In this field guide, I distinguish five separate senses with which the term ‘mechanism’ is used in contemporary philosophy of science. Many of these senses have overlapping areas of application but involve distinct philosophical claims and characterize the target mechanisms in relevantly different ways. This field guide will clarify the key features of each sense and introduce some main debates, distinguishing those that transpire within a given sense from those that are best understood as concerning two distinct senses. The ‘new (...) mechanisms’ sense is the primary sense from which other senses will be distinguished. In part II of this field guide, I consider three further senses of the term that are ontologically ‘flat’ or at least not explicitly hierarchical in character: equations in structural equation models of causation, causal-physical processes, and information-theoretic constraints on states available to systems. After characterizing each sense, I clarify its ontological commitments, its methodological implications, how it figures in explanations, its implications for reduction, and the key manners in which it differs from other senses of mechanism. I conclude that there is no substantive core meaning shared by all senses, and that debates in contemporary philosophy of science can benefit from clarification regarding precisely which sense of mechanism is at stake. (shrink)

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s "Principia and The Opticks". It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical causation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely interventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underlying concept of causation (...) is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechanicist one. (shrink)

The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Jim Woodward, has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt—though poorly understood—hunch that high-level, relatively abstract explanations, of the sort provided by sciences like biology, psychology and economics, are in some cases explanatorily optimal. It is the aim of this paper to show that this is mistaken. Due to a lack of effective constraints on the causal variables at the heart of the interventionist causal-explanatory scheme, as presently (...) formulated it is either unable to prefer high-level explanations to low, or systematically overshoots, recommending explanations at so high of a level as to be virtually vacuous. (shrink)

The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been (...) performed. The problem arises when it is argued that the actions do not harm these people—because the actions do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be.1 Consider: Radioactive Waste Policy: We are trying to decide whether to adopt a permissive radioactive waste policy. This policy would be less inconvenient to us than our existing practices. If we enact the newly-proposed policy, then we will cause there to be radioactive pollution that will cause illness and suffering. However, the policy will have such significant effects on public policy and industry functioning, that different people will exist in the future depending on whether we enact the policy. Two things should be emphasized. First, the illness and suffering caused will be very serious: deformed babies, children with burns from acid rain, and adults dying young from cancer. Second, the policy will affect who will exist in the future because our present practices invade people’s everyday lives, for example by affecting recycling practices in the home; these practices will change if the policy is adopted. Furthermore, whether we adopt the policy will determine which plants are built where, what jobs are available, and what trucks are on the road. These effects will create small differences in everyone’s lives which ultimately affect who meets whom and who conceives with whom, or at least when people conceive. This affects who exists in the future. (shrink)

“Despair and a sense of loss are not static conditions but goads to our continuous labor” (Senses 70). This is the way Stanley Cavell describes one of the fundamental lessons of skepticism, the fam...

While ethnomusicologists often write about musical instruments and engage with social theories, these two predilections are typically distinct, and rarely are instruments theorized let alone considered in social terms. Drawing on recent work in Science and Technology Studies, I argue for a study of the social where musical objects (including instruments) and people are actors within patterned heterogeneous networks. I begin with literary examples of instruments framed as having agency, then move to the treatment of instrument-agency within organology. As an (...) exemplar for this methodology, I consider the social life of the saz, an ubiquitous lute from Turkey. (shrink)

