- Against epistemic absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.details
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The Duty to Object.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):35-60.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
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How Not to Be a Fallibilist.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):423-440.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic Skepticism.Christos Kyriacou - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):543-561.details
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The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles: How badly do we need closure?Brent G. Kyle - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1495-1525.details
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The steering thrust phenomenon in action-directed-pragmatics.Igal Kvart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1639-1671.details
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Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.details
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Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards.Nikola Anna Kompa - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4673-4693.details
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Contextualism and Disagreement.Nikola Kompa - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):137-152.details
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Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.details
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Relativism, sceptical paradox, and semantic blindness.Dirk Kindermann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.details
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Knowledge embedded.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Synthese (5):4035-4055.details
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Contextualist Theories of Vagueness.Jonas Åkerman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (7):470-480.details
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In defence of virtue epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.details
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.details
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What we know when we act.Timothy Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2665-2683.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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Epistemic Modal Disagreement.Jonah Katz & Joe Salerno - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):141-153.details
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Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.Masashi Kasaki - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98.details
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Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation.Klemens Kappel & Emil F. L. Moeller - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-19.details
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Taking Stock of Engineering Epistemology: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.Vivek Kant & Eric Kerr - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (4):685-726.details
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The Value Question in Metaphysics.Guy Kahane - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):27-55.details
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Action Trees and Moral Judgment.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):555-578.details
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Hoping for Metanormative Realism.Anne Jeffrey - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):1-15.details
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Human Imprints of Real Time: from Semantics to Metaphysics.K. M. Jaszczolt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1855-1879.details
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Defeaters and rising standards of justification.Mikael Janvid - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.details
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Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.details
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Varieties of disagreement and predicates of taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.details
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Defending Standards Contextualism.Robert Hudson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 35-59.details
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A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference.Robert J. Howell - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):389-415.details
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Knowledge and normality.Joachim Horvath & Jennifer Nado - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11673-11694.details
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Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):161-177.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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The structure of moral encroachment.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1793-1812.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.details
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