Wissenschaftsfreiheit wird vorherrschend als Freiheit der Wissenschaft von politischer Einmischung verstanden. Der Artikel kritisiert dieses negative Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit anhand einer Analyse seines prominentesten Vertreters, dem Netzwerk Wissenschaftsfreiheit, das damit eine Politisierung einseitig den Vertreter*innen gesellschaftskritischer Ansätze zuschreibt, während es die eigene Position als ‚rein wissenschaftlich‘ und politisch neutral dargestellt. Demgegenüber schlägt der Artikel ein kritisches Verständnis von Wissenschaftsfreiheit vor, das seine Politizität reflektiert. Ausgehend von der Analyse, dass starre Macht- und Privilegienstrukturen das zentrale Hindernis für die gemeinsame Arbeit an (...) wissenschaftlicher Objektivität sind, geht es beim kritischen Begriff der Wissenschaftsfreiheit um die Reflexion und Transformation des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik. Dabei steht die Diversifizierung von Zugangschancen und Standpunkten innerhalb der Wissenschaft im Mittelpunkt – also die Neuverteilung von Macht und Privilegien. Der Artikel entwickelt dieses Verständnis aus einer Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Politik in zwei philosophischen Begründungsmöglichkeiten der Wissenschaftsfreiheit und aus einer Rekonstruktion der kritischen politischen Theorie, insbesondere der foucaultschen Machttheorie und der feministischen Standpunkttheorie. Er zeigt auf dieser Grundlage, dass drei verschiedene Arten der Diversifizierung der Wissenschaft – intern, extern-institutionell und extern-aktivistisch –, die vom vor dem Hintergrund des negativen Begriffs als Einschränkung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit verstanden werden, tatsächlich zu ihrer Verbesserung beitragen. -/- . (shrink)

While ‘cancel culture’ is commonly regarded as limiting freedom of speech and artistic freedom, this article proposes a new understanding of ‘cancel culture’ as emancipatory norm-setting that is key for democratization. On a non-governmental level of the self-regulation of the art world, the argument for artistic freedom ignores the fact that art is permeated by power. The introduction of ‘politically correct’ norms leads to a justified redistribution of such power. On a parastatal level of public broadcasting and state cultural funding, (...) neutrality is necessary but should be understood materially to include marginalized voices. Restrictions of freedom of speech and artistic freedom do occur on the state-level of hate-speech regulation. Here, the danger of a potential shift from emancipatory regulation to a harmful restriction is particularly virulent, as a discussion of the German BDS ban shows. (shrink)

Dass wir alle in einer gemeinsamen Wirklichkeit leben, setzen wir meist unhinterfragt voraus. Sehen Andere die Welt dann doch einmal anders, mag es uns scheinen, als sähen sie diese einfach nicht so, wie sie wirklich ist. Schwerer fällt uns anzuerkennen, dass andere zuweilen in ganz anderen Wirklichkeiten unterwegs sind als wir selbst. - Tom Poljansek zeigt, wie sich die Vorstellung einer Pluralität menschlicher Wirklichkeiten mit der Annahme einer wahrnehmungsunabhängigen Realität vereinbaren lässt, ohne sich in einen Relativismus der vielen Wirklichkeiten zu (...) verlaufen. In Auseinandersetzung mit »kontinentalen« und »analytischen« Ansätzen legt er eine elegante Theorie menschlicher Wirklichkeiten vor, die konstruktivistische und realistische, phänomenologische und naturalistische Motive unerwartet miteinander verbindet. (shrink)

In response to an impasse, articulated in the late 1980s, the cognitive capacities of ordinary people assumed central place in contemporary critical social theory. The participants’ perspective gained precedence over scientific standards branded as external. The notion of cognition, however, went unchallenged. This article continues the move away from external standards, and discusses two models of critique, which differ based on their underlying notions of cognition. The representational model builds on cognitive content, misrecognition and normativity; three features which are illustrated (...) with positions adopted by prominent exponents of critical social theory. An alternative understanding relies on action-oriented disclosure and the participants’ basic familiarity with the social world. On this reading, what clashes with unequal structures is skilful coping, rather than representations and normative standards. The action-oriented approach may overcome the dilemma of understanding both the impact and the possible transcendence of unequal structures, although it cannot ultimately replace representational critique. (shrink)