Can Contemporary Science Inspire Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Causality? The cooperation between natural science, philosophy, and theology in an analysis of the causal structure and co-dependency of entities in the universe seems to be both legitimate and expected. It turns out, however, that in practice it oftentimes raises some tensions, questions and difficulties, leading to the development of alternative and in a sense competitive models of causality and of God’s action in the world. What is more, the attitude of (...) natural sciences since modernity, concentrated on gaining knowledge about natural phenomena to predict and control them, without trying to determine the nature of their ultimate causes, Humean criticism and rejection of the concept of causality as such, and concentration of analytic philosophers on the description of what accompanies phenomena classified as causal, leaving aside the question of the metaphysical status of causes and effects – they all seem to make impossible an interaction and mutual reference of contemporary science, philosophy, and theology in their reflection on the topic of causation. The main goal of this article is to defend the thesis about the possible and actual influence of scientific analysis of cause and effect relationships on the philosophical and theological reflection on causation, not only in the Middle Ages and Modernity, but also in contemporary thought. The presentation of the latest positions in the debate on divine action in the natural world will be followed by an argument in favor of the relevance of the model developed by philosophers and theologians representing the Thomistic school. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an empiricist account of modality that keeps a substantive account of modal commitment, but throws out the metaphysics. I suggest that if we pair a deflationary attitude toward representation with a substantive account of how scientific models are constructed and put to use, the result is an account that deflates the metaphysics of modal commitment without deflating the content of modal claims.

PriestGraham. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2016. 2nd ed. ISBN 978-0-19-878359-6 ; 978-0-19-878360-2. Pp. xxxvi + 368.

Cyborg and prosthetic technologies frame prominent posthumanist approaches to understanding the nature of race. But these frameworks struggle to accommodate the phenomena of racial passing and racial travel, and their posthumanist orientation blurs useful distinctions between racialized humans and their social contexts. We advocate, instead, a humanist approach to race, understanding racial hierarchy as an industrial technology. Our approach accommodates racial passing and travel. It integrates a wide array of research across disciplines. It also helpfully distinguishes among grounds of racialization (...) and conditions facilitating impacts of such racialization. (shrink)

Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population (...) change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order effect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative. (shrink)

The idea that psychiatry contains, in principle, a series of levels of explanation has been criticised both as empirically false but also, by Campbell, as unintelligible because it presupposes a discredited pre-Humean view of causation. Campbell’s criticism is based on an interventionist-inspired denial that mechanisms and rational connections underpin physical and mental causation respectively and hence underpin levels of explanation. These claims echo some superficially similar remarks in Wittgenstein’s Zettel. But attention to the context of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggests a reason (...) to reject explanatory minimalism in psychiatry and reinstate a Wittgensteinian notion of level of explanation. Only in a context broader than the one provided by interventionism is the ascription of propositional attitudes, even in the puzzling case of delusions, justified. Such a view, informed by Wittgenstein, can reconcile the idea that the ascription mental phenomena presupposes a particular level of explanation with the rejection of an a priori claim about its connection to a neurological level of explanation. (shrink)

The recent use of typicality in statistical mechanics for foundational purposes has stirred an important debate involving both philosophers and physicists. While this debate customarily focuses on technical issues, in this paper I try to approach the problem from an epistemological angle. The discussion is driven by two questions: (1) What does typicality add to the concept of measure? (2) What kind of explanation, if any, does typicality yield? By distinguishing the notions of `typicality-as-vast-majority' and `typicality-as-best-exemplar', I argue that the (...) former goes beyond the concept of measure. Furthermore, I also argue that typicality aims at providing us with a form of causal explanation of equilibrium. (shrink)

The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favour of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently, a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. Both proponents and opponents of the interventionist solution crucially rely on the notion of supervenience when formulating their positions. In this article, we consider the relation between interventionism and supervenience in detail and argue that importing supervenience relations into (...) the interventionist framework is deeply problematic. However, rather than reject interventionist solutions to exclusion wholesale, we wish to propose that the problem lies with the concept of supervenience. This would open the door for a moderate defence of the interventionist solution to the exclusion argument. (shrink)

The first part of this paper argues that if Craver’s ([2007a], [2007b]) popular mutual manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist theory of causation--for which it is explicitly designed--it either undermines the mechanistic research paradigm by entailing that there do not exist relationships of constitutive relevance or it gives rise to the unwanted consequence that constitution is a form of causation. The second part shows how Woodward’s theory can be adapted in such a way that (...) (MM) neither undermines the mechanistic paradigm nor reduces constitution to causation. However, it turns out that this modified theoretical embedding of (MM) makes it impossible to produce empirical evidence for constitutive relations. The paper ends by suggesting an additional criterion, the fat-handedness criterion, which, when combined with (MM), generates indirect empirical evidence for constitutive relevance. (shrink)

