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  1. (1 other version)Science versus the Humanities: Hyman on Wollheim on Depiction.Gary Kemp - 2016 - The Journal of Aesthetic Education 50 (2):1-7.
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  • Image/Images: A Debate Between Philosophy and Visual Studies.Alessandro Cavazzana & Francesco Ragazzi (eds.) - 2021 - Venice: Edizioni Ca' Foscari.
    The third issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts is centered on a series of questions related to the nature of images. What properties characterize them? Do they exist also in our minds? What relationship do they have with phenomena such as perception, memory, language and interpretation? The authors participating in this issue have been asked to answer these and other questions starting from and in dialogue with the two philosophical perspectives that have most (...)
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  • Where Images Make Their Wonder: An Introduction.Alessandro Cavazzana & Francesco Ragazzi - 2021 - JOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 2 (1):7-20.
    The paper is an introduction to the third issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts. The authors give an account of the theories that have most enriched the study of images since the second half of the twentieth century: analytical philosophy and visual culture studies. A distinction is made between the two philosophical traditions. On the one hand, in particular within the context of analytic philosophy, images have been studied as single entities in relationship (...)
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  • Perceiving Aesthetic Properties.Alberto Voltolini - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (3):417-434.
    In this paper, I want to claim that, in conformity with overall intuitions, there are some aesthetic properties that are perceivable. For they are high-level properties that are not only grasped immediately, but also attended to holistically—just like the grouping properties they depend on and that are responsible for the Gestalt effects or switches through which they are grasped. Yet, unlike such grouping properties, they are holistically attended to in a disinterested modality, where objects and their properties are regarded for (...)
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  • The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences.Fabrizio Calzavarini & Alberto Voltolini - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):621-644.
    There are some complex experiences, such as the experiences that allow us to understand linguistic expressions and pictures respectively, which seem to be very similar. For they are stratified experiences in which, on top of grasping certain low-level properties, one also grasps some high-level semantic-like properties. Yet first of all, those similarities notwithstanding, a phenomenologically-based reflection shows that such experiences are different. For a meaning experience has a high-level fold, in which one grasps the relevant expression’s meaning, which is not (...)
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  • Imagining one experience to be another.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13977-13991.
    I can imagine a banana to be a phone receiver. I can also imagine the flapping of my arms to be flying. So it is possible to imagine one thing to be another—at least for some types of ‘things’. I will argue that although it is possible to imagine an object to be another object and it is also possible to imagine an activity to be a different activity, one cannot imagine one’s present sensory experience to be a different sensory (...)
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  • Reality, Fiction, and Make-Believe in Kendall Walton.Emanuele Arielli - 2021 - In Krešimir Purgar (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Image Studies. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 363-377.
    Images share a common feature with all phenomena of imagination, since they make us aware of what is not present or what is fictional and not existent at all. From this perspective, the philosophical approach of Kendall Lewis Walton—born in 1939 and active since the 1960s at the University of Michigan—is perhaps one of the most notable contributions to image theory. Walton is an authoritative figure within the tradition of analytical aesthetics. His contributions have had a considerable influence on a (...)
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  • Paintings of Music.Michelle Liu - 2022 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 80 (2):151-163.
    Paintings of music are a significant presence in modern art. They are cross-modal representations, aimed at representing music, say, musical works or forms, using colors, lines, and shapes in the visual modality. This article aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding paintings of music. Using examples from modern art, the article addresses the question of what a painting of music is. Implications for the aesthetic appreciation of paintings of music are also drawn.
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  • Moved by Music Alone.Tom Cochrane - 2021 - British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (4):455-470.
    In this paper I present an account of musical arousal that takes into account key demands of formalist philosophers such as Peter Kivy and Nick Zangwill. Formalists prioritise our understanding and appreciation of the music itself. As a result, they demand that any feelings we have in response to music must be directed at the music alone, without being distracted by non-musical associations. To accommodate these requirements I appeal to a mechanism of contagion which I synthesize with the expectation-based arousal (...)
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  • No Time to Move: Motion, Painting and Temporal Experience.Jack Shardlow - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):239 - 260.
