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  1. Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass-Counters and Hand-Claspers?Micah Lott - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (1):103-125.
    The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content, plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argument centers on the idea of (...)
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  • Must realists be skeptics? An Aristotelian reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.Micah Lott - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):71-96.
    In a series of influential essays, Sharon Street has argued, on the basis of Darwinian considerations, that normative realism leads to skepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that if we begin with the account of moral knowledge provided by Aristotelian naturalism, then we can offer a satisfactory realist response to Street’s argument, and that Aristotelian naturalism can avoid challenges facing other realist responses. I first explain Street’s evolutionary argument and three of the most prominent realist responses, and I identify challenges (...)
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  • Constructing a Good Life.Micah Lott - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):363-375.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 363 - 375 In _The Value of Living Well,_ Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism”. VE is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one concerning VE ’s eudaimonism and the other concerning VE ’s constructivism. I will argue that, as it stands, VE does (...)
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  • Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity.Francisco Lisboa & Susana Cadilha - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):1-21.
    In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that (...)
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  • Constructivism and the Problem of Normative Indeterminacy.Yair Levy - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):243-253.
    I describe a new problem for metaethical constructivism. The problem arises when agents make conflicting judgments, so that the constructivist is implausibly committed to denying they have any reason for any of the available options. The problem is illustrated primarily with reference to Sharon Street’s version of constructivism. Several possible solutions to the problem are explained and rejected.
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  • Forms of Rational Agency.Douglas Lavin - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:171-193.
    A measure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard has broad application. Compare the external breed standards arbitrarily imposed at a dog show with the internal standards of health at work in the veterinarian's office. This paper is about practical standards, measures of acting well and badly, and so measures deployed in deliberation and choice. More specifically, it (...)
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  • Nietzsche on creating and discovering values.Thomas Lambert - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):49-69.
    ABSTRACTThis article considers Friedrich Nietzsche’s claims about value creation alongside his proclamation that ‘nature is always value-less’, assessing their implications for his metaethics. It begins by weighing the evidence for a recent constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethics, arguing that despite several apparent interpretive advantages, Nietzschean constructivism ultimately fails. Through a close reading of GS 301 and related passages, the constructivist interpretation is shown to be misguided in taking Nietzsche’s talk of value creation as expressing a metaethical view according to which (...)
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  • Is Spinoza's Ethics Metaethically Constructivist?Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (2):131-146.
    Charles Jarrett and P. D. Zuk have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza's Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present their textual evidence, and suggest that the evidence is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett and Zuk have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption: that relational normativity entails moral antirealism/constructivism. I explain why this is not the case by (...)
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  • Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes.Charlie Kurth - 2014 - Ethics 124 (2):370-383.
    Allan Gibbard maintains that his plan-based expressivism allows for a particular type of innocent mistake: I can agree that your plan to X makes sense (say, because it was based on advice from someone you trust), while nonetheless insisting that it is incorrect (e.g., because you chose a bad advisor). However, Steve Daskal has recently argued that there are significant limitations in Gibbard’s account of how we can be mistaken about the normative judgments we make. This essay refines Gibbard’s account (...)
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  • Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
    How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to (...)
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  • Two of a kind: Are norms of honor a species of morality?Toby Handfield & John Thrasher - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (3):39.
    Should the norms of honor cultures be classified as a variety of morality? In this paper, we address this question by considering various empirical bases on which norms can be taxonomically organised. This question is of interest both as an exercise in philosophy of social science, and for its potential implications in meta-ethical debates. Using recent data from anthropology and evolutionary game theory, we argue that the most productive classification emphasizes the strategic role that moral norms play in generating assurance (...)
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  • Being Realistic about Reflective Equilibrium.Hannah Altehenger, Simon Gaus & Andreas Leonhard Menges - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):514-522.
    In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...)
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  • Constructivism, intersubjectivity, provability, and triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.
    Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of (...)
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  • Epistemological Open Questions.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.
    While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument. This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still influential (...)
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  • Towards a Cognitive Scientific Vindication of Moral Realism: The Semantic Argument.Abraham D. Graber - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1059-1069.
