This book, presented in two parts, offers a slow introduction to mathematical logic, and several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions. Its first part, Logic Sets, and Numbers, shows how mathematical logic is used to develop the number structures of classical mathematics. The exposition does not assume any prerequisites; it is rigorous, but as informal as possible. All necessary concepts are introduced exactly as they would be in a course in mathematical logic; (...) but are accompanied by more extensive introductory remarks and examples to motivate formal developments. The second part, Relations, Structures, Geometry, introduces several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions, and shows how they are used to study and classify mathematical structures. Although more advanced, this second part is accessible to the reader who is either already familiar with basic mathematical logic, or has carefully read the first part of the book. Classical developments in model theory, including the Compactness Theorem and its uses, are discussed. Other topics include tameness, minimality, and order minimality of structures. The book can be used as an introduction to model theory, but unlike standard texts, it does not require familiarity with abstract algebra. This book will also be of interest to mathematicians who know the technical aspects of the subject, but are not familiar with its history and philosophical background. (shrink)

This article focusses on the generality of the entities involved in a geometric proof of the kind found in ancient Greek treatises: it shows that the standard modern translation of Greek mathematical propositions falsifies crucial syntactical elements, and employs an incorrect conception of the denotative letters in a Greek geometric proof; epigraphic evidence is adduced to show that these denotative letters are ‘letter-labels’. On this basis, the article explores the consequences of seeing that a Greek mathematical proposition is fully general, (...) and the ontological commitments underlying the stylistic practice. (shrink)

A probabilistic propositional logic, endowed with a constructor for asserting compatibility of diagonalisable and bounded observables, is presented and illustrated for reasoning about the random results of projective measurements made on a given quantum state. Simultaneous measurements are assumed to imply that the underlying observables are compatible. A sound and weakly complete axiomatisation is provided relying on the decidable first-order theory of real closed ordered fields. The proposed logic is proved to be a conservative extension of classical propositional logic.

We give a general account of the goals of axiomatization, introducing a variant on Detlefsen’s notion of ‘complete descriptive axiomatization’. We describe how distinctions between the Greek and modern view of number, magnitude, and proportion impact the interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry. We argue, as did Hilbert, that Euclid’s propositions concerning polygons, area, and similar triangles are derivable from Hilbert’s first-order axioms. We argue that Hilbert’s axioms including continuity show much more than the geometrical propositions of Euclid’s theorems and (...) thus are an immodest complete descriptive axiomatization of that subject. (shrink)

This article presents Tarski's Address at the Princeton Bicentennial Conference on Problems of Mathematics, together with a separate summary. Two accounts of the discussion which followed are also included. The central topic of the Address and of the discussion is decision problems. The introductory note gives information about the Conference, about the background of the subjects discussed in the Address, and about subsequent developments to these subjects.

Alfred Tarski was one of the greatest logicians of the twentieth century. His influence comes not merely through his own work but from the legion of students who pursued his projects, both in Poland and Berkeley. This chapter focuses on three key areas of Tarski's research, beginning with his groundbreaking studies of the concept of truth. Tarski's work led to the creation of the area of mathematical logic known as model theory and prefigured semantic approaches in the philosophy of language (...) and philosophical logic, such as Kripke's possible worlds semantics for modal logic. We also examine the paradoxical decomposition of the sphere known as the Banach–Tarski paradox. Finally we examine Tarski's work on decidable and undecidable theories, which he carried out in collaboration with students such as Mostowski, Presburger, Robinson and others. (shrink)

Traces the development of recursive functions from their origins in the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s, with particular emphasis on the work and influence of Kurt Gödel.

We propose and investigate a uniform modal logic framework for reasoning about topology and relative distance in metric and more general distance spaces, thus enabling the comparison and combination of logics from distinct research traditions such as Tarski’s for topological closure and interior, conditional logics, and logics of comparative similarity. This framework is obtained by decomposing the underlying modal-like operators into first-order quantifier patterns. We then show that quite a powerful and natural fragment of the resulting first-order logic can be (...) captured by one binary operator comparing distances between sets and one unary operator distinguishing between realised and limit distances . Due to its greater expressive power, this logic turns out to behave quite differently from both and conditional logics. We provide finite axiomatisations and ExpTime-completeness proofs for the logics of various classes of distance spaces, in particular metric spaces. But we also show that the logic of the real line is not recursively enumerable. This result is proved by an encoding of Diophantine equations. (shrink)

The article deals with Cantor’s diagonal argument and its alleged philosophical consequences such as that there are more reals than integers and, hence, that some of the reals must be independent of language because the totality of words and sentences is always count-able. My claim is that the main flaw of the argument for the existence of non-nameable objects or truths lies in a very superficial understanding of what a name or representation actually is.

