- Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.details
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Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.details
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Hallucinating real things.Steven P. James - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3711-3732.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory.Rasmus Jaksland - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):35-61.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S8):1981-1999.details
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Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertion.Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):491-498.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation.Kensuke Ito - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-18.details
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The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.details
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Updating without evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):576-599.details
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Duty and knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.details
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Mind‐wandering: A philosophical guide.Zachary C. Irving & Aaron Glasser - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12644.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
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Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.details
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Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement.Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.details
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The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Knowledge-to-fact arguments can deliver knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.details
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Question closure to solve the surprise test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.details
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Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):351-367.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Christoph Kelp Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
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Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
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A Philosophically Neutral Semantics for Perception Sentences.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2022 - Theoria 88:532-544.details
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Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79:52-61.details
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TxW Epistemic Modality.Andrea Iacona - 2012 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 10:3-14.details
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Warranted assertability maneuvers and the rules of assertion.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.details
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Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
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Beyond Millianism.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.details
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Credible Futures.Andrea Iacona & Samuele Iaquinto - 2021 - Synthese 199:10953-10968.details
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The most general factive stative attitude.John Hyman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):561-565.details
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The unity of knowledge.John Hyman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.details
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Knowledge and evidence.John Hyman - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):891-916.details
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The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.details
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Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):439-457.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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