To fulfill their crucial duty of relieving suffering in their patients, physicians may have to administer palliative sedation when they implement treatment-limitation decisions such as the withdrawal of life-supporting interventions in patients with poor prognosis chronic severe brain injury. The issue of palliative sedation deserves particular attention in adults with serious brain injuries and in neonates with severe and irreversible brain lesions, who are unable to express pain or to state their wishes. In France, treatment limitation decisions for these patients (...) are left to the physicians. Treatment-limitation decisions are made collegially, based on the presence of irreversible brain lesions responsible for chronic severe disorders of consciousness. Before these decisions are implemented, they are communicated to the relatives. Because the presence and severity of pain cannot be assessed in these patients, palliative analgesia and/or sedation should be administered. However, palliative sedation is a complex strategy that requires safeguards to prevent a drift toward hastening death or performing covert euthanasia. In addition to the law on patients' rights at the end of life passed in France on April 22, 2005, a recent revision of Article 37 of the French code of medical ethics both acknowledges that treatment-limitation decisions and palliative sedation may be required in patients with severe brain injuries and provides legal and ethical safeguards against a shift towards euthanasia. This legislation may hold value as a model for other countries where euthanasia is illegal and for countries such as Belgium and Netherlands where euthanasia is legal but not allowed in patients incapable of asking for euthanasia but in whom a treatment limitation decision has been made. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungBei den meisten Patienten, die heute erwartet an einer unheilbaren Krankheit versterben, wird vor ihrem Tod eine bewusste Entscheidung zum Therapieverzicht getroffen. Während dem Therapieverzicht auf Wunsch des Patienten ein wichtiger Stellenwert in der medizinethischen Diskussion zukommt, hat der Umgang mit Forderung nach „unangemessener“ Maximaltherapie bislang weniger Beachtung gefunden. In einer empirischen Studie zur Einbeziehung von Patienten in Entscheidungen zum Therapieverzicht konnten wir zeigen, dass etwa ein Drittel der Patienten auch bei infauster Prognose Lebenszeit durch Maximaltherapie gewinnen möchte. Diese Patienten (...) wurden im Gegensatz zu Patienten mit palliativem Therapieziel häufig nicht in Entscheidungen zur Therapiebegrenzung einbezogen. Hier werden die ethischen Implikationen dieser Praxis untersucht und gefragt, ob ein Therapieverzicht am Lebensende auch gegen den Wunsch des Patienten ethisch zu rechtfertigen ist oder ob Ärzte dem Wunsch des Patienten nach Lebenszeitgewinn auch bei infauster Prognose durch Maximaltherapie nachkommen sollen. Vor dem Hintergrund der gängigen Konzepte zur Rechtfertigung eines einseitigen Therapieverzichts, die für sich genommen zu kurz greifen, wird ein alternatives Entscheidungsmodell vorgestellt, das vier bewertungsrelevante Kriterien vorsieht: die Wirksamkeit einer Maßnahme, die Autonomiefähigkeit des Patienten, die patientenseitige Nutzenbewertung und die Kosten für die Solidargemeinschaft. Je nachdem, welche Kriterien erfüllt sind, rechtfertigen sie eine Entscheidung zum Therapieverzicht oder eine Fortsetzung der Therapie entsprechend dem Patientenwillen. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 62-64, June 2011.

Objective: To describe the frequency of support for terminal sedation among internists, determine whether support for terminal sedation is accompanied by support for physician assisted suicide , and explore characteristics of internists who support terminal sedation but not assisted suicide.Design: A statewide, anonymous postal survey.Setting: Connecticut, USA.Participants: 677 Connecticut members of the American College of Physicians.Measurements: Attitudes toward terminal sedation and assisted suicide; experience providing primary care to terminally ill patients; demographic and religious characteristics.Results: 78% of respondents believed that if (...) a terminally ill patient has intractable pain despite aggressive analgesia, it is ethically appropriate to provide terminal sedation . Of those who favoured terminal sedation, 38% also agreed that PAS is ethically appropriate in some circumstances. Along a three point spectrum of aggressiveness in end of life care, the plurality of respondents were in the middle, agreeing with terminal sedation but not with PAS. Compared with respondents who were less aggressive or more aggressive, physicians in this middle group were more likely to report having more experience providing primary care to terminally ill patients and attending religious services more frequently .Conclusions: Support for terminal sedation was widespread in this population of physicians, and most who agreed with terminal sedation did not support PAS. Most internists who support aggressive palliation appear likely to draw an ethical line between terminal sedation and assisted suicide. (shrink)