    This paper is concerned with the senses in which paintings do and do not depict various temporal phenomena, such as motion, stasis and duration. I begin by explaining the popular – though not uncontroversial – assumption that depiction, as a pictorial form of representation, is a matter of an experiential resemblance between the pictorial representation and that which it is a depiction of. Given this assumption, I illustrate a tension between two plausible claims: that paintings do not depict motion in (...)
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  • Imagination and Perception in Film Experience.Enrico Terrone - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Both perception and imagination seem to play a crucial role in our engagement with fiction films but whether they really do so, and which role they possibly play, is controversial. On the one hand, a fiction film, as film, is a depiction that invites us to perceive the events portrayed. On the other hand, as fiction, it invites us to imagine the story told. Thus, after watching the film Alien, one might say that one saw Ripley fighting the monster but (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why Trompe l'oeils Deceive Our Visual Experience.Gabriele Ferretti - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1):33-42.
    Philosophers suggested that usual picture perception requires the simultaneous occurrence of the perception of the surface and of the depicted object. However, there are special cases of picture perception, such as trompe l'oeil perception, in which, unlike in usual picture perception, the object looks like a real, present object we can interact with, of the kind we are usually acquainted with in face-to-face perception. While philosophers suggested that usual picture perception and trompe l'oeil perception must differ with respect to the (...)
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  • Art made for pictures.John Kulvicki & Bence Nanay - 2018 - Phenomenology and Mind 14:120-134.
    Over the last fifteen years, communication has become pictorial in a manner that it never was before. Billions of people have smart phones that enable them to take, edit, and share pictures easily whenever they choose to do so. This has created expressive niches within which new activities, with their own norms, continue to develop. Ready availability of these pictorial modes of communication, we claim, not only constitutes a change in the range of our communicative practices, but also changes the (...)
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  • Different Kinds of Fusion Experiences.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):203-222.
    Some people have stressed that there is a close analogy between meaning experiences, i.e., experiences as of understanding concerning linguistic expressions, and seeing-in experiences, i.e., pictorial experiences of discerning a certain item – what a certain picture presents, viz. the picture’s subject – in another item – the picture’s vehicle, the picture’s physical basis. Both can be seen as fusion experiences, in the minimal sense that they are experiential wholes made up of different aspects. Actually, two important similarities between such (...)
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  • (1 other version)Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - 2019 - Erkenntnis (4):1-22.
    Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. (...)
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  • Realism in Film: Less is More.Jiri Benovsky - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):131-141.
    What is realism in film? Focusing on a test case of HFR high-definition movies, I discuss in this article various types of realism as well as their interrelations. Precision, recessiveness of the medium, transparency, and 'Collapse' are discussed and compared. At the end of the day, I defend the claim that 'less is more' in the sense that more image precision can actually have a negative impact on storytelling.
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  • Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-88.
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  • Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an (...)
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  • Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition.Chad Kidd - 2014 - In Linda Osbeck & Barbara Held (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-150.
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  • Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):87-116.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of (...)
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  • Trompe l’oeil and the Dorsal/Ventral Account of Picture Perception.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):181-197.
    While there has been a lot of discussion of picture perception both in perceptual psychology and in philosophy, these discussions are driven by very different background assumptions. Nonetheless, it would be mutually beneficial to arrive at an understanding of picture perception that is informed by both the philosophers’ and the psychologists’ story. The aim of this paper is exactly this: to give an account of picture perception that is valid both as a philosophical and as a psychological account. I argue (...)
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  • Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.Robert Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):43-81.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
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  • Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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  • The Epistemic Misuse & Abuse of Pictorial Caricature.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):137-152.
    I claim that caricature is an epistemically defective depiction. More precisely, when employed in service to some epistemic uptake, I claim that caricature can have a non-negligible epistemic effect only for a less than ideally rational audience with certain cognitive biases. An ideally rational audience, however, would take all caricature to be what I refer to as fairground caricature, i.e., an interesting or entertaining form of depiction that is at best only trivially revelatory. I then argue that any medium (or (...)
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  • The philosophical implications of the Perky experiments: reply to Hopkins.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):439-443.
    The Perky experiments are taken to demonstrate the phenomenal similarity between perception and visualization. Robert Hopkins argues that this interpretation should be resisted because it ignores an important feature of the experiments, namely, that they involve picture perception, rather than ordinary seeing. My aim is to point out that the force of this argument depends on one’s views on picture perception. On what I take to be the most mainstream account of picture perception, Hopkins’s argument does not work. But even (...)
