- (1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Transparency and the truth norm of belief.Alireza Kazemi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Glüer and Wikforss: Discussions.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):749-755.details
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Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.details
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Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge.Barnaby Walker - forthcoming - Philosophy.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
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The Norm of Belief. [REVIEW]Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):272-275.details
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Interpreting Quantum Theories.James Owen Weatherall - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):275-278.details
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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
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Why we reason the way we do.Nishi Shah - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.details
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Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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(1 other version)Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.details
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A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.Veli Mitova - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1911-1933.details
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On the normative significance of the aims of religious practice.Joona Auvinen - 2021 - Zygon 56 (1):118-138.details
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Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):213-228.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Transparency belongs to action, not to belief.Nikolai Viedge - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-228.details
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Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):281-293.details
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Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity.Davide Fassio - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1084-1106.details
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Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.details
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Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.details
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Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.details
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Transparency and the ethics of belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.details
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(1 other version)The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):279-283.details
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(1 other version)The Norms of Belief as the Norms of Commitment: A Case for Pluralism.Alireza Kazemi - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy (00):1-17.details
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La théorie de l’erreur épistémique fait-elle une erreur?Quentin Soussen - 2022 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 116 (4):555-570.details
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(1 other version)Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.details
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Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.details
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Desire That Amounts to Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):56-73.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief.Mirosław Szatkowski - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):47-68.details
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Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):209-233.details
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Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.details
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Normativity without Reflectivity: on the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures.Hilla Jacobson - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):75-93.details
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Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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