We study the foundation of space-time theory in the framework of first-order logic (FOL). Since the foundation of mathematics has been successfully carried through (via set theory) in FOL, it is not entirely impossible to do the same for space-time theory (or relativity). First we recall a simple and streamlined FOL-axiomatization Specrel of special relativity from the literature. Specrel is complete with respect to questions about inertial motion. Then we ask ourselves whether we can prove the usual relativistic properties of (...) accelerated motion (e.g., clocks in acceleration) in Specrel. As it turns out, this is practically equivalent to asking whether Specrel is strong enough to “handle” (or treat) accelerated observers. We show that there is a mathematical principle called induction (IND) coming from real analysis which needs to be added to Specrel in order to handle situations involving relativistic acceleration. We present an extended version AccRel of Specrel which is strong enough to handle accelerated motion, in particular, accelerated observers. Among others, we show that~the Twin Paradox becomes provable in AccRel, but it is not provable without IND. (shrink)

We introduce new first-order languages for the elementary n-dimensional geometry and elementary n-dimensional affine geometry , based on extending equation image and equation image, respectively, with new function symbols. Here, β stands for the betweenness relation and ≡ for the congruence relation. We show that the associated theories admit effective quantifier elimination.

Let R be a real closed field. An integer part I for R is a discretely ordered subring such that for every \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${r \in R}$$\end{document}, there exists an \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${i \in I}$$\end{document} so that i ≤ r < i + 1. Mourgues and Ressayre (J Symb Logic 58:641–647, 1993) showed that every real closed field has an integer part. The procedure of Mourgues and (...) Ressayre appears to be quite complicated. We would like to know whether there is a simple procedure, yielding an integer part that is \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^0_2(R)}$$\end{document} —limit computable relative to R. We show that there is a maximal Z-ring \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${I \subseteq R}$$\end{document} which is \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^0_2(R)}$$\end{document}. However, this I may not be an integer part for R. By a result of Wilkie (Logic Colloquium ’77), any Z-ring can be extended to an integer part for some real closed field. Using Wilkie’s ideas, we produce a real closed field R with a Z-ring \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${I \subseteq R}$$\end{document} such that I does not extend to an integer part for R. For a computable real closed field, we do not know whether there must be an integer part in the class \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^0_2}$$\end{document}. We know that certain subclasses of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Delta^0_2}$$\end{document} are not sufficient. We show that for each \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${n \in \omega}$$\end{document}, there is a computable real closed field with no n-c.e. integer part. In fact, there is a computable real closed field with no n-c.e. integer part for any n. (shrink)

We investigate topological properties of subsets S of the real plane, expressed by first-order logic sentences in the language of the reals augmented with a binary relation symbol for S. Two sets are called topologically elementary equivalent if they have the same such first-order topological properties. The contribution of this paper is a natural and effective characterization of topological elementary equivalence of closed semi-algebraic sets.

Model theorists have been studying analytic functions since the late 1970s. Highlights include the seminal work of Denef and van den Dries on the theory of the p-adics with restricted analytic functions, Wilkie's proof of o-minimality of the theory of the reals with the exponential function, and the formulation of Zilber's conjecture for the complex exponential. My goal in this talk is to survey these main developments and to reflect on today's open problems, in particular for theories of valued fields.

This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to ...

We show that the theory of the real field with a generic real power function is decidable, relative to an oracle for the rational cut of the exponent of the power function. We also show the existence of generic computable real numbers, hence providing an example of a decidable o-minimal proper expansion of the real field by an analytic function.

Although the case for the judgment-dependence of many other domains has been pored over, surprisingly little attention has been paid to mathematics and logic. This paper presents two dilemmas for a judgment-dependent account of these areas. First, the extensionality-substantiality dilemma: in each case, either the judgment-dependent account is extensionally inadequate or it cannot meet the substantiality condition (roughly: non-vacuous specification). Second, the extensionality-extremality dilemma: in each case, either the judgment-dependent account is extensionally inadequate or it cannot meet the extremality condition (...) (roughly: absence of independent explanation). The paper concludes with a moral concerning the judgment-dependence of a posteriori areas of discourse that emerges from consideration of these two a priori cases. (shrink)