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  • Perceiving pictures.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
    I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: (...)
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  • (1 other version)Seeing-in, seeing-as, seeing-with: Looking through pictures.Emmanuel Alloa - 2010 - In Elisabeth Nemeth, Richard Heinrich & Wolfram Pichler (eds.), Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts. Preproceedings of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 179-190.
    In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has undoubtedly become a major conceptual reference. Rather than trying to establish what Wittgenstein’s own image theory could possibly look like, this paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries that arise when using Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘seeing-as’ for addressing the plural realities of images. While putting into evidence the tensions that come into play when applying what was initially a theory (...)
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  • Empathy with inanimate objects and the uncanny valley.Catrin Misselhorn - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (3):345-359.
    The term “uncanny valley” goes back to an article of the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori. He put forward the hypothesis that humanlike objects like certain kinds of robots elicit emotional responses similar to real humans proportionate to their degree of human likeness. Yet, if a certain degree of similarity is reached emotional responses become all of a sudden very repulsive. The corresponding recess in the supposed function is called the uncanny valley. The present paper wants to propose a philosophical explanation (...)
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  • Arnaud François & Camille Riquier (eds.). Annales bergsoniennes VIII: Bergson, la morale, les émotions. Paris: PUF, 2017, 364 páginas. [REVIEW]Clara Zimmermann - 2020 - Boletín de Estética 52:111-115.
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  • A real eye opener. La fotografía de Vivian Maier.Pablo Pavesi - 2017 - Boletín de Estética 13 (40):61-75.
    Vivian Maier’s street photography shows us a sudden transfiguration of reality, by which persons, scenes and things become faerical (neologism that also receives one of the senses of the French féerie , a play where supernatural, or, in this case, also infranatural creatures appear). We propose that this transfiguration is an apparition – a faerical epiphany (always earthy and fleshy) that follows two ways, one sunny and luminous, the other obscure and subterranean. We will examine Maier’s body, reflected in her (...)
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  • Taking twofoldness seriously: Walton on imagination and depiction.Bence Nanay - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (3):285–289.
    This paper analyzes Kendall Walton's theory of depiction and, more specifically, his notion of twofoldness. I argue that (1) Walton’s notion of twofoldness is, in spite of what Walton claims, very different from Richard Wollheim’s and (2) Walton’s notion of twofoldness is inconsistent with the rest of his theory of depiction.
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  • Image structure.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (4):323–340.
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  • Pictorial representation.John Kulvicki - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):535–546.
    Maps, notes, descriptions, diagrams, flowcharts, photographs, paintings, and prints, all, in one way or another, manage to be about things or stand for them. This article looks at three ways in which philosophers have explained the way that pictures represent the world. It starts by describing some leading perceptual accounts and then surveys contemporary content and structural alternatives.
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  • Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery.Evan Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):203--213.
    This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the (...)
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  • The particularity of photographic experience.René Jagnow - 2023 - Theoria 89 (2):216-231.
    A common view in the philosophy of perception holds that states of seeing objects face to face have particular contents. When you see, say, a dog face to face, your visual state represents the particular dog that is in front of you. In this paper, I argue for a related claim about states of seeing objects in conventional photographs. When you see a dog in a photograph, for example, your visual state represents the particular dog that was in front of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In.Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1285-1324.
    Philosophers have suggested that, in order to understand the particular visual state we are in during picture perception, we should focus on experimental results from vision neuroscience—in particular, on the most rigorous account of the functioning of the visual system that we have from vision neuroscience, namely, the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’. According to the initial version of this model, our visual system can be dissociated, from an anatomo-functional point of view, into two streams: a ventral stream subserving visual recognition, (...)
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  • Imagination, Perception and Memory. Making (some) sense of Walton’s view on Photographs and Depiction.Paloma Atencia-Linares - 2017 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 19:251-268.
    Walton has controversially claimed that all pictures are fiction because, in seeing a picture one imagines that one is seeing the depicted content in the flesh; and that in seeing a photograph one _literally – _although indirectly – _sees_ the photographed object. Philosophers have found these claims implausible for various reasons: it is not the case that all pictures are fiction; explaining depiction does not require an imaginative engagement and seeing objects in photographs is not tantamount to seeing the object. (...)
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  • Depicting Depictions.René Jagnow - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):453-479.
    How is it possible for a picture to depict a picture? Proponents of perceptual theories of depiction, who argue that the content of a picture is determined, in part, by the visual state it elicits in suitable viewers, that is, by a state of seeing-in, have given a plausible answer to this question. They say that a picture depicts a picture, in part, because, under appropriate conditions of observation, a suitable viewer will be able to see a picture in the (...)
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  • Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  • The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  • Why Immoral Art Cannot Morally Harm Us.Maria Caruso - unknown
    Both philosophers and literary critics have championed artworks as necessary to moral education. As a result many of these critics believe that art that is bad or immoral can causally affect our character, resulting in moral harm. Moral harm is the idea that artworks possess a strong disposition to affect our moral beliefs such that we are less able to distinguish between what is good and what is bad. I examine this concept of moral harm and argue that immoral artworks (...)
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  • Seeing, visualizing, and believing: Pictures and cognitive penetration.John Zeimbekis - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 298-327.
    Visualizing and mental imagery are thought to be cognitive states by all sides of the imagery debate. Yet the phenomenology of those states has distinctly visual ingredients. This has potential consequences for the hypothesis that vision is cognitively impenetrable, the ability of visual processes to ground perceptual warrant and justification, and the distinction between cognitive and perceptual phenomenology. I explore those consequences by describing two forms of visual ambiguity that involve visualizing: the ability to visually experience a picture surface as (...)
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  • Is twofoldness necessary for representational seeing?Bence Nanay - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3):248-257.
    Richard Wollheim claimed that twofoldness is a necessary condition for the perception of pictorial representations and it is also a necessary condition for the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. Jerrold Levinson pointed out that these two questions are different and argued that though twofoldness may be a necessary condition for the aesthetic appreciation of pictures, it cannot be a necessary condition for the perception of pictorial representations. I argue that Wollheim's use of the term ‘twofoldness’ alternates between two concepts: the simultaneous (...)
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  • Look again: Phenomenology and mental imagery. [REVIEW]Evan Thompson - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  • (1 other version)Why the Pictorial Needs the Motoric.Gabriele Ferretti - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):771-805.
    Does action play any crucial role in our perception of pictures? The standard literature on picture perception has never explicitly tackled this question. This is for a simple reason. After all, objects in a picture seem to be static objects of perception. Thus, it might sound extremely controversial to say that action is crucial in picture perception. Contrary to this general intuitive stance, this paper defends, for the first time, the apparently very controversial claim, never addressed in the literature, that (...)
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  • The puzzle of make-believe about pictures: can one imagine a perception to be different?Sonia Sedivy - 2021 - In Art, Representation, and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York: Routledge. pp. 147-163.
    Kendall Walton explains pictures in terms of games of perceptual make-believe. Pictures or depictions are props that draw us to participate in games of make-believe where we imagine seeing what a picture depicts. Walton proposes that one imagines of one’s perceptual experience of the coloured canvas that it is a different perceptual experience. The issue is whether perception and imagination can combine the way Walton suggests. Can one imagine a perception to be different? To get a clearer understanding of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Twofoldness and Three-Layeredness in Pictorial Representation.Alberto Voltolini - 2018 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):89-111.
    In this essay, I defend a Wollheimian account of a twofold picture perception. While I agree with Wollheim’s objectors that a picture involves three layers that qualify a picture in its complexity -- its vehicle, what is seen in it, and its subject --, I argue that the third layer does not involve perception, even indirectly: what is seen in a picture constrains its subject to be a subject of a certain kind, yet it does not force the latter to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Visual Feeling of Presence.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):112-136.
    Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual (...)
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  • (1 other version)Science versus the Humanities: Hyman on Wollheim on Depiction.Gary Kemp - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 50 (2):1-7.
    In the seventh chapter of his extraordinary book The Objective Eye, John Hyman offers various criticisms of Richard Wollheim’s theory of pictorial depiction.1 My immediate purpose in this short piece is to make the case that these criticisms fail. By no means do I claim that there are not other criticisms to be made against Wollheim’s theory or that Hymans’s book as a whole fails—not in its overarching attempt to rescue the objectivity of art from subjectivist views or, more narrowly, (...)
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  • The Unity of Hallucinations.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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