- What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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The Reason in Desire.Moritz Schulz - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Projective Adaptivism.Leonid Tarasov - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):379-402.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Political Ignorance.Kenneth Boyd - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Wahrheit.Dirk Kindermann - 2015 - In Nikola Kompa (ed.), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 91-99.details
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Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear.Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith - 2022 - Abingdon, England: Routledge.details
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Contextualism, invariantism and semantic blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.details
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Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - 2020 - Erkenntnis (4):1501-1519.details
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Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):465-476.details
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Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Epistemic comparative conditionals.Linton Wang - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156.details
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Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-11.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Book symposium: Nuno venturinha. Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology.Nuno Venturinha, Marcelo Carvalho, Marcos Silva, João V. G. Cuter & Darlei Dall’Agnol - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (3):164-258.details
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A Case for Weak Safety.Niklaas Tepelmann - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):545-569.details
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Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.details
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Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):153-168.details
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Generics, Content and Cognitive Bias.Rachel Katharine Sterken - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (1):75-93.details
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No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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A puzzle for epistemic WAMs.Mona Simion - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689.details
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Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment, and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):239-259.details
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Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence.Michael J. Shaffer - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Entscheidendes Wissen: Kommentar zu Beings of Thought and Action.Moritz Schulz - 2023 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (1):63-69.details
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Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment.Javiera Perez Gomez & Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):593-613.details
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Extreme Betting.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):32-41.details
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Crenças “gettierizadas” e conhecimento procedimental.Luis Estevinha Rodrigues - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):438-446.details
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Knowledge in real-world contexts: not glamorous, but indispensable.Patricia Rich - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-32.details
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Skepticism and the Prediction Objection.Esben Petersen - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3):193-217.details
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Denying knowledge.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):36-55.details
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On a flawed argument against the KK principle.S. Okasha - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):80-86.details
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Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.details
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The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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The Attitude of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):678-685.details
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