“Terminal sedation” refers to the use of sedation as palliation in dying patients with a terminal diagnosis. Although terminal sedation has received widespread legal and ethical justification, the practice remains ethically contentious, particularly as some hold that it foreseeably hastens death. It has been proposed that empirical studies show that terminal sedation does not hasten death, or that even if it may hasten death it does not do so in a foreseeable way. Nonetheless, it is clear that providing terminal sedation (...) in combination with the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatments such as fluid and nutrition can foreseeably hasten death significantly—what is here called early terminal sedation . There are ethical justifications for the use of sedation in palliative care and thus it would seem that ETS is an ethically and legally acceptable practice. However, what emerges from the literature is the repeated assertion that terminal sedation must be restricted to use in imminently dying patients—the “imminence condition”—and that therefore ETS is unacceptable. This restriction has taken on greater significance with the trend of palliative care to include the care of patients who are not imminently dying. This paper proposes to show that although there is widespread intuitive support for the imminence condition, it does not follow from the justifications for sedation as palliation, and that explicit arguments for the imminence condition are needed. (shrink)

Background: Due to recent legislations on euthanasia and its current practice in the Netherlands and Belgium, issues of end-of-life medicine have become very vital in many European countries. In 2002, the Ethics Working Group of the German Association for Palliative Medicine (DGP) has conducted a survey among its physician members in order to evaluate their attitudes towards different end-of-life medical practices, such as euthanasia (EUT), physician-assisted suicide (PAS), and terminal sedation (TS). Methods: An anonymous questionnaire was sent to the 411 (...) DGP physicians, consisting of 14 multiple choice questions on positions that might be adopted in different hypothetical scenarios on situations of “intolerable suffering” in end-of-life care. For the sake of clarification, several definitions and legal judgements of different terms used in the German debate on premature termination of life were included. For statistical analysis t-tests and Pearson-correlations were used. Results: The response rate was 61% (n=251). The proportions of the respondents who were opposed to legalizing different forms of premature termination of life were: 90% opposed to EUT, 75% to PAS, 94% to PAS for psychiatric patients. Terminal sedation was accepted by 94% of the members. The main decisional bases drawn on for the answers were personal ethical values, professional experience with palliative care, knowledge of alternative approaches, knowledge of ethical guidelines and of the national legal frame. Conclusions: In sharp contrast to similar surveys conducted in other countries, only a minority of 9.6% of the DGP physicians supported the legalization of EUT. The misuse of medical knowledge for inhumane killing in the Nazi period did not play a relevant role for the respondents’ negative attitude towards EUT. Palliative care needs to be stronger established and promoted within the German health care system in order to improve the quality of end-of-life situations which subsequently is expected to lead to decreasing requests for EUT by terminally ill patients. (shrink)

The moral importance of the ‘intention–foresight’ distinction has long been a matter of philosophical controversy, particularly in the context of end-of-life care. Previous empirical research in Australia has suggested that general physicians and surgeons may use analgesic or sedative infusions with ambiguous intentions, their actions sometimes approximating ‘slow euthanasia’. In this paper, we report findings from a qualitative study of 18 Australian palliative care medical specialists, using in-depth interviews to address the use of sedation at the end of life. The (...) majority of subjects were agnostic or atheistic. In contrast to their colleagues in acute medical practice, these Australian palliative care specialists were almost unanimously committed to distinguishing their actions from euthanasia. This commitment appeared to arise principally from the need to maintain a clear professional role, and not obviously from an ideological opposition to euthanasia. While some respondents acknowledged that there are difficult cases that require considered reflection upon one's intention, and where there may be some ‘mental gymnastics,’ the nearly unanimous view was that it is important, even in these difficult cases, to cultivate an intention that focuses exclusively on the relief of symptoms. We present four narratives of ‘terminal’ sedation – cases where sedation was administered in significant doses just before death, and may well have hastened death. Considerable ambiguities of intention were evident in some instances, but the discussion around these clearly exceptional cases illustrates the importance of intention to palliative care specialists in maintaining their professional roles. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the moral justification for palliative sedation until death. Palliative sedation involves the intentional lowering of consciousness for the relief of untreatable symptoms. The paper focuses on the moral problems surrounding the intentional lowering of consciousness until death itself, rather than possible adjacent life-shortening effects. Starting from a Kantian perspective on virtue, it is shown that continuous deep sedation until death (CDS) does not conflict with the perfect duty of moral self-preservation because CDS does not destroy (...) capacities for agency. In addition, it is argued that CDS can frustrate the imperfect duty of self-cultivation by reducing consciousness permanently. Nevertheless, there are cases where CDS is morally acceptable, namely, cases where the agent has already permanently lost the possibility for free action in advance of sedation—for example, due to excruciating and ongoing pain. Because the latter can be difficult to diagnose properly, safeguards may be needed in order to prevent the application of CDS for the wrong reasons. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 48-49, June 2011.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 65-66, June 2011.