1. One theory or many? In 2004 a very interesting and readable article by Lenore Blum, entitled “Computing over the reals: Where Turing meets Newton,” appeared in the Notices of the American Mathematical Society. It explained a basic model of computation over the reals due to Blum, Michael Shub and Steve Smale (1989), subsequently exposited at length in their influential book, Complexity and Real Computation (1997), coauthored with Felipe Cucker. The ‘Turing’ in the title of Blum’s article refers of course (...) to Alan Turing, famous for his explication of the notion of mechanical computation on discrete data such as the integers. The ‘Newton’ there has to do to with the well known numerical method due to Isaac Newton for approximating the zeros of continuous functions under suitable conditions that is taken to be a paradigm of scientific computing. Finally, the meaning of “Turing meets Newton” in the title of Blum’s article has another, more particular aspect: in connection with the problem of controlling errors in the numerical solution of linear equations and inversion of matrices,Turing (1948) defined a notion of condition for the relation of changes in the output of a computation due to small changes in the input that is analogous to Newton’s definition of the derivative. The thrust of Blum’s 2004 article was that the BSS model of computation on the reals is the appropriate foundation for scientific computing in general. By way of response, two years later another very interesting and equally readable article appeared in the Notices, this time by Mark Braverman and Stephen Cook (2006) entitled “Computing over the reals: Foundations for scientific computing,” in which the authors argued that the requisite foundation is provided by a quite different “bit computation” model, that is in fact prima facie incompatible with the BSS model. The bit computation model goes back to ideas due to Stefan Banach and Stanislaw Mazur in the latter part of the 1930s, but the first publication was not made until Mazur (1963).. (shrink)

Alfred Tarski’s influence on computer science was indirect but significant in a number of directions and was in certain respects fundamental. Here surveyed is Tarski’s work on the decision procedure for algebra and geometry, the method of elimination of quantifiers, the semantics of formal languages, model-theoretic preservation theorems, and algebraic logic; various connections of each with computer science are taken up.

Around 1989, a striking letter written in March 1956 from Kurt Gödel to John von Neumann came to light. It poses some problems about the complexity of algorithms; in particular, it asks a question that can be seen as the first formulation of the P=?NP question. This paper discusses some of the background to this letter, including von Neumann's own ideas on complexity theory. Von Neumann had already raised explicit questions about the complexity of Tarski's decision procedure for elementary algebra (...) and geometry in a letter of 1949 to J. C. C. McKinsey. The paper concludes with a discussion of why theoretical computer science did not emerge as a separate discipline until the 1960s. (shrink)

For a finite von Neumann algebra factor M, the projections form a modular ortholattice L(M). We show that the equational theory of L(M) coincides with that of some resp. all L(ℂ n × n ) and is decidable. In contrast, the uniform word problem for the variety generated by all L(ℂ n × n ) is shown to be undecidable.

Steve Awodey and Erich H. Reck. Completeness and Categoricity: 19th Century Axiomatics to 21st Century Senatics.

The article deals with Cantor's argument for the non-denumerability of reals somewhat in the spirit of Lakatos' logic of mathematical discovery. At the outset Cantor's proof is compared with some other famous proofs such as Dedekind's recursion theorem, showing that rather than usual proofs they are resolutions to do things differently. Based on this I argue that there are "ontologically" safer ways of developing the diagonal argument into a full-fledged theory of continuum, concluding eventually that famous semantic paradoxes based on (...) diagonal construction are caused by superficial understanding of what a name is. (shrink)

The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in (...) the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s. -/- The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

We shall prove quantifier elimination theorems for neocompact formulas, which define neocompact sets and are built from atomic formulas using finite disjunctions, infinite conjunctions, existential quantifiers, and bounded universal quantifiers. The neocompact sets were first introduced to provide an easy alternative to nonstandard methods of proving existence theorems in probability theory, where they behave like compact sets. The quantifier elimination theorems in this paper can be applied in a general setting to show that the family of neocompact sets is countably (...) compact. To provide the necessary setting we introduce the notion of a law structure. This notion was motivated by the probability law of a random variable. However, in this paper we discuss a variety of model theoretic examples of the notion in the light of our quantifier elimination results. (shrink)

Set theory is an autonomous and sophisticated field of mathematics, enormously successful not only at its continuing development of its historical heritage but also at analyzing mathematical propositions cast in set-theoretic terms and gauging their consistency strength. But set theory is also distinguished by having begun intertwined with pronounced metaphysical attitudes, and these have even been regarded as crucial by some of its great developers. This has encouraged the exaggeration of crises in foundations and of metaphysical doctrines in general. However, (...) set theory has proceeded in the opposite direction, from a web of intensions to a theory of extensionpar excellence, and like other fields of mathematics its vitality and progress have depended on a steadily growing core of mathematical structures and methods, problems and results. There is also the stronger contention that from the beginning set theory actually developed through a progression ofmathematicalmoves, whatever and sometimes in spite of what has been claimed on its behalf.What follows is an account of the development of set theory from its beginnings through the creation of forcing based on these contentions, with an avowedly Whiggish emphasis on the heritage that has been retained and developed by current set theory. The whole transfinite landscape can be viewed as the result of Cantor's attempt to articulate and solve the Continuum Problem. (shrink)

(new version: 10/30/07). Click here to download the companion Mathematica 6 notebook that goes along with this paper.