    In a methodological milieu characterized by efforts to bring the methods of philosophy closer to the methods of the sciences, one can find, with increasing regularity, meta-ethical arguments relying on scientific theory or data. The received view appears to be that, not only is it implausible to think that a scientific vindication of a non-mentalist moral semantics will be forthcoming but that evidence from a variety of sciences threatens to undermine non-mentalist views. My aim is to push back against this (...)
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  • Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.
    Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...)
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  • Artifactual Normativity.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Synthese 200 (126):1-19.
    A central tension shaping metaethical inquiry is that normativity appears to be subjective yet real, where it’s difficult to reconcile these aspects. On the one hand, normativity pertains to our actions and attitudes. On the other, normativity appears to be real in a way that precludes it from being a mere figment of those actions and attitudes. In this paper, I argue that normativity is indeed both subjective and real. I do so by way of treating it as a special (...)
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  • A Frankfurter in Königsberg: Prolegomenon to any Future non-metaphysical Kant.James Gordon Finlayson - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (4):583-604.
    In this article I press four different objections on Forst’s theory of the ‘Right to Justification’. These are (i) that the principle of justification is not well-formulated; (ii) that ‘reasonableness and reciprocity’, as these notions are used by Rawls, are not apt to support a Kantian conception of morality; (iii) that the principle of justification, as Forst understands it, gives an inadequate account of what makes actions wrong; and (iv) that, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Forst’s account (...)
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  • Wiggins on Ethical Objectivity and ‘Des Cannibales’.Adam Etinson - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (3):321-336.
    This short essay offers a commentary on Chapter 11 of David Wiggins’,Ethics(2006). The essay asks how we should interpret Wiggins’ defense of ethical ‘objectivity’ given his subjectivist metaethics. An interpretation is drawn from Sharon Street's work on metaethical constructivism, of which Wiggins’ view is taken to be one variety.
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  • A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism.Melis Erdur - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):591-602.
    If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a (...)
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  • Layered Constructivism: The Plural Sources of Practical Reasons.Laura Engel - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1721-1744.
    Constructivism as a distinct metaethical position has garnered significant interest in recent years due in part to Sharon Street’s theory, Humean metaethical constructivism. According to Street’s account, practical reasons are constructed by individual valuing entities. On this view, then, whether a particular reason applies to an individual is completely contingent upon what that individual actually values. In this article I argue for the recognition of multiple sources of practical reasons and values, including both individuals and communities. The resulting view, which (...)
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  • Is it Good Enough to be Good Qua Human? The Normative Independence of Attributive Goodness.Casey S. Elliott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    Prima facie the norms of natural-teleology conflict with norms of morality and rationality. Morality often rejects behaviours that can promote natural-success, and we can have reasons to act in ways that conflict with natural-imperatives. That’s a problem for Attributivism, which dictates that what one ought to do is exhausted in satisfying the standards of one’s kind, and thus that members of natural-kinds ought ultimately to do that which is naturally good. I argue that standard responses are inadequate. I argue further (...)
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  • Epistemological motivations for anti-realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.
    Anti-realism is often claimed to be preferable to realism on epistemological grounds: while realists have difficulty explaining how we can ever know claims if we are realists about it, anti-realism faces no analogous problem. This paper focuses on anti-realism about normativity to investigate this alleged advantage to anti-realism in detail. I set up a framework in which a version of anti-realism explains a type of modal reliability that appears to be epistemologically promising, and plausibly explains the appearance of an epistemological (...)
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  • A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory.Nicholas Drake - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):189-214.
    There is a common view that the utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill is morally realist and involves a strong kind of practical obligation. This article argues for two negative theses and a positive thesis. The negative theses are that Mill is not a moral realist and that he does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and those I callrobustobligations, obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. The positive thesis is that Mill's metaethical (...)
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  • Ethical Pragmatism.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):383-403.
    Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact-value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about (...)
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  • John Rawls métaéthicien?Ophélie Desmons - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):473-497.
    Those who criticize as well as those who nowadays defend constructivism in metaethics consider John Rawls’s constructivism to be incomplete. According to them, his ontological agnosticism makes evident this incompleteness; I question this widely accepted charge. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Rawls’s agnosticism is the effect of his metaethics rather than a lack of metaethics. Thanks to this interpretation, I question the originality and attractiveness of Rawls’s metaethics. My claim is that Rawls’s metaethics adequately captures the specific (...)
