- On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):95-116.details
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Reproducibility of empirical findings: experiments in philosophy and beyond.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - unknowndetails
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The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will.Kiichi Inarimori - 2024 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 24:125-143.details
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The Thought Experiments are Rigged: Mechanistic Understanding Inhibits Mentalistic Understanding.Toni S. Adleberg - unknowndetails
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):346-374.details
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Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.details
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Intuitions in Experimental Philosophy.Joachim Horvath - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.), The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 71-100.details
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Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 385-405.details
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Women and ‘the philosophical personality’: evaluating whether gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test have significance for explaining the gender gap in Philosophy.Christina Easton - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):139-167.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Experimental Philosophy: A Methodological Critique.Robert L. Woolfolk - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):79-87.details
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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
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Intentional Action Without Knowledge.Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele & David Rose - 2020 - Synthese 197:1-13.details
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A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):885-907.details
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A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition.Damián Enrique Szmuc - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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“Filling in”, thought experiments and intuitions.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):255-262.details
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Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):110-129.details
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Famine, affluence, and philosophers’ biases.Peter Seipel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2907-2926.details
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Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
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In defence of a logic for ‘because’.B. Schnieder - 2016 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (2):160-171.details
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Experimental Explication.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):672-710.details
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Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.details
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Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2671-2695.details
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Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1783-1806.details
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In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.details
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Persistence through function preservation.David Rose - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):97-146.details
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Intentional action without knowledge.David Rose, Alfred Mele & Romy Vekony - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1231-1243.details
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Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.details
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How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
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Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):569-588.details
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Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
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The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue.Conny Rhode - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):535-554.details
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Exclusion Criteria in Experimental Philosophy.Sara Kier Praëm, Jacob Busch & Carsten Bergenholtz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1531-1545.details
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Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):297-310.details
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Talking to ourselves? Academic philosophy and the public sphere.Chris Norris - 2014 - Think 13 (37):57-72.details
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
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Philosophical Expertise.Jennifer Nado - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.details
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Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.details
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Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknowndetails
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How To Think About Philosophical Methodology.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):447-463.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
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Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):590-611.details
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Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.details
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The method(s) of cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.details
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