- Do affective desires provide reasons for action?Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Ratio 34 (2):147-157.details
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Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.details
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Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.details
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Wanting and willing.Eric Marcus - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):887-899.details
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Reasoning with heuristics.Brett Karlan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):100-108.details
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Religious Convictions and Moral Motivation.Andrei G. Zavaliy - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):141-161.details
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The Right Wrong‐Makers.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):426-440.details
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What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.details
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The limits of libertarianism in debates over euthanasia and the application of moral fictionalism in bioethics.Michal Trčka - 2020 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 10 (1-2):30-39.details
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Qui peut sauver la morale? Essai de métaéthique.François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2019 - Paris: Ithaque. Edited by Hichem Naar.details
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Self-deception, intentions and the folk-psychological explanation of action (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako - 2020 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 19 (1):91-117.details
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Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):986-996.details
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Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).details
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The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism.James R. Beebe - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 4.details
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(1 other version)Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:253-277.details
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Moral Relativism.Chris Gowans - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.details
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Remembering what is right.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):49-64.details
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Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
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The Structure of Unpleasantness.Abraham Sapién - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):805-830.details
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A debunking explanation for moral progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
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Two types of epistemic instrumentalism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5455-5475.details
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Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.details
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(1 other version)The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 286-306.details
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Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
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Experimental philosophy and the fruitfulness of normative concepts.Matthew Lindauer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2129-2152.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
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(1 other version)Aspects of folk morality: Objectivism and relativism.Hagop Sarkissian - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 212-224.details
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Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinkidetails
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Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.details
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Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.details
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Nothing ‘Mere’ to It: Reclaiming Subjective Accounts of Normativity of Law.S. Swaminathan - 2019 - Journal of Human Values 25 (1):1-14.details
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Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):653-666.details
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(1 other version)Just too different: normative properties and natural properties.David Copp - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):263-286.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Inferentialism without Normativity.Krzysztof Poslajko & Pawel Grabarczyk - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (2):174-195.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Action explanation and its presuppositions.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):123-146.details
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Being realistic about motivation.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2751-2765.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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The virtue of curiosity.Lewis Ross - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):105-120.details
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Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason.Monique Wonderly - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 262-275.details
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A Dual-Process Account of Moral Judgment: What Psychopaths Can Teach Us About Morality.Deirdre Kelly - 2016 - Dissertation, Carleton Universitydetails
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Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity.Joseph Jebari - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2429-2453.details
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Consequentialism and the Evaluation of Action qua Action.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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Folk Platitudes as the Explananda of Philosophical Metaethics: Are They Accurate? And Do They Help or Hinder Inquiry?Hagop Sarkissian - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):565-575.details
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Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism.Alexander Dietz - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):497-510.details
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Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 15-54.details
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Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.details
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