- Reflective epistemological disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.details
|
|
Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion.Matthew J. Cull - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (64):27-40.details
|
|
Modal Logic as a Methodological Tool in Epistemology.José Alejandro Fernández Cuesta - 2022 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 11 (1):71-79.details
|
|
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Moral Bioenhancement.Parker Crutchfield - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (5):389-396.details
|
|
Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.details
|
|
Comments on Vogel.Troy Cross - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):89 - 98.details
|
|
Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.details
|
|
A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.details
|
|
Suppose Yalcin is wrong about epistemic modals.Joshua D. Crabill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.details
|
|
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
|
|
Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?Christopher Cowie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1685-1702.details
|
|
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Avi Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.details
|
|
The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox.Roy T. Cook - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):467-482.details
|
|
Good to know.Earl Conee - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331.details
|
|
Factual Evidence without Knowledge.Earl Conee - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):536-552.details
|
|
Evidential support and best explanations.Earl Conee - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):71-85.details
|
|
Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
|
|
On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.details
|
|
Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.Juan Comesaña - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):781-791.details
|
|
Falsehood and Entailment.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.details
|
|
Empirical justification and defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1771-1786.details
|
|
Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.details
|
|
A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.details
|
|
Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.details
|
|
Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):700-716.details
|
|
A norm of aesthetic assertion and its semantic (in)significance.John Collins - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):973-1003.details
|
|
The uncoordinated teachers puzzle.Michael Cohen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-8.details
|
|
Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.details
|
|
Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
|
|
Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.details
|
|
Strokes of Luck.E. J. Coffman - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):477-508.details
|
|
Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.details
|
|
Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.details
|
|
Can virtue epistemology capitalize on jtb's appeal?E. J. Coffman - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):199-222.details
|
|
Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
|
|
How Infallibilists Can Have It All.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):363-380.details
|
|
Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.details
|
|
Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.details
|
|
What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro (eds.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor). Springer.details
|
|
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
|
|
Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science.Kelly James Clark & Dani Rabinowitz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67 - 81.details
|
|
Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons.Claudio Almeida - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319.details
|
|
Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
|
|
What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
|
|
Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
|
|
Intuitive knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.details
|
|
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.details
|
|
Could knowledge-talk be largely non-literal?Julianne Chung - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):383-411.details
|
|
Theories and Theories of Truth.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.details
|
|