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Intentionalism and pain.D. T. Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.details
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Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):82-117.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
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What the body commands: the imperative theory of pain.Colin Klein - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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Pain: Perception or Introspection?Murat Aydede - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.details
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Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.details
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Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.details
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The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge.details
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What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.details
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Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain.Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.details
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Another Look At Representationalism About Pain.M. Tye - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 99-120.details
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The Contents of Olfactory Experience.Christopher Mole - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):173-79.details
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Knowing what I see.Alex Byrne - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.details
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Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.details
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(1 other version)Ow! The Paradox of Pain.Christopher S. Hill - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.details
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Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.details
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An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.details
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Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.details
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Is feeling pain the perception of something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.details
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The location of pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.details
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(1 other version)Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.details
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Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience.Tim Crane - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):49-67.details
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Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
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On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colors.J. J. C. Smart - 1975 - In Charles L. Y. Cheng (ed.), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press. pp. 54-63.details
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Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism.David R. Hilbert - 1987 - Csli Press.details
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(1 other version)Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Beyond phenomenal naivete.Benj Hellie - 2006 - Philosophers' Imprint 6:1-24.details
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The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1962 - In Ronald Joseph Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Oxford, England: Blackwell. pp. 158-80.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Qualia ain't in the head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.details
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Orgasms again.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:51-54.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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(1 other version)Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument?Torin Alter - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 65--76.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.details
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Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.details
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A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.details
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Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.details
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