- (1 other version)Evidence and Cognition.Samuel D. Taylor & Jon Williamson - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12888.details
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The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism.Erik J. Olsson, Trond A. Tjøstheim, Andreas Stephens, Arthur Schwaninger & Maximilian Roszko - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):417-438.details
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Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (1):26-54.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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What Topic Continuity Problem?Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Stupefying.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1).details
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Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation.Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-24.details
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(1 other version)Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S8):1981-1999.details
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Against Evidential Minimalism.Daniel Buckley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis (5).details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Time-Slice Epistemology for Bayesians.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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Moral criticism, hypocrisy, and pragmatics.Y. Sandy Berkovski - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):1-26.details
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Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.Simone Gozzano - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):371-391.details
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Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.details
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In defence of the modal account of legal risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-16.details
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Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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Conditional Collapse.Sam Carter - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):971-1004.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Faith and traditions.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):740-759.details
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Proper functions: etiology without typehood.Geoff Keeling & Niall Paterson - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (3):1-17.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.details
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"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):434-453.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning.Christopher Kennedy & Malte Willer - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3325-3348.details
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Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
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Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):658-683.details
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Smithies’s Mentalism and E=K.Alex Byrne - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):774-782.details
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Erratum to: Russell–Myhill and grounding.Boris Kment - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):298-298.details
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Justification and being in a position to know.Daniel Waxman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):289-298.details
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Updating without evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):576-599.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
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