- Deflationism about Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Metaethics of Maat.Kevin DeLapp - 2019 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. London: Routledge. pp. 19-39.details
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Ecumenical Truthmaking: A Précis of A Theory of Truthmaking.Jamin Asay - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1(3)):1-5.details
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Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy.Stephen Boulter - 2007 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Celebrity Politics and Democratic Elitism.Alfred Archer & Amanda Cawston - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):33-43.details
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Access, Promulgation, and Propaganda.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - manuscriptdetails
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No Safe Haven for Truth Pluralists.Teemu Tauriainen - 2021 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 97:183-205.details
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Assertion: a (partly) social speech act.Neri Marsili & Mitchell Green - 2021 - Journal of Pragmatics 181 (August 2021):17-28.details
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Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: Lesson from Suszko’s Thesis.Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):155-176.details
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Objectivity in Mathematics, Without Mathematical Objects†.Markus Pantsar - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (3):318-352.details
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Moral realism in Spinoza's Ethics.Colin Marshall - 2017 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Spinoza’s Ethics. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 248-65.details
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Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws.Gila Sher - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3945-3974.details
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How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):85-107.details
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Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.details
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Guardians of the Possibility that Claims Can Be False.Susan T. Gardner - 2020 - Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):11-24.details
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Reference for neo-Fregeans.David E. Taylor - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11505-11536.details
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Pragmatism and Correspondence.Andrew Howat - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):685-704.details
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Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
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The Metametaphysics of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Shopping for Truth Pluralism.Will Gamester - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11351-11377.details
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Are There Moral Truths?Bart Streumer - manuscriptdetails
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The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1453-1460.details
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'When You (Say You) Know, You Can't Be Wrong': J.L. Austin on 'I Know' Claims.Sabina Vaccarino Bremner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Dilemma for Determination Pluralism (or Dualism).Ragnar van der Merwe - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (4):507-523.details
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Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.details
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Retweeting: its linguistic and epistemic value.Neri Marsili - 2021 - Synthese 198:10457–10483.details
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Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Relativism, realism, and subjective facts.Giovanni Merlo & Giulia Pravato - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8149-8165.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Maddy On The Multiverse.Claudio Ternullo - 2019 - In Stefania Centrone, Deborah Kant & Deniz Sarikaya (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics: Univalent Foundations, Set Theory and General Thoughts. Springer Verlag. pp. 43-78.details
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On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism.Marián Zouhar - 2019 - Filozofia Nauki 27 (3):5-27.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):463-481.details
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Moral Disagreement and Arational Convergence.Patrick Hassan - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):145-161.details
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Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4925-4936.details
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Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.details
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Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.details
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Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.details
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Davidson on Reference.Robert Williams - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell.details
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An account of truthmaking.Noël Blas Saenz - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3413-3435.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap.Jessica Leech - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3193-3212.details
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A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
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Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310.details
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