- If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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Why we reason the way we do.Nishi Shah - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.details
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Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution.Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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Skepticism about reasons for emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):108-123.details
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Action and Necessity: Wittgenstein's On Certainty and the Foundations of Ethics.Michael Wee - 2024 - Dissertation, Durham Universitydetails
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Twisted ways to speak our minds, or ways to speak our twisted minds?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation: First essays. Cham: Springer.details
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Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Stipulative Agency.Derek Lam - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 7-31.details
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Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (3):337-356.details
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How Important Are Possessed Reasons?Jonathan Way - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):156-167.details
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Suspending judgment the correct way.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2001-2023.details
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The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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(1 other version)Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.details
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Ethics and Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):353 - 382.details
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Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.details
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Explaining the Instrumental Principle.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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(1 other version)Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):443-462.details
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The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):379-388.details
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In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.details
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Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.details
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Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake?Yair Levy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2021-2038.details
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How we know what we intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.details
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On an alleged counter-example to causal decision theory.John Cantwell - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):127-152.details
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A Davidsonian Account of the Practicality of Practical Reasoning.Alexander Leferman - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (1):67-89.details
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The Puzzle of Faith.Jason C. Stigall - unknowndetails
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Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.details
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The conclusion of practical reasoning: the shadow between idea and act.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):287-302.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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(1 other version)Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.details
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Diachronic agency and practical entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.details
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Broome on reasoning.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2).details
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Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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