„Political Correctness“, „Identitätspolitik“ und „Cancel Culture“ werden heutzutage überwiegend als Waffen von Konservativen eingesetzt, um ihre Privilegien gegen emanzipative Neuregelungen zu verteidigen. Solche Neuregelungen als Einschränkung der Kunst- und Meinungsfreiheit zu kritisieren ist deshalb meist falsch. Tatsächlich tragen „Political Correctness“, „Identitätspolitik“ und „Cancel Culture“ zur inklusiveren Verwirklichung der Demokratie bei. Im Artikel zeige ich, dass es darauf ankommt, auf welcher Ebene politische Regulierungen der Kunst stattfinden: nicht-staatlich im allgemeinen Kunstbetrieb, para-staatlich im öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk, oder staatlich. Nur wenn der Staat mit (...) zentralisierter rechtlicher, ökonomischer und symbolischer Macht in laufende Debatten eingreift, kann man von problematischer Cancel Culture sprechen - das ist fast nie der Fall. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify the interpretation of Kantian morality and Hegelian ethical life given by Honneth and Habermas; it try in particularly to explain the several meanings and forms of Honneth’s relaunch of Hegel’s conception of Sitt- lichkeit. The Author aims at the same time to show some structural limits of this neo-Hegelian ethical perspective from a political point of view, also in relation to the concept of «immanent critique» adopted by Honneth, and differentiated by him from the concept (...) of «internal criticism» developed by Michael Walzer. The Author observes that the immanent approach of Honneth’s normative reconstruction and social critique seems to have some problems to take in account the plurality of different and con icting ethical-political orientations. (shrink)

Die Einleitung unseres Kapitels bietet eine grundsäzliche Charakterisierung der Soziologie und zeichnet einige wichtige historische Entwicklungslinien der Philosophie der Soziologie (PdS) nach. Im Hauptteil werden zentrale ontologische sowie ausgewählte explanatorische Themen der PdS vorgestellt. Im Schlussteil sollen einige aktuelle Diskussionen umrissen werden.

The aim of this paper is to show that Honneth’s philosophy of history is teleological in a narrow sense. This teleological character is problematic for the theory of the struggle for recognition, for the conception of history as such, and for the methodology of the normative reconstruction. In particular, the teleological conception gives to the theory of recognition a historical form that points out a unilateral character. Furthermore, the teleological neo-Hegelian methodology of normative reconstruction seems to adopt a too stark (...) trust in the progress of human societies faced with the problem of social, political and cultural regressions. (shrink)

Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...) of collective agency with multi-agent systems and multi-system agents, and argue that genuinely collective agents instantiate agency at both the collective level and at the level of the component parts. Developing the enactive model, we propose understanding agency – both at the level of the individual and of the collective – as spectra that are constituted by dimensions that vary across time. Finally, we consider whether collectives that are not merely metaphorically ‘agents’ but rather are genuinely agentive also instantiate subjectivity at the collective level. We propose that investigations using the perceptual crossing paradigm suggest that a shared lived perspective can indeed emerge but this should not be conflated with a collective first-person perspective, for which material integration in a living body may be required. (shrink)

‘Immanent criticism' has been discussed by philosophers of quite different persuasions, working in separate areas and in different traditions of philosophy. Almost all of them agree on roughly the same story about its origins: It is that Hegel invented immanent criticism, that Marx later developed it, and that the various members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, refined it in various ways, and that they are all paradigmatic practitioners of immanent criticism. I call this the Continuity Thesis. There are four (...) different claims that interest me. Hegel is the originator of immanent criticism. Hegel's dialectical method is that of immanent criticism. Adorno practises immanent criticism and endorses the term as a description of his practice. Adorno's dialectical method is fundamentally Hegelian. In this article, I offer an account of immanent criticism, on the basis of which, I evaluate these four claims and argue that the Continuity Thesis should be rejected. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie gegenwärtige Debatte um die normativen Grundlagen kritischer Gesellschaftstheorie weist eine große Bandbreite ethischer Positionen auf: vom ethischen Negativismus, der gänzlich auf einen positiven Kritik-Maßstab verzichtet, über Entfremdungs- und Resonanztheorien, die zumindest eine grobe Vorstellung des guten Lebens vermitteln wollen, bis hin zu deontologischen Ansätzen, die Gesellschaftskritik in intelligibler Freiheit begründet sehen. Der folgende Beitrag zeigt, dass diese drei Grundpositionen sich mit Problemen konfrontiert sehen, die der hegelsche Freiheitsbegriff zu lösen vermag.

