Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1969 - New York: Routledge.
    _Content and Consciousness_ is an original and ground-breaking attempt to elucidate a problem integral to the history of Western philosophical thought: the relationship of the mind and body. In this formative work, Dennett sought to develop a theory of the human mind and consciousness based on new and challenging advances in the field that came to be known as cognitive science. This important and illuminating work is widely-regarded as the book from which all of Dennett’s future ideas developed. It is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Content and consciousness.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1969 - Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    A pioneering work in the philosophy of mind, Content and Consciousness brings together the approaches of philosophers and scientists to the mind--a connection that must occur if genuine analysis of the mind is to be made. This unified approach permits the most forbiddingly mysterious mental phenomenon--consciousness--to be broken down into several distinct phenomena, and these are each given a foundation in the physical activity of the brain. This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   454 citations  
  • Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because it allows a seeming to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • –Ίδ–. [REVIEW]Elizabeth Tucker - 1977 - The Classical Review 27 (2):205-206.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • – Ίδ–.Elizabeth Tucker - 1977 - The Classical Review 27 (02):205-.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   199 citations  
  • Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   516 citations  
  • Metacognition and higher-order thoughts.David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments".Georges Rey - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
    According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full-blown propositional beliefs. This classical dual-component theory of experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual-component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW]David Pereplyotchik - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):434-448.
    Gennaro presents a version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness that differs from the version defended by Rosenthal . I explore several key differences between Gennaro's and Rosenthal's views, with an eye toward establishing that Rosenthal's Extrinsic Higher-Order Thought theory is preferable to Gennaro's Wide Intrinsicality View . Gennaro's attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the WIV rest on an unargued and implausible assumption to the effect that the higher-order intentional contents of self-representing conscious states are necessarily accurate. Gennaro (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.Karen Neander - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):411-434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2171 citations  
  • A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Jesse M. Mulder - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3):449-465.
    Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion ‘awareness-of.’ I argue that this notion implies a form of ‘seeming’ that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind of seeming results in an infinite regress. Finally, highlighting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.
    The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   148 citations  
  • Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.
    On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It's clear that actual human beings don't live up (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Epistemic Warrants and Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Perception.James Edwards & Dimitris Platchias - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:343-364.
    We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher-order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first-order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher-order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so-called ‘targetless’ higher-order states. We explain the key notion of an immediate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - New York: Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   400 citations  
  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.R. J. Hirst - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (37):366-373.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   238 citations  
  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   394 citations  
  • Some Like It Hot: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-129.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-29.
    Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
    One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.
    The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg.N. Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):443-448.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states that can occur nonconsciously. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs?that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist?undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   582 citations  
  • Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2044 citations  
  • Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration.Lawrence Weiskrantz - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of `consciousness' is intrinsically related to one's awareness of one's self, of time, and of the physical world. What, then, can be learned about consciousness from people who have suffered brain damage such as amnesia which affects their awareness? This is the question explored by Lawrence Weiskrantz, a distinguished neuropsychologist who has worked with such patients over 30 years. Written in an engaging and accessible style, Consciousness Lost and Found provides a unique perspective on one of the most (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   138 citations  
  • Mental Representation: A Reader.Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.
    This volume is a collection of new and previously published essays focusing on one of the most exciting and actively discussed topics in contemporary philosophy: naturalistic theories of mental content. The volume brings together important papers written by some of the most distinguished theorists working in the field today. Authors contributing to the volume include Jerry Fodor, Rugh Millikan, Fred Dretske, Ned Block, Robert Cummins, and Daniel Dennett.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   291 citations  
  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   493 citations  
  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   282 citations  
  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   900 citations  
  • Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as 'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a scientific world view, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Debate on unconscious perception.Ian Phillips & Ned Block - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge. pp. 165–192.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   250 citations  
  • Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: A critical review of visual masking.Sid Kouider & Stanislas Dehaene - 2007 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B 362 (1481):857-875.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   499 citations  
  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Philosophy 34 (131):366-367.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   223 citations  
  • Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   251 citations  
  • Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):619-622.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Consciousness. Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Critica 41 (121):85-97.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations