- True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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One wage of unknowability.Dennis Whitcomb - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):339-352.details
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On epistemic conceptions of meaning: Use, meaning and normativity.Daniel Whiting - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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A Model for Free Speech.Daniel Weston - 2022 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 35 (6):2211-2240.details
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A Minimality Constraint on Grounding.Jonas Werner - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1153-1168.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Note on Design: What's Fine-tuning Got to Do With It?Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):431-438.details
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The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.details
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Tolerating Gluts.Zach Weber, David Ripley, Graham Priest, Dominic Hyde & Mark Colyvan - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):813-828.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Yet another new cosmological argument.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (1):11-31.details
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Stalnaker on sleeping beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.details
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Memory, belief and time.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):692-715.details
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Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.details
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Interests, evidence and games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.details
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Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.details
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Vagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):66-89.details
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Imagination and the A Priori.Jared Warren - 2022 - Synthese 201 (1):1-16.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Defending Understanding-Assent Links.Jared Warren - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9219-9236.details
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Multi-Path vs. Single-Path Replies to Skepticism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):383-412.details
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Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.details
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Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.N. Waights Hickman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):311-335.details
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(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding.Natalia Waights Hickman - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):707-728.details
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Contextualismo integrativo: una manera de ordenar las distintas nociones de justificación epistémica.Ricardo Vázquez & Jonatan García - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):27-44.details
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On monarchy.Detlef von Daniels - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (4):456-477.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Knowledge, the concept know, and the word know: considerations from polysemy and pragmatics.Rachel Dudley & Christopher Vogel - 2023 - Synthese 203 (1):1-46.details
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Zhuangzi as externalist: Reconciling two interpretations of the Happy Fish debate.Ranie B. Villaver - 2023 - Asian Philosophy 33 (4):363-376.details
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