A primary goal of quantum computer science is to find an explanation for the fact that quantum computers are more powerful than classical computers. In this paper I argue that to answer this question is to compare algorithmic processes of various kinds and to describe the possibility spaces associated with these processes. By doing this, we explain how it is possible for one process to outperform its rival. Further, in this and similar examples little is gained in subsequently asking a (...) how-actually question. Once one has explained how-possibly, there is little left to do. (shrink)

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

Suppose dispositions bear a distinctive connection to counterfactual facts, perhaps one that could be enshrined in a variation on the well-worn schema "Necessarily, x is disposed to phi in psi iff x would phi in psi. Could we exploit this connection to provide an account of what it is to be a disposition? This paper is about four views of dispositionality that attempt to do so.

Together with other influential psychologists of the time, Wundt considers internal data as absolute evidence, grounding psychology on this assumption. In opposition to his former mentor, Külpe aims at rehabilitating Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Yet, he is far from embracing transcendentalism and rejects Kant’s skepticism as to the possibility of a scientific psychology. Nevertheless, Külpe believes that Kant is right in considering internal data as unreliable for scientific purposes: accordingly, psychology should share the same scientific methodology of any other science.

This paper addresses a problem that arises when it comes to inferring deterministic causal chains from pertinent empirical data. It will be shown that to every deterministic chain there exists an empirically equivalent common cause structure. Thus, our overall conviction that deterministic chains are one of the most ubiquitous (macroscopic) causal structures is underdetermined by empirical data. It will be argued that even though the chain and its associated common cause model are empirically equivalent there exists an important asymmetry between (...) the two models with respect to model expansions. This asymmetry might constitute a basis on which to disambiguate corresponding causal inferences on non-empirical grounds. (shrink)

Appeals to practices are common the humanities and social sciences. They hold the potential to explain interesting or compelling similarities, insofar as similarities are distributed within a community or group. Why is it that people who fall under the same category, whether men, women, Americans, baseball players, Buddhists, feminists, white people, or others, have interesting similarities, such as similar beliefs, actions, thoughts, foibles, and failings? One attractive answer is that they engage in the same practices. They do the same things, (...) perhaps as a result of doing things at the same site or setting, or perhaps as a result of being raised in a similar way among members of the same group. In the humanities, appeals to practices often serve as a move to point out diversity among different communities or diversity within the same community. Communities are distinct from one another in part because their members do different things or do things in different ways. The distinct and varied ways in which different communities enact social norms or formulate law, state institutions, and public policy might be explicable in part by the different practices their members are socialized into. Appeals to practices hold the promise of explaining these differences in terms of the different background practices of the groups, cultivated through a kind of cultural isolation or sense of collective identity. In the social sciences, appeals to practices have played a central role in fundamental theorizing and theory building. Appeals to practices in the social sciences are often much more systematic and theoretical, forming the core of the systematic theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens in Anthropology and Sociology. Practice theory has thus become a growth industry in social scientific investigation, offering the promise of a central object of investigation that explains both unity and difference within and across communities and groups. But it is unclear just what practices are and what role, both ontological and explanatory, that practices are supposed to play. The term `practices' is used to pick out a wide range of things, and its relation to other terms, from `tradition' or `paradigm' to `framework' or `presupposition', is unclear. Practices are posited as ubiquitous, yet they are difficult to isolate and pin down. We are all said to participate in them, but they remain hidden. Their role, whether causal, logical, or hermeneutical, remains mysterious. After locating the historical origins of appeals to practices in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, my dissertation uses Stephen Turner's broad and systematic critique of appeals to practices to develop a new type of account. My account is a phenomenological account that treats practices as human doings that show up to people in material and social environments and make themselves available for specific responses in those environments. I argue that a phenomenological account is an effective alternative to accounts that treat practices as either shared objects with properties or shared and implicit presuppositions. I use a phenomenological account of practices to treat important debates in feminist philosophy and the philosophy of the social sciences, particularly debates over pornography's subordination of women and the classification of mental disorders in psychiatry. (shrink)

