- Reasons and the ambiguity of 'belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.details
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Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality.Maria Alvarez - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3293-3310.details
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Non-Cognitivism and Validity.David Alm - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):121-147.details
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Problems for moral/natural supervenience.David E. Alexander - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):73 - 84.details
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Alief or belief? A contextual approach to belief ascription.Miri Albahari - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.details
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Filosofía Experimental y Economía Experimental: un enfoque híbrido.Fernando Aguiar, Antonio Gaitán & Blanca Rodríguez López - 2014 - Isegoría 51:623-648.details
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Extended preferences and interpersonal comparisons: A new account.Matthew D. Adler - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (2):123-162.details
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Aggregating moral preferences.Matthew D. Adler - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):283-321.details
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Moral Mistakes.Zed Adams - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):1-21.details
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Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2013 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.details
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The Wrong Time to Aim at What's Right: When is De Dicto Moral Motivation Less Virtuous?Ron Aboodi - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):307-314.details
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One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.details
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Transcultural and Transnational Communication Principles? Suggestions for Minimum and Maximum Values as a Common Ground.Anthony Löwstedt & Natalia Hatarova - 2024 - Journal of Media Ethics 39 (2):85-98.details
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Socially Motivated Belief and Its Epistemic Discontents.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2024 - Philosophic Exchange.details
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A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
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Divine Desire Theory and Obligation.Christian B. Miller - 2008 - In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New waves in philosophy of religion. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105--24.details
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Defending Aesthetic Internalism: Liking, Loving, and Wholeheartedness.James Harold - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective.David Heering - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):665-684.details
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Motivational Internalism and The Second-Order Desire Explanation.Xiao Zhang - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(D2)5-18.details
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Famine, Affluence, and Amorality.David Sackris - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(A1)5-29.details
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By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Svavarsdóttir’s Burden.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):577-589.details
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Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism.Attila Tanyi - 2013 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 500-527.details
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Disagreement, Error, and an Alternative to Reference Magnetism.Timothy Sundell - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):743-759.details
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Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
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The Canberra Plan and the Nature of Law.Torgen Spaak - 2016 - In Paweł Banaś, Adam Dyrda & Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (eds.), Metaphilosophy of Law. Portland, Oregon: Hart. pp. 81-119.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Relativism.Chris Gowans - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.details
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.details
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Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood.David Enoch & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 434-462.details
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Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.details
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Error Theory in Metaethics.Jonas Olson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-71.details
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Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.N. G. Laskowski & Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 536-551.details
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The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-28.details
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Ethical Judgment and Motivation.David Faraci & Tristram McPherson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 308-323.details
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The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-291.details
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Indeterminacy, coincidence, and “Sourcing Newness” in mathematical research.James V. Martin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Conceptual Ethics and The Categories of “Ideal Theory” and “Non-Ideal Theory” in Political Philosophy: A Proposal for Abandonment.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - forthcoming - New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering.details
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Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
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Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):921-946.details
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A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.details
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Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.details
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Normative judgement.Scott Sturgeon - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):569–587.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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