A distinction is commonly drawn between continuous sedation until death and physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia. Only the latter is found to involve killing, whereas the former eludes such characterization. I argue that continuous sedation until death is equivalent to physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia in that both involve killing. This is established by first defining and clarifying palliative sedation therapies in general and continuous sedation until death in particular. A case study analysis and a look at current practices are provided. This is followed by a (...) defense of arguments in favor of definitions of death centering on higher brain (neocortical) functioning rather than on whole brain or cardiopulmonary functioning. It is then shown that continuous sedation until death simulates higher brain definitions of death by eliminating consciousness. Appeals to reversibility and double effect fail to establish any distinguishing characteristics between the simulation of death that occurs in continuous sedation until death and the death that occurs as a result of physician-assisted suicide/euthanasia. Concluding remarks clarify the moral ramifications of these findings. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungKlinische Therapieentscheidungen werden zumeist auf dem Boden einer medizinischen (bzw. ärztlichen) Indikationsstellung und der entsprechenden informierten Zustimmung des Patienten zu der vorgeschlagenen Behandlungsmaßnahme gefällt. Das Recht des Patienten, eine Behandlungsmaßnahme abzulehnen, ist in der juristischen und ethischen Bewertung breit abgesichert. Hingegen ist unklar, welche Rolle ein (positiv geäußerter) Wunsch des Patienten oder gar seiner Angehörigen nach einer bestimmten Behandlung im normativen Entscheidungsprozess spielen sollte, wenn überhaupt. Dieser Beitrag erörtert den Stellenwert des eigenständigen Patientenwunsches aus studienbezogener, klinischer und normativer Sicht. Ein (...) authentisches Fallbeispiel verdeutlicht das Spektrum zugrunde liegender Autonomiekonzepte und das Dilemma divergierender Bewertungsmaßstäbe zwischen Arzt und Patient in der Tumortherapie und Palliativmedizin. Der Beitrag zeigt auf, wie bestehende Konzepte von Autonomie und Indikation genutzt werden können, um einerseits den Behandlungswunsch eines Patienten konkret in den Entscheidungsprozess einzubeziehen, andererseits eine klare Abgrenzung zu einer unreflektierten „wunscherfüllenden Medizin“ aufrecht zu erhalten. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 49-51, June 2011.

ABSTRACT There has been much discussion regarding the acceptable use of sedation for palliation. A particularly contentious practice concerns deep, continuous sedation given to patients who are not imminently dying and given without provision of hydration or nutrition, with the end result that death is hastened. This has been called ‘early terminal sedation’. Early terminal sedation is a practice composed of two legally and ethically accepted treatment options. Under certain conditions, patients have the right to reject hydration and nutrition, even (...) if these are life‐sustaining. Patients are also entitled to sedation as palliation for intolerable, intractable suffering. Though early terminal sedation is thought to be rare at present, the changing nature of palliative medicine suggests its use will increase. Arguments regarding early terminal sedation have failed to recognize early terminal sedation as a distinct legal and ethical entity. It can be seen as both the simple sum of treatment refusal and sedation for palliation, analogous to terminal sedation. It can also be seen as an indivisible palliative treatment, more analogous to assisted suicide or euthanasia. But ultimately, it is wholly analogous neither to terminal sedation given when death is imminent, nor to assisted suicide or euthanasia. This paper contends that early terminal sedation should be considered as a distinct entity. Such a reconception promises to provide a way forward in the debate, practice and policy regarding this contentious area of palliative medicine. (shrink)