The 2016 US Election and its aftermath have renewed anti-racist activism on the American left. This article takes a close look at familiar philosophical analyses of racism and argues that they have two shortcomings: (1) they do not offer proper guidance in combating racism, and (2) they do not adequately represent the historical relationship between race and racism. A different view of racism, one that adopts a genealogical, as opposed to analytical, approach is laid out. And it is argued that (...) this view is better able to account for what racism is and to guide the anti-racist response called for by current events. (shrink)

The work of Theodor Waitz is an important but hitherto unnoticed source of Dilthey’s concept of ‘human sciences’. Waitz was an outstanding philosopher and psychologist who, in the late 1850s, devoted himself wholeheartedly to empirical anthropology. In this field Waitz distinguished himself for his defence of the unity of humankind against mainstream polygenic and racial doctrines. Waitz inspired Dilthey’s articulation of psychology into two branches: the ‘descriptive’ one and the ‘explanative’ one. Even more remarkably, in a work reviewed by Dilthey (...) in warmly favourable terms, Waitz explicitly mentioned and defined the ‘sciences which treat of the spirit ’. Some of Dilthey's most interesting ideas are thus prefigured in Waitz’s long underrated work. (shrink)

The concept of the Golden Mean, which has been accepted as a behavioral guideline of human beings for thousands of years, is briefly reviewed. Several empirical studies in the field of organizational behavior are summarized as evidence that the concept has practical management applications. Based on the Golden Mean concept and its management empirical evidence, the authors propose a model of Reasoned Responses and its practical application to the decision-making process.

The standard view on economics imperialism is that it should be resisted when it is epistemically or morally harmful. I argue that the moral dimension of economics imperialism is in need of further analysis. In my view, economics imperialism is wrong when imperialists violate the epistemic responsibility they have towards scientists working in the discipline that is the target for imperialist explorations. By epistemic responsibility, I refer to a moral duty to justify one’s knowledge claims to a particular audience so (...) that the justification appeals to at least some of the standards of argumentation recognized by that audience. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Highlights of Past Literature Current Work Future Work.

Etyka troski rozwija teorię uogólnionej troski poprzez wyjście od naturalnych praktyk opiekuńczych. Jednak ze względu na jej uwikłanie w naturalizm efektem często jest zarówno wąska definicja kobiecości, jak i wąskie rozumienie troski – może ona dotyczyć tylko ludzi. Przyjęcie opieki nad dzieckiem jako paradygmatu sprawia też, że etyka troski powiela reprodukcyjny futuryzm – fantazmatyczne ujęcie polityczności jako jednolitej wspólnoty ucieleśnianej przez postać Dziecka. By pokazać, że etyka troski nie musi być naturalistyczna, konfrontuję ją z postulatem Donny Haraway, by ograniczyć reprodukcję (...) w imię dbałości o inne niż ludzie istoty, oraz z pojawiającym się w powieściach Octavii Butler motywem opieki nad dzieckiem, które nie jest ludzkie – „potwornego macierzyństwa” – by zarysować nieantropocentryczną etykę troski. (shrink)

What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain (...) data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not. (shrink)

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking e Cartwritght, segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente (...) os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg. (shrink)

Ao lado das imagens já conhecidas de Nietzsche como “precursor do nazismo”, “racista”, “pós-moderno”, “pensador perigoso e irracionalista”, em tempos recentes acrescentou-se à imagem de “precursor do transhumanismo”. Ao apresentarmos aqui alguns elementos do transhumanismo, em especial aqueles ligados às mais recentes biotecnologias, bem como alguns conceitos do pensamento de Nietzsche, em especial o além-do-homem e a ontologia da imanência do vir-a-ser, visamos ampliar esse debate, enfatizando que, para Nietzsche, o ideal transhumanista não seria mais do que um sintoma do (...) ideal ascético, tão presente ainda na nossa contemporaneidade. (shrink)