This article starts with the idea that the task of social philosophy can be defined as the diagnosis and therapy of social pathologies. It discusses four conceptions of social pathology. The first two conceptions are ‘normativist’ and hold that something is a social pathology if it is socially wrong. On the first view, there is no encompassing characterization of social pathologies available: it is a cluster concept of family resemblances. On the second view, social pathologies share a structure (e.g. second-order (...) disorder). The last two conceptions are ‘naturalist’ and hold that something is wrong because it is pathological. The third view takes it that society is the kind of substance that can fall ill – an organism. The fourth view operates with the notion of a social life that can degenerate. The four conceptions are compared along six criteria: (1) is the view plausible?; (2) is it informative (if true)?; (3) does it help define the task of social philosophy?; (4) does it take naturalistic vocabulary seriously?; (5) does it hold that pathologies share a structure?; and (6) how does it see the primacy of being wrong and being pathological? (shrink)

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory and critical realism. Based on new research in moral sociology and anthro...

Through philosophical reasoning, this article will argue for two theses, which function as two sides of the same coin. The first thesis is that Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), as a science and in addition to numerous concrete individual studies, must work self-reflexively on a common and tentatively formal theory of ESD. The first substantive section of the article attempts to justify why ESD is a highly complex science that is anything but easy to work on. I will try to (...) justify this second thesis by reflecting, even if only by example, on the question of why, how and with what objectives the addressees of ESD pedagogy are to be educated.Critical questions in respect of the scientific discourse on ESD will substantiate the second thesis. Simultaneously, I aim to argue that to work self-reflexivel y on a common and tentatively formal theory of ESD is necessary for the systematic and scientific development of the discipline, and that only self-critical and systematic ESD research can provide precise knowledge on how ESD, as a pedagogical practice, can unfold its potential for the designated and desired transformation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAs a comment on the debate between Dave Elder-Vass and Leigh Price, I propose a dialogue between Bhaskar and Habermas. If we could introduce critical realism into critical theory, we might...

ABSTRACTIf we engage in reflection on standards of critique, we are entering the terrain of metaethics, or the question of which ethical standards we should accept. The question is not only, in the sense of self-awareness, what we as individual researchers or as a critical discourse analysis community think or feel about a specific social phenomenon. The metaethical question is about what we should think or feel.The aim of this article is to argue for a specific perspective on critique, namely, (...) an immanent critique that takes social suffering as the starting point for discourse analysis. I will show that the suffering produced by human beings or suffering that could be abolished or alleviated by human beings must be behind every informed critique in CDS.In a first step, I will present different sources of critique that can be found in CDS and argue in favor of the approach of immanent critique as a model for CDS. I will then develop a theory of social suffering that is sensitive to the enormous diversity of normative spheres and normative claims and that can be used as an anchor for critique. Finally, I will show how and when this type of critique becomes social critique, or a critique towards the fundamental structures of societies, and reconnect the approach presented here to the existing forms of critique in CDS.If CDS wants to not only combine discourse analysis and critique but also to perform discourse analysis as critique, then CDS must more explicitly consider not only text and talk but also silent and silenced forms of suffering. As social suffering is a complex phenomenon that requires interdisciplinary approaches based in philosophy, politics, psychology and sociology, DA must broaden its methods towards empathic understanding, affective reactions, practices, and material dispositions. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 135-140.

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...) will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe notion of ideology is related to social and material reality and especially to the processes of social reproduction. Therefore, the analysis of ideology seems to fall into the domain of discourse analysis. The analysis of language and practices of signification in social contexts constitutes the basic triangle of discourse analysis. However, the Marxist concept of ideology always refers to some kind of falsity, that ultimately enables the researcher to not only analyse but also to criticize ideologies. Ideologies are always (...) in some way false, injust or inadequate. It is at this point that discourse analysts usually raise the most serious objections as they understand truth itself as a discursive product, resulting from powerful struggles of domination and exclusion. The present article explores in how far the Marxist notion can be used for the purpose of discourse analysis. It argues that even the notion of falsity as present in classical Marxism can be adapted for understanding and criticizing contemporary ideologies. I start by presenting some common understandings of ideology in the field of Discourse Studies. In a second step I will analyse elements of the notion of ideology in Marx's early writings, especially in the debate with the Young Hegelians and ask what this means for empirical discourse analysis. I will then point towards elements of the critique of ideology in Marx mature ‘political economy’ that could be fruitful for Discourse Studies. Finally, I will try to reconcile a Marxist concept of ideology based ultimately on a notion of falsity with such discourse analytical approaches highly suspicious of the possibility of the existing ‘politics of truth’. We will see that, due to the relation between ideas and material organization in ideologies, the critique of ideologies becomes not only a critique of practices of justifications but turns into a genuine social critique. (shrink)