Based on the relevant logic R, the system R# was proposed as a relevant Peano arithmetic. R# has many nice properties: the most conspicuous theorems of classical Peano arithmetic PA are readily provable therein; it is readily and effectively shown to be nontrivial; it incorporates both intuitionist and classical proof methods. But it is shown here that R# is properly weaker than PA, in the sense that there is a strictly positive theorem QRF of PA which is unprovable in R#. (...) The reason is interesting: if PA is slightly weakened to a subtheory P+, it admits the complex ring C as a model; thus QRF is chosen to be a theorem of PA but false in C. Inasmuch as all strictly positive theorems of R# are already theorems of P+, this nonconservativity result shows that QRF is also a nontheorem of R#. As a consequence, Ackermann's rule γ is inadmissible in R#. Accordingly, an extension of R# which retains its good features is desired. The system R##, got by adding an omega-rule, is such an extension. Central question: is there an effectively axiomatizable system intermediate between R# and R##, which does formalize arithmetic on relevant principles, but also admits γ in a natural way? (shrink)

Edward Nelson published in 1986 a book defending an extreme formalist view of mathematics according to which there is animpassable barrierin the totality of exponentiation. On the positive side, Nelson embarks on a program of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Raphael Robinson's theory of arithmetic. In the shadow of this program, some very nice logical investigations and results were produced by a number of people, not only regarding what can be interpreted inbut also what cannot be so (...) interpreted. We explain some of these results and rely on them to discuss Nelson's position. (shrink)

We present a model of computation for string functions over single-sorted, total algebraic structures and study some basic features of a general theory of computability within this framework. Our concept generalizes the Blum-Shub-Smale setting of computability over the reals and other rings. By dealing with strings of arbitrary length instead of tuples of fixed length, some suppositions of deeper results within former approaches to generalized recursion theory become superfluous. Moreover, this gives the basis for introducing computational complexity in a BSS-like (...) manner. Relationships both to classical computability and to Friedman's concept of eds computability are established. Two kinds of nondeterminism as well as several variants of recognizability are investigated with respect to interdependencies on each other and on properties of the underlying structures. For structures of finite signatures, there are universal programs with the usual characteristics. For the general case of not necessarily finite signature, this subject will be studied in a separate, forthcoming paper. (shrink)

Quine, em seu livro Philosophy of Logic, identifica lógica com lógica de primeira ordem e defende a concepçáo segundo a qual a completude é uma propriedade necessária dos sistemas lógicos. O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a argumentaçáo de Quine e mostrar que suas idéias a respeito da natureza da lógica apresentam diversos problemas tanto conceituais, como técnicos.

The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is often paraphrased as ``every computable function is computable by means of a Turing machine.'' The author has constructed a family of equational theories that are not Turing-decidable, that is, given one of the theories, no Turing machine can recognize whether an arbitrary equation is in the theory or not. But the theory is called pseudorecursive because it has the additional property that when attention is limited to equations with a bounded number of variables, one obtains, (...) for each number of variables, a fragment of the theory that is indeed Turing-decidable. In a 1982 conversation, Alfred Tarski announced that he believed the theory to be decidable, despite this contradicting CTT. The article gives the background for this proclamation, considers alternate interpretations, and sets the stage for further research. (shrink)

We investigate topological properties of subsets S of the real plane, expressed by first-order logic sentences in the language of the reals augmented with a binary relation symbol for S. Two sets are called topologically elementary equivalent if they have the same such first-order topological properties. The contribution of this paper is a natural and effective characterization of topological elementary equivalence of closed semi-algebraic sets.

This paper develops the very basic notions of analysis in a weak second-order theory of arithmetic BTFA whose provably total functions are the polynomial time computable functions. We formalize within BTFA the real number system and the notion of a continuous real function of a real variable. The theory BTFA is able to prove the intermediate value theorem, wherefore it follows that the system of real numbers is a real closed ordered field. In the last section of the paper, we (...) show how to interpret the theory BTFA in Robinson's theory of arithmetic Q. This fact entails that the elementary theory of the real closed ordered fields is interpretable in Q. (shrink)