Definitions, uses, and understanding of technology have varied tremendously since Jacob Bigelow’s Elements of Technology in 1829. In addition to providing a frame of reference for understanding technology, the purpose of this study was to define or describe it conceptually. A determination of dimensions comprising technology was made by critiquing historical and contemporary examples of definition by Bigelow and Volti. An analytic-synthetic method was employed to deconstruct both definitions spanning two centuries to derive aspects of technology. Definitions relying on an (...) anthropocentric “how humans use technology” viewpoint failed to account for different perspectives that were found when an ethological perspective inquiring “how technology is used” served as a framework. Findings support qualification of insulin as technology according to the following comprehensive definition: something inherently intelligent enough to either function, be used to function, or be interpreted as having a function that intelligent beings—human or otherwise—can appreciate, something devised, designed, or discovered serving particular purposes from a secular standpoint without humankind creating it, or a significant beneficiary of rationally derived knowledge that is “used for” a purpose without itself necessarily being translated into something material that “does” autonomously, or dependently when used. (shrink)

In the context of late capitalism, cultural producers have contributed to the process of precarisation by embracing ideas of autonomy, concomitantly contributing to neoliberal policies and political-economy. I scrutinise the claim for the autonomy of the arts in Eastern Europe, a context that exemplifies the transition from socialism to the neoliberal era. The analysis foregrounds the precarious working conditions of cultural producers during the transition from self-managed socialism to the independent nation-state of Slovenia. In Slovenia, the precarisation of artists had (...) already begun in the 1980s when the socialist government implemented the Law for the Independent Cultural Workers, still in place today. I demonstrate that cultural producers address their working conditions in ideological terms, instead of approaching them in terms of class relations that govern cultural production. Hence, the claim for autonomy is a strategically misguided response to the dismantling of the welfare state. (shrink)

There are three main approaches to scientific explanation in the philosophical literature. The unification approach claims that science explains by fitting the particular facts and events within a general theoretical framework. The mechanistic approach claims that science explains by identifying mechanisms. According to the manipulationist approach an explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer a “what-if-things-had-been-different question.” The article examines whether these three approaches are compatible or not in the case of the social sciences, and (...) it concludes by defending explanatory pluralism. (shrink)

Post-9/11, concern about bioterrorism has transformed public health from unappreciated to a central component of national security. Within the War on Terror, bioterrorism preparedness has taken a back seat only to direct military action in terms of funding. Domestically, homelessness, joblessness, crime, education, and race relations are just a few of a litany of pressing issues requiring government attention. Even within the biomedical sciences and healthcare, issues surrounding the fact that more than 40 million Americans lack health insurance, the rising (...) cost of prescription medications, and the use of government funds for research using embryonic stem cells remain unresolved. Should we prioritize a hypothetical threat (bioterrorism), or existing conditions that have implications for identifiable individuals? Even more fundamentally, should we prioritize research aimed at defense from bioterrorism (or even terrorism in general) when there are so many pressing social problems that affect the U.S. population? (shrink)

Uma das técnicas, pensadas por Nietzsche, para ativar a consciência moral é a técnica da memória, que o filósofo denomina mnemotécnica. Ora, submeter a memória a procedimentos com capacidade de predição e controle, equivale a despi-la daquilo que é sua característica orgânica e vital que lhe confere a capacidade de, para além de todos os enquadramentos técnicos superficiais, a todo o momento superar-se mediante o alcance de pontos mais culminantes de potência. As considerações de Nietzsche em torno do problema da (...) má consciência, assim como de sua expressão em forma de ódio e vingança é marca do ressentimento, estão ligadas aos obstáculos que se interpõem frente à ação. Pela ação, toda a carga instintiva é manifesta em forma de obra de arte pelo criador; ao contrário, se interiorizada, a carga se torna veneno degenerativo. Nietzsche atribui estes obstáculos à ação e à memória como um dos fatores preponderantes. Na Segunda Dissertação de Para a genealogia da moral, Nietzsche apresenta a má consciência como um fatalismo sem luta, o que repercute em resignação e doença. Pela má consciência às propensões naturais do agir é atribuído um olhar ruim, hostil à vida e difamador do mundo. Sua origem se liga a um movimento de interiorização dos instintos, o que resulta em luta contra si mesmo e degeneração fisiológica. A presente investigação considera as diversas técnicas que foram sendo desenvolvidas a fim de que não só as informações mais diversas não caíssem no esquecimento, mas a maneira como estas são lembradas no sentido de produzirem, ao invés de expansão da vida, encolhimento, resignação e degeneração. Estaria Nietzsche defendendo a dissolução da memória como um todo, ou redimensionando a maneira pela qual se tem vivido dela? (shrink)

