- Justification as a dimension of rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1523-1546.details
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(1 other version)Metanormative regress: an escape plan.Christian Tarsney - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).details
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Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (2):47-63.details
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Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):153-178.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?Ruth Weintraub - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):346-360.details
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Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check.Michele Palmira - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):799-824.details
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Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Giacomo Melis - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2065-2083.details
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A Rational Agent With Our Evidence.Dominik Kauss - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (7):2803-2824.details
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"I'm, Like, a Very Smart Person" On Self-Licensing and Perils of Reflection.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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Compromising with the Uncompromising: Political Disagreement under Asymmetric Compliance.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Journal of Political Philosophy 31 (3):337-357.details
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(1 other version)Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).details
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The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.details
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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
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Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives.Patrick Bondy & David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):963-969.details
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Coherence as Competence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):353-376.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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From Impossibility to Evidentialism?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):384-406.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist.Neil Sinhababu - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge.details
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Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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(1 other version)Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
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What are the chances you’re right about everything? An epistemic challenge for modern partisanship.Hrishikesh Joshi - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (1):36-61.details
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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
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