- Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6149-6167.details
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Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms.Jim Hutchinson - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):516-541.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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In defense of flip-flopping.Andrew M. Bailey & Amy Seymour - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13907-13924.details
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Moore’s Proof, Warrant Transmission and Skepticism.Simon Dierig - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):487-502.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt: On Ephecticism about Rape Accusations.Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:393-421.details
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Epistemic austerity: limits to entitlement.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13771-13787.details
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The Certainties of Delusion.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 211-229.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-14.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 1528 - In L. - & 5 H. (eds.), Non-Evidential Anti-Scepticism.details
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(1 other version)Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):501-522.details
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Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.details
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What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Francis Fallon & Gavin Hyman (eds.), Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.details
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Underdetermination and closure: Thoughts on two sceptical arguments.Martin Smith - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Disjunctive luminosity.Drew Johnson - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):118-126.details
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Annalisa Coliva, Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology.Yevi Oceguera Ponce - 2020 - Dianoia 65 (85):193-200.details
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Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):402-415.details
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(1 other version)Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (96):517-539.details
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The Skeptic and the Climate Change Skeptic.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):566-580.details
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Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-27.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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(1 other version)Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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The Will to Truth and the Will to Believe: Friedrich Nietzsche and William James Against Scientism.Rachel Cristy - 2018 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs: Some Remarks against Incommensurability and Scepticism.Yuliya Fadeeva - 2020 - Wittgenstein-Studien 11 (1):53-78.details
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Weak Non-Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill.details
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Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
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Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori.Giacomo Melis & Crispin Wright - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori. Oxford University Press.details
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Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle.Jie Gao - 2020 - Journal of Dialectics of Nature 42 (5):17-22.details
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Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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(1 other version)Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-26.details
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Value beyond truth-value: a practical response to skepticism.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8601-8619.details
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Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):1-21.details
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(1 other version)Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):27-36.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.details
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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details
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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.details
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Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
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