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  • Introduction.Ophélie Desmons - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):465-471.
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  • Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.
    This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s remarks on moral matters.
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  • Why Humean constructivists should become Kantian constructivists.Sem de Maagt - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):280-293.
    One of the main reasons for philosophers to have embraced Humean constructivism rather than Kantian constructivism is a negative one: they believe that in the end Kantian constructivism is an unsta...
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  • Rainer Forst leitor de John Rawls.Matheus Garcia de Moura - 2022 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 13 (1):e8.
    O artigo visa discutir o papel que a obra de John Rawls possui para o projeto teórico de Rainer Forst. Trata-se de acompanharas principaisleituras que Forst realiza sobre esse autor e discutir algumas consequências que podem ser delas depreendidas para seu modelo crítico. Assim, em primeiro lugar, discute-se a tentativa de Forst em aproximar os critérios de reciprocidade e universalidade, de seu princípio de justificação, à teoria de Rawls, ao mesmo tempo em que acusa Rawls de que sua configuração da (...)
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  • Are Radical Realists Hypocrites about Intuition-Dependence?Ben Cross - forthcoming - Moral Philosophy and Politics.
    Radical realists criticise the role that moral intuitions play in moralist political philosophy. However, radical realists may also rely on certain epistemic intuitions when making use of their theories of ideology critique. Hence, one might wonder whether radical realists’ criticism of moralists’ intuition-dependence is hypocritical. Call this the intuition asymmetry objection. My aim in this article is to show that the intuition asymmetry objection fails. After examining the basis of objections by radical realists to the role of moral intuitions in (...)
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  • Truth As, At Most, One.Niall Connolly - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):135-147.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 135-147, February 2012.
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  • Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.
    The idea that there is a distinctively practical use of reason, and correspondingly a distinctively practical form of knowledge, unites many otherwise diverse voices in the history of practical philosophy: from Aristotle to Kant, from Rousseau to Marx, from Hegel to G.E.M. Anscombe, and many others. This volume gathers works by scholars who take inspiration from these and many other historical figures in order to deepen our systematic understanding of questions raised by their work that still are, or ought to (...)
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  • Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality.Brendan Cline - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):231-253.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to undercut the justification of our moral judgments by showing why a tendency to make moral judgments would evolve regardless of the truth of those judgments. Machery and Mallon (2010. Evolution of morality. In J.M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The Moral Psychology Handbook (pp. 3-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press) have recently tried to disarm these arguments by showing that moral cognition – in the sense that is relevant to debunking – is not (...)
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  • The Practice of Pharmaceutics and the Obligation to Expand Access to Investigational Drugs.Michael Buckley & Collin O’Neil - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (2):193-211.
    Do pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to expand access to investigational drugs to patients outside the clinical trial? One reason for thinking they do not is that expanded access programs might negatively affect the clinical trial process. This potential impact creates dilemmas for practitioners who nevertheless acknowledge some moral reason for expanding access. Bioethicists have explained these reasons in terms of beneficence, compassion, or a principle of rescue, but their arguments have been limited to questions of moral permissibility, leaving (...)
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  • The Priority of Legitimacy in Times of Political Transition.Michael Buckley - 2013 - Human Rights Review 14 (4):327-345.
    This paper interprets the relation between justice and legitimacy found in John Rawls's Political Liberalism and then applies it to the field of transitional justice. The author argues that transitional mechanisms can be better defended in terms of “legitimacy” than in “justice,” because the circumstances of transitional justice admit of reasonable disagreement over “just” public policy. In such circumstances, policy recommendations can always be construed as falling short of justice, thus raising plausible concerns over their normative justification. This paper attempts (...)
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  • A Constructivist Approach to Business Ethics.Michael Buckley - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 117 (4):695-706.
    A recurrent challenge in applied ethics concerns the development of principles that are both suitably general to cover various cases and sufficiently exact to guide behavior in particular instances. In business ethics, two central approaches—stockholder and stakeholder—often fail by one or the other requirement. The author argues that the failure is precipitated by their reliance upon “universal” theory, which views the justification of principles as both independent of their context of application and universally appropriate to all contexts. The author develops (...)