Two trends have emerged in recent work from the Frankfurt School: the first involves a reconsideration of immanent critique’s basic commitments and viability for critical social theory, while the second involves an effort to introduce temporal considerations for social interaction into critical theorizing to help make sense of the phenomenon of social acceleration. This article contributes to these ongoing discussions by investigating whether social systems theory, in which temporal relations play a primary role, can be integrated with immanent critique. If (...) such a synthesis were successful, it would promise to unify two distinct forms of social theorizing that have often been taken to be orthogonal or incommensurate since the debate between Luhmann and Habermas in the 1970s. The investigation proceeds in three parts: first, the article delineates immanent critique’s conditions of success; second, using these conditions, it identifies potential points of contact between social systems theorizing and immanent critical forms of analysis, while exemplifying these commonalities via a case study; finally, the article argues that, although immanent critique is not a strict method of analysis or investigation, its success conditions preclude social systems theory on the grounds that the latter approach cannot anchor itself within the context of analysis in the way ‘immanent critique’ requires. (shrink)

It is the purpose of this paper to address ethical issues concerning the development and application of Assistive Technology at Workplaces (ATW). We shall give a concrete technical concept how such technology might be constructed and propose eight technical functions it should adopt in order to serve its purpose. Then, we discuss the normative questions why one should use ATW, and by what means. We argue that ATW is good to the extent that it ensures social inclusion and consider four (...) normative domains in which its worth might consists in. In addition, we insist that ATW must satisfy two requirements of good workplaces, which we specify as (a) an exploitation restraint and (b) a duty of care. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between two main questions regarding the notion of privacy: “What is privacy?” and “Why do/should we value privacy?”. In developing a social-ontological recognitional model of privacy, it gives an answer to the first question. According to the SORM, Privacy is a second order quality of roles within social practices. It is a function of who is or should be recognized as a “standard authority”. Enjoying standard authority means to have the right to interpret and contest role behavior (...) and role obligations within a specific practice, as well as evaluate the normative structure, the fundamental practice norms as well as the roles and their status. The SORM utilizes the concept of standard authority to explicate privacy with regard to two categories that capture the relevant phenomena of privacy: decisional and informational privacy. Within a practice, an actor is said to have decisional privacy if she as a BCR does not recognize bearers of accidental roles as standard authorities. Vice versa, an actor is said to enjoy informational privacy if all other BCRs recognize her as a standard authority. Additionally, the requirement of mutual recognition by the practice participants as standard authorities introduces a “weak normativity” into the theory, which can be used to identify deficient privacy arrangements within practices. (shrink)

Thema dieses Essays sind Fragen nach dem Verhältnis theoriegeleiteter empirischer Forschung und systematischer Analyse, Rekonstruktion und Bewertung von in pädagogischen Konstellationen unweigerlich auftretenden ethischen Fragestellungen und Problemen. Ziel des Beitrags ist es, am Beispiel von aktuellen bildungstheoretischen Debatten über den normativen Gehalt des Bildungsbegriffs Möglichkeiten des Umgangs mit einigen der zentralen methodologischen Herausforderungen einer sozialwissenschaftlich informierten und anwendungsorientierten Ethik zu skizzieren. Dabei wird nicht beansprucht, die entsprechenden Fragen abschließend zu klären, sondern es werden am Beispiel von Problemvorgaben einer Ethik der (...) Bildung Wege und Perspektiven der Argumentation und Analyse sondiert, die bis dato insbesondere in der deutschsprachigen Erziehungs- und Bildungsphilosophie eher unterrepräsentiert sind. Zu diesem Zweck werde ich zunächst grundsätzliche Fragen zur Ein- und Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeit, des Anwendungsbereichs und der Aufgaben Pädagogischer Ethik diskutieren, um sodann in kritischer Absicht aktuelle Probleme mit ethischen Positionierungen im Rahmen erziehungsund bildungswissenschaftlicher Forschung darzulegen. Darauf aufbauend werde ich am Beispiel der Kontroverse über die normativen Grundlagen von Kollers transformatorischer Bildungstheorie methodologische Probleme einer Ethik der Bildung analysieren, die sich auf das Verhältnis von theoretischer Konzeptualisierung und der empirischen Rekonstruktion von Einzelfällen und ihrer ethischen Bewertung beziehen. Abschließend werde ich aus einer allgemeineren Perspektive Möglichkeiten, Probleme und Herausforderungen einer empirisch informierten Pädagogischen Ethik vorstellen. (shrink)

This article address the criticisms usually used against some representatives of the Frankfurt School to adhere to an imperialist meta-narrative. Through a discussion of the theories of some of them, we seek to establish a distinction between normativity and genealogy to approach the treatment of the fundamental questions of a critical point of view and to focus on the problems concerning the eurocentrism of the School. Likewise, some basic guidelines are presented for an assessment of the contributions of Modernity as (...) historical development from a Hegelian Marxist and Latin American point of view. (shrink)