- Stich againstde dicto‐de reambiguity.Dale Jacquette - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):223-230.details
|
|
Cognisance and cognitive science. Part two: Towards an empirical psychology of cognisance.James Russell - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):165-201.details
|
|
A pieced quilt: A critical discussion of Stephen Schiffer'sRemnants of Meaning.Louise Antony - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):119-137.details
|
|
Behavior, ISO functionalism, and psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):191-209.details
|
|
(1 other version)Kim on the Mind—Body Problem. [REVIEW]Terence Horgan - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):579-607.details
|
|
Do explanatory desire attributions generate opaque contexts?Naomi Reshotko - 1996 - Ratio 9 (2):153-170.details
|
|
Methodological Individualism and Marxism.Julius Sensat - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):189.details
|
|
Theory knitting: An integrative approach to theory development.David A. Kalmar & Robert J. Sternberg - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):153 – 170.details
|
|
The psycho-physical laws of intentionality.J. T. Whyte - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):295 – 304.details
|
|
Representational content and the explanation of behaviour.Olav Gjelsvik - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):333 – 353.details
|
|
Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epistemology in an age of cognitive science.Robert N. McCauley - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):143-152.details
|
|
Epistemic logic for rule-based agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.details
|
|
Consciousness from a first-person perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.details
|
|
Why semantic properties won't earn their keep.Peter Godfrey -Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.details
|
|
Stalnaker on Inquiry.Michael Pendlebury - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (3):229-272.details
|
|
Folk psychology as a model.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-16.details
|
|
On the very idea of eliminating the intentional.Richard Double - 1986 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):209–216.details
|
|
What is musical intuition? Tonal theory as cognitive science.Mark DeBellis - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):471 – 501.details
|
|
(1 other version)Explaining learning: From analysis to paralysis to hippocampus.John Clark - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):667–687.details
|
|
No speech, never mind!Monima Chadha - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.details
|
|
Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology.Martin Pickering & Nick Chater - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.details
|
|
Six levels of mentality.Leslie Stevenson - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):105-124.details
|
|
Reply to Stich and Nichols.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.details
|
|
Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism.John M. Preston - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (September):277-303.details
|
|
The very idea of a folk psychology.R. A. Sharpe - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):381-93.details
|
|
The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1991 - Synthese 89 (October):15-39.details
|
|
(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
|
|
How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.details
|
|
The origins of folk psychology.George Graham - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):357-79.details
|
|
(1 other version)The limits of spectatorial folk psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.details
|
|
Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism.Fred A. Keijzer & Sacha Bem - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):323-46.details
|
|
Precis of the emperor's new mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):643-705.details
|
|
(1 other version)Semantic determinants and psychology as a science.Steven Yalowitz - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (1):57-91.details
|
|
Phenomenology and psychophysics.Steven Horst - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):1-21.details
|
|
Intentionality, social play, and definition.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74.details
|
|
Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.details
|
|
Staving off catastrophe: A critical notice of Jerry Fodor's psychosemantics.Todd Jones - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (1):58-82.details
|
|
Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?Pierre Jacob - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.details
|
|
A farewell to functionalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.details
|
|
Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.details
|
|
Content, causation, and cognitive science.David Braun - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):375-89.details
|
|
Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach.Mark Rowlands - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.details
|
|
Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content.Pierre Jacob - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.details
|
|
Emdedded systems vs. individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.details
|
|
A dichotomy sustained.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):187-211.details
|
|
Contents just are in the head.Amir Horowitz - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):321-344.details
|
|
In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.details
|
|
Where does the self‐refutation objection take us?William Ramsey - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):453-65.details
|
|
Ramsey on eliminativism and self‐refutation.Victor Reppert - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):499-508.details
|
|