - 2012 - Zygon 47 (2):388-414.
    Pragmatism has played only a small role in the half century and more of the science‐and‐religion dialogue, in part because pragmatism was at a low ebb in the 1950s. Even though Jamesean pragmatism in particular is experiencing a resurgence, owing partly to the work of Rorty and Putnam, it remains inconspicuous in the dialogue. Excepting artificial intelligence and artificial life, computer science also has not played a large role in the dialogue. Recent research into the foundations of object‐oriented programming, however, (...)
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  • Between Causes and Reasons: Sellars, Hegel (and Lewis) on “Sensation”.Luca Corti - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (3):422-447.
    ABSTRACTThis paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel (...)
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  • Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things.Willem A. deVries - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (3):363-378.
    ABSTRACTI have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain an...
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  • Substances.John Heil - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):645-658.
    ABSTRACTThe paper takes up a conception of substances according to which substances are simple property bearers, properties being modes, particular qualitative ways individual substances are. What a substance does or would do is determined by its qualities. Efficient causation is to be understood as the manifesting of powers possessed by substances owing to their qualitative natures. Although complexes, entities with substantial parts, are not substances, they would be no less real, no less participants in the causal fray. What the substances (...)
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  • Just What is the Relation Between the Manifest and the Scientific Images?Willem A. deVries - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):112-128.
    Robert B. Brandom’s From Empiricism to Expressivism ranges widely over fundamental issues in metaphysics, with occasional forays into epistemology as well. The centerpiece is what Brandom calls ‘the Kant-Sellars thesis about modality’. This is ‘[t]he claim that in being able to use ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything that one needs to know how to do, in principle, to use alethic modal vocabulary – in particular subjunctive conditionals’. Despite claiming descent from Sellars, Brandom defends here (...)
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  • Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability.Christopher Frey - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):237-254.
    I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to (...)
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  • Discursive and Somatic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty Contra 'McDowell or Sellars'.Carl B. Sachs - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):199-227.
    Here I show that Sellars’ radicalization of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions is vulnerable to a challenge grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. Sellars argues that Kant’s concept of ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between singular demonstrative phrases and sense-impressions. In light of the critique of the Myth of the Given, Sellars argues, in the ‘Myth of Jones’, that sense-impression are theoretical posits. I argue that Merleau-Ponty offers a way of understanding perceptual activity which successfully avoids both the Myth of (...)
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  • EMU and Inference: What the Explanatory Model of Scientific Understanding Ignores.Mark Newman - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (1):55-74.
    The Explanatory Model of Scientific Understanding is a deflationary thesis recently advocated by Kareem Khalifa. EMU is committed to two key ideas: all understanding-relevant knowledge is propositional in nature; and the abilities we use to generate understanding are merely our usual logical reasoning skills. In this paper I provide an argument against both ideas, suggesting that scientific understanding requires a significant amount of non-propositional knowledge not captured by logical relations. I use the Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding to reveal how (...)
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  • Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  • What Makes Writing Academic.Julia Molinari - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Nottingham
    This thesis contextualises academic writing in EAP (English for Academic Purposes) and subjects it to an interdisciplinary (educational and philosophical) analysis in order to argue that what makes writing academic are its socio-academic practices and values, not its conventional forms. In rejecting dominant discourses that frame academic writing as a transferable skill which can be reduced to conventional forms, I show that academic writings are varied and evolve alongside changing writer agencies and textual environments. This accounts for the emergence of (...)
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  • A Process Ontology.Haines Brown - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (3):291-312.
    The paper assumes that to be of practical interest process must be understood as physical action that takes place in the world rather than being an idea in the mind. It argues that if an ontology of process is to accommodate actuality, it must be represented in terms of relative probabilities. Folk physics cannot accommodate this, and so the paper appeals to scientific culture because it is an emergent knowledge of the world derived from action in it. Process is represented (...)
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  • The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?Pascal Engel - unknown
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein's rule following considerations, Davidson's triangulation argument, and Brandom's inferential pragmatics, and criticizes each. It is argued that (...)
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  • Evidence of Factive Norms of Belief and Decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.
    According to factive accounts of the norm of belief and decision-making, you should not believe or base decisions on a falsehood. Even when the evidence misleadingly suggests that a false proposition is true, you should not believe it or base decisions on it. Critics claim that factive accounts are counterintuitive and badly mischaracterize our ordinary practice of evaluating beliefs and decisions. This paper reports four experiments that rigorously test the critic’s accusations and the viability of factive accounts. The results undermine (...)
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  • Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism can split the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and his reasons for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that (...)
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  • Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
    This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
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  • The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  • Consciousness and Sensation: Philosophical Aspects.David Rosenthal - 2001 - In N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Pergamon/Elsevier.
    consciousness. Such unconscious processing always " Cambridge, UK " tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this.
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  • Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation.Peter Forrest - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):239-254.
    In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason (...)
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  • Modeling Mental Qualities.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
    Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, (...)
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  • Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.
    Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...)
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  • Moderate Scientism in Philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - forthcoming - In Jereon de Ridder, Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford University Press.
    Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific (...)
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  • New Perspectives on Analytic Pragmatism.Daniele Santoro & Carlo Penco - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):1-11.
    Analytic pragmatism is a framework of analysis elaborated by Robert Brandom, whose goal is to explain the relations between meaning and use according to a systematic and general method of inquiry. In April 2009, a workshop was organized to discuss the recent developments of this new theoretical approach. Brandom delivered three lectures, where he explored some aspects of analytic pragmatism and addressed the motivating themes of this enterprise, while the contribution from the other speakers ranged over specific aspects of the (...)
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  • Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.
    There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first-order and second-order beliefs. (...)