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  • The Circumstances of Intergenerational Justice.Eric Brandstedt - 2015 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (1):33-56.
    Some key political challenges today, e.g. climate change, are future oriented. The intergenerational setting differs in some notable ways from the intragenerational one, creating obstacles to theorizing about intergenerational justice. One concern is that as the circumstances of justice do not pertain intergenerationally, intergenerational justice is not meaningful. In this paper, I scrutinize this worry by analysing the presentations of the doctrine of the circumstances of justice by David Hume and John Rawls. I argue that we should accept the upshot (...)
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  • The internal morality of medicine: a constructivist approach.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4449-4467.
    Physicians frequently ask whether they should give patients what they want, usually when there are considerations pointing against doing so, such as medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations. It has been argued that the source of medicine’s values and physicians’ obligations lies in what has been dubbed “the internal morality of medicine”: medicine is a practice with an end and norms that are definitive of this practice and that determine what physicians ought to do qua physicians. In this paper, I defend (...)
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  • Internal and External Paternalism.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):673-687.
    I introduce a new distinction between two types of paternalism, which I call ‘internal’ and ‘external’ paternalism. The distinction pertains to the question of whether the paternalized subject’s current evaluative judgments are mistaken relative to a standard of correctness that is internal to her evaluative point of view—which includes her ‘true’ or ‘ideal’ self—as opposed to one that is wholly external. I argue that this distinction has important implications for (a) the distinction between weak and strong paternalism; (b) the distinction (...)
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  • Entre Cila e Caríbdis: o dilema darwiniano e o debunking da moralidade.Evandro Barbosa - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).
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  • Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.Sorin Baiasu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1185-1208.
    Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given (...)
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  • Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed.Carla Bagnoli - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (3):311-329.
    G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of construction as constitutive norms. (...)
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  • Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.Bagnoli Carla - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1229-1246.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  • Authority as a contingency plan.Carla Bagnoli - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):130-145.
    Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...
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  • Les explications par un troisième facteur permettent-elles aux réalistes moraux de relever le défi épistémologique?Félix Aubé Beaudoin - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):161-191.
    Moral realists face an epistemological challenge: they must explain why many judgments that are likely to be moral truths are those it would be evolutionarily adaptive to hold. Is it a coincidence? Do evolutionary forces track these truths?Third-factor explanationis the strategy most commonly adopted by moral realists to explain this striking correlation. In this article, I argue that it does not allow them to meet the challenge.
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  • Fondamentalisme ou constructivisme des raisons? Les limites du réalisme normatif de Thomas Scanlon.Félix Aubé Beaudoin & Patrick Turmel - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):549-570.
    We argue that Reasons Fundamentalism, as defended by T.M. Scanlon, faces two important difficulties—one ontological, the other epistemological—namely the ontological proliferation problem and the reliability challenge. We suggest that formal constructivism can avoid these difficulties, and that Scanlon would do well to adopt it. We also show that Scanlon’s three main objections to this view depend either on a misunderstanding of what formal constructivism is or on a question-begging argument in favour of realism.
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  • Why Care about Being an Agent.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.
    The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments (...)
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  • The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):17-38.
    Among the available metaethical views, it would seem that moral realism—in particular moral naturalism—must explain the possibility of moral progress. We see this in the oft-used argument from disagreement against various moral realist views. My suggestion in this paper is that, surprisingly, metaethical constructivism has at least as pressing a need to explain moral progress. I take moral progress to be, minimally, the opportunity to access and to act in light of moral facts of the matter, whether they are mind-independent (...)
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  • Constitutivism and the Self-Reflection Requirement.Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1165-1183.
    Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection for rational agency. Interestingly enough, there is no clear account of how and why self-reflection plays such an important role for these views. My aim in this paper is to address this underappreciated problem for constitutivist views and to determine whether constitutivist self-reflection is normatively oriented. Understanding its normative features will allow us to evaluate a potential way that constitutivism may meet its purported metaethical promise. I begin by showing why constitutivism, as exemplified (...)
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