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In earlier publications of the first author it was shown that intentional explanation of actions, functional explanation of biological traits and causal explanation of abnormal events share a common structure. They are called explanation by specification (of a goal, a biological function, an abnormal causal factor, respectively) as opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law. Explanation by specification is guided by a schematic train of thought, of which the argumentative steps not concerning questions were already shown to be logically (...) 

An analogy between functional dependencies and implicational formulas of sentential logic has been discussed in the literature. We feel that a somewhat different connexion between dependency theory and sentential logic is suggested by the similarity between Armstrong's axioms for functional dependencies and Tarski's defining conditions for consequence relations, and we pursue aspects of this other analogy here for their theoretical interest. The analogy suggests, for example, a different semantic interpretation of consequence relations: instead of thinking ofB as a consequence of (...) 

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even wellknown; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach. 

Two different kinds of multipleconclusion consequence relations taken from Shoesmith and Smiley and Galatos and Tsinakis or Nowak, called here disjunctive and conjunctive, respectively, defined on a formal language, are considered. They are transferred into a bounded lattice and a complete lattice, respectively. The properties of such abstract consequence relations are presented. 

Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language to metaphysics. It (...) 

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...) 



The phrase ‘autoepistemic logic’ was introduced in Moore [1985] to refer to a study inspired in large part by criticisms in Stalnaker [1980] of a particular nonmonotonic logic proposed by McDermott and Doyle.1 Very informative discussions for those who have not encountered this area are provided by Moore [1988] and the wideranging survey article Konolige [1994], and the scant remarks in the present introductory section do not pretend to serve in place of those treatments as summaries of the field. A (...) 

In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle advances three arguments against circular proof. The third argument relies on his discussion of circular proof in Prior Analytics 2.5. This is problematic because the two chapters seem to deal with two rather disparate conceptions of circular proof. In Posterior Analytics 1.3, Aristotle gives a purely propositional account of circular proof, whereas in Prior Analytics 2.5 he gives a more complex, syllogistic account. My aim is to show that these problems can be solved, and that (...) 

In this paper we investigate the relation between the axiomatization of a given logical consequence operation and axiom systems defining the class of algebras related to that consequence operation. We show examples which prove that, in general there are no natural relation between both ways of axiomatization. 

Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic logics have attracted a sceptical question: "Granted that logic can be done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this is the preferred way to do it?'' A recent suggestion is that at least part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialectical writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess a kind of foundational significance. The relation of being foundational (...) 

Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were nonnormal interpretations of classical logic  ones for which negation and conjunction are not truthfunctional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church argued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disagree. We provide a definition of "nonnormal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...) 

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Dana Scott introduced a kind of generalization (or perhaps simplification would be a better description) of the notion of inference, familiar from Gentzen, in which one may consider multiple conclusions rather than single formulas. Scott used this idea to good effect in a number of projects including the axiomatization of manyvalued logics (of various kinds) and a reconsideration of the motivation of C.I. Lewis. Since he left the subject it has been vigorously prosecuted (...) 

This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multipleconclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a prooftheoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multipleconclusion systems are illsuited for this purpose because they fail (...) 

We study a range of issues connected with the idea of replacing one formula by another in a fixed context. The replacement core of a consequence relation ⊢ is the relation holding between a set of formulas {A1,..., Am,...} and a formula B when for every context C, we have C,..., C,... ⊢ C. Section 1 looks at some differences between which inferences are lost on passing to the replacement cores of the classical and intuitionistic consequence relations. For example, we (...) 

Entailment relations, introduced by Scott in the early 1970s, provide an abstract generalisation of Gentzen’s multiconclusion logical inference. Originally applied to the study of multivalued logics, this notion has then found plenty of applications, ranging from computer science to abstract algebra. In particular, an entailment relation can be regarded as a constructive presentation of a distributive lattice and in this guise it has proven to be a useful tool for the constructive reformulation of several classical theorems in commutative algebra. In (...) 

The aim of the article is to outline the historical background and the present state of the methodology of deductive systems invented by Alfred Tarski in the thirties. Key notions of Tarski's methodology are presented and discussed through, the recent development of the original concepts and ideas. 

There exist important deductive systems, such as the nonnormal modal logics, that are not proper subjects of classical algebraic logic in the sense that their metatheory cannot be reduced to the equational metatheory of any particular class of algebras. Nevertheless, most of these systems are amenable to the methods of universal algebra when applied to the matrix models of the system. In the present paper we consider a wide class of deductive systems of this kind called protoalgebraic logics. These include (...) 

The concept of erotetic argument is introduced. Two relations between sets of declarative sentences and questions are analysed; and two classes of erotetic arguments are characterized. 

The classesMatr( ) of all matrices (models) for structural finitistic entailments are investigated. The purpose of the paper is to prove three theorems: Theorem I.7, being the counterpart of the main theorem from Czelakowski [3], and Theorems II.2 and III.2 being the entailment counterparts of Bloom's results [1]. Theorem I.7 states that if a classK of matrices is adequate for , thenMatr( ) is the least class of matrices containingK and closed under the formation of ultraproducts, submatrices, strict homomorphisms and (...) 

Firstorder logic is formalized by means of tools taken from the logic of questions. A calculus of questions which is a counterpart of the Pure Calculus of Quantifiers is presented. A direct proof of completeness of the calculus is given. 



The class Matr(C) of all matrices for a prepositional logic (, C) is investigated. The paper contains general results with no special reference to particular logics. The main theorem (Th. (5.1)) which gives the algebraic characterization of the class Matr(C) states the following. Assume C to be the consequence operation on a prepositional language induced by a class K of matrices. Let m be a regular cardinal not less than the cardinality of C. Then Matr (C) is the least class (...) 

The concepta question is reducible to a nonempty set of questions is defined and examined. The basic results are: (1) each question which is sound relative to some of its presuppositions is reducible to some set of binary (i.e. having exactly two direct answers) questions; (b) each question which has a finite number of direct answers is reducible to some finite set of binary questions; (c) if entailment is compact, then each normal question (i.e. sound relative to its presuppositions) is (...) 

I show that the modeltheoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix modeltheoretic truthconditions for logical connectives. 

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) 

The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaningisuse framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to (...) 



A possibility of defining logical constants within abstract logical frameworks is discussed, in relation to abstract definition of logical consequence. We propose using duals as a general method of applying the idea of invariance under replacement as a criterion for logicality. 