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  • Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics.Pablo Lorenzano - 2000 - In Joseph D. Sneed, Wolfgang Balzer & C.-Ulises Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Rodopi. pp. 75-251.
    This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...)
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  • Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.
    What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, you (...)
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  • Le varietà del naturalismo.Gaia Bagnati, Alice Morelli & Melania Cassan (eds.) - 2019 - Edizioni Ca' Foscari.
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  • Directival Theory of Meaning Resurrected.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 29:62-81.
    The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...)
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  • Dispositions, Logical States, and Mental Occurrents.Ronald C. Hoy - 1980 - Synthese 44 (2):207-40.
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  • Multiculturalism as a Cognitive Virtue of Scientific Practice.Ann E. Cudd - 1998 - Hypatia 13 (3):43 - 61.
    I argue that science will be better, by its own criteria, if it pursues multiculturalism, by which I mean an ethnic- and gender-diverse set of scientists. I argue that minority and women scientists will be more likely to recognize false, prejudiced assumptions about race and gender that infect theories. And the kinds of changes that society will undergo in pursuing multiculturalism will help reveal these faulty assumptions to scientists of all races and genders.
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  • No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
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  • Intentional Relations and the Sideways‐on View: On McDowell's Critique of Sellars.Lionel Shapiro - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):300-319.
    : McDowell opposes the view that the intentionality of language and thought remains mysterious unless it can be understood ‘from outside the conceptual order’. While he thinks the demand for such a ‘sideways-on’ understanding can be the result of ‘scientistic prejudice’, he points to Sellars's thought as exhibiting a different source: a distortion of our perspective ‘from within the conceptual order’. The distortion involves a failure on Sellars's part to see how descriptions from within the conceptual order can present expressions (...)
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  • The Rumble in the Bundle.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):298-313.
    In 1952, two well-known characters called ‘A’ and ‘B’ met for the first time to argue about the Identity of Indiscernibles (Black, 1952). A argued that the principle is true, and B that it is false. By all accounts A took a bit of a beating and came out worst-off. Forty-three years later John O’Leary-Hawthorne offered a response on behalf of A that looked as if it would work so long as A was willing to accept the universal-bundle theory of (...)
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  • Situating Experience: Agency, Perception, and the Given.Matthew Burstein - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):1-29.
    William Alston has been a long-time critic of the arguments of Wilfrid Sellars, and he has recently revisited the arguments made by Sellars in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Alston’s work attempts to show how Sellarsian views fail to account for our understanding of perception by making a two-part attack on Sellars’s account: part one of the attack takes up the Sellarsian approach to ‘looks’-talk, and part two concerns Sellars’s thoroughgoing conceptualism with regard to perception. In this article, I (...)
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  • The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.
    Abductivists claim that explanatory considerations (e.g., simplicity, parsimony, explanatory breadth, etc.) favor belief in the external world over skeptical hypotheses involving evil demons and brains in vats. After showing how most versions of abductivism succumb fairly easily to obvious and fatal objections, I explain how rationalist versions of abductivism can avoid these difficulties. I then discuss the most pressing challenges facing abductivist appeals to the a priori and offer suggestions on how to overcome them.
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  • Notes on Bergmann’s New Ontology and Account of Relations.Lorenzo Peña - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:219-249.
    Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to speak (...)
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  • Intentionality.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184.
    At the level of our platitudinous background knowledge about things, speech is the expression of thought. And understanding what such expressing involves is central to understanding the relation between thinking and speaking. Part of what it is for a speech act to express a mental state is that the speech act accurately captures the mental state and can convey to others what mental state it is. And for this to occur, the speech act at least must have propositional content that (...)
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  • The Priority Principle From Kant to Frege.Jeremy Heis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):268-297.
    In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant's thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode […] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought (...)
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  • Speculative Fiction and the Philosophy of Perception.Brian L. Keeley - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):169-181.
    After first noting that I seek to broaden the definition of science fiction to a little more loosely defined speculative fiction, this essay explores four different ways in which fiction can work together with both the sciences and the philosophy of perception. This cooperation is needed because there is much about the sensory worlds of humans and non-human animals of which we continue to be ignorant. First, speculative fiction can be a source of hypotheses about the nature of the senses. (...)
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  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
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  • Elme És Evolúció.Bence Nanay - 2000 - Kávé..
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  • Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention, Action and Introspection.Petter Johansson - unknown
    This thesis is an empirical and theoretical exploration of the surprising finding that people often may fail to notice dramatic mismatches between what they want and what they get, a phenomenon my collaborators and I have named choice blindness. The thesis consists of four co-authored papers, dealing with different aspects of the phenomenon. Paper one presents an initial set of studies using a computerised choice procedure, and discusses the relation of choice blindness to the parent phenomenon of change blindness. Paper (...)
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  • Sellars and the Space of Reasons [Sellars y El Espacio de Las Razones].John McDowell - unknown
    In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars introduces the image of the space of reasons, and delineates a non-traditional empiricism, uncontaminated by the Myth of the Given. Brandom takes Sellars’s drift to be against empiricism as such, against the very idea that something deserving to be called “experience” could be relevant to the acquisition of empirical knowledge in any way except merely causally. In this paper I attack Brandom’s idea that we anyway need a concession to externalism for non-inferential (...)
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  • Nové Filosofie Sociální Vědy: Realistická Alternativa.William Outhwaite - 2007 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 29 (3-4):5-38.
    This text provides a detailed examination of realism as a philosophy of natural science and its implications for the practice of social science. It also summarises some of the central themes of realism and its relations with other philosophical traditions. Realism is seen as essentially an ontological doctrine which means that it shares with neo-pragmatism a critique of the predominantly epistemological stress – most evident in rationalism – of much recent philosophy. It is argued that on the relation between science (...)
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