Según un punto de vista muy difundido, y alineado con la concepción nómica de la explicación causal, la biología funcional está sometida a un régimen de heteronomía explicativa en cuyo marco los fenómenos orgánicos deben explicarse recurriendo a leyes oriundas de la física y la química. En contra de esa perspectiva, la concepción experimental de la causación permite entender la naturaleza de muchas explicaciones biológicas que, sin hacer referencia a leyes causales – físicas, químicas o de cualquier otra naturaleza – (...) se legitiman por el hecho de ponernos en condiciones de controlar experimentalmente fenómenos relativos al funcionamiento y a la constitución de los organismos. Esas explicaciones suponen invariantes locales que muchas veces, pero no necesariamente, podrán llegar a ser caracterizados como instancias de leyes físico químicas. (shrink)

This article deals with the causal connection between cause and effect. Main claim is that Hume’s theory cannot solve the problem of spurious causes, and that it is needed to take into account the theory of causal processes. Hence, for this reason Salmon’s causal-mechanical model is analyzed. According to this model between causally related events a mark, signal or energy is transmitted. Subsequently, manipulation theories of causation are analyzed. These theories face some problems, which, however, can be solved using the (...) method of prevention. This method can distinguish relevant causes from the spurious ones by preventing a transmission of specific types of events. With the method of prevention and the theory of causal processes it is possible to distinguish between events where necessary or relevant causal connection is present and events where it is missing. Therefore, the problem of spurious causes is soluble. (shrink)

Politics and religion are two concepts that have constantly intertwined throughout history and continue to do so at the start of the third millennium. Previous studies show that religion plays an important part in the political life and the concepts of state and church are connected. Although there are also certain discursive manners in which the Church adapts to political and socio-economical contexts, it is much more often that the connection between the two spheres of communication (political and religious) comes (...) from the part of politicians. The article deals with notions such as pseudo-events, media spectacle, political marketing and using religion as a tool for political positioning. The current research is based on an analytical descriptive method: the media content analysis. The focus of the analysis is on the highest rated daily print media and it covers the period from 2007 to 2010. It checks the prevalence of politicians in the media coverage of religious events on the most important religious holidays of the year: Easter, St Mary and Christmas. The most relevant results of the study show that the intertwining of politics and religion is often negatively reflected by the media. The results are a necessary addition to previous studies (Iancu and Balaban) that had only focused on a quantitative analysis of politicians' media coverage during religious festivities. (shrink)

Las corrientes manipulabilistas tradicionales consideran que una implementación de política efectiva debe estar fundamentada en un conocimiento invariante. Este modo de pensamiento está basado en el supuesto ontológico de que existen factores causales estables tanto en las ciencias naturales como en las sociales. También asumen que un sólo tipo de intervención ex-ante es pertinente para una implementación efectiva. En el presente artículo se realizará una crítica a estos enfoques. En particular, se mostrará que los procesos sociales responden a una lógica (...) de “árboles de posibilidades” o “resultados de final abierto”. Sobre la base de esta variante ontológica se argumentará que más que un conocimiento de factores invariantes, el sustento de una buena política debe buscarse en los condicionamientos explicitados dentro de un anteproyecto y en la factibilidad de que los mismos se satisfagan en el sistema objetivo. Asimismo, se mostrará cómo las típicas intervenciones ex-ante no son adecuadas en el reino de lo social. Contrario a ellos, las intervenciones deberán ser sistemáticas. (shrink)