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Higher-order theories of consciousness

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)

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  1. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):265-268.
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  • Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as 'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a scientific world view, and (...)
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  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
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  • (2 other versions)Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) - 2015 - MIT Press.
    In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...)
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  • The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
    One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...)
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  • Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
    According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only when represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories must predict there to be some brain areas (or networks of areas) such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order states, the disabling of them brings about deficits in consciousness. It is commonly thought that the prefrontal cortex produces these kinds of higher-order states. In this paper, I first argue that this is likely correct, meaning that, if some (...)
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  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal (...)
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  • Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought.Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
    In this paper it is argued that existing ‘self-representational’ theories of phenomenal consciousness do not adequately address the problem of higher-order misrepresentation. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-representational account is introduced that does. This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by the quotational component of a quotational phenomenal concept. According to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help to account for the (...)
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  • Consciousness and false HOTs.Jonah Wilberg - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.
    In this paper I aim to defend David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of consciousness against a prominent objection. The central claim of HOT theory is that a mental state is conscious only if one has the HOT that one is in that state. In broad outline, the objection is that HOT theory is unable to account for cases where the relevant HOTs are false. I consider two variants of the objection, corresponding to two kinds of false HOT: those that merely (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281--297.
    " Biosemantics " was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term " biosemantics " (...)
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  • How the Mind Works.Steven Pinker - 1997 - Norton.
    A provocative assessment of human thought and behavior, reissued with a new afterword, explores a range of conundrums from the ability of the mind to perceive three dimensions to the nature of consciousness, in an account that draws on ...
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  • The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language.Steven Pinker - 1994/2007 - Harper Perennial.
    In this classic, the world's expert on language and mind lucidly explains everything you always wanted to know about language: how it works, how children learn it, how it changes, how the brain computes it, and how it evolved. With deft use of examples of humor and wordplay, Steven Pinker weaves our vast knowledge of language into a compelling story: language is a human instinct, wired into our brains by evolution. The Language Instinct received the William James Book Prize from (...)
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  • Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
    Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.
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  • (11 other versions)An essay concerning human understanding.John Locke - 1689 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Pauline Phemister.
    The book also includes a chronological table of significant events, select bibliography, succinct explanatory notes, and an index--all of which supply ...
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  • (1 other version)Being and nothingness.Jean-Paul Sartre - 1956 - Avenel, N.J.: Random House.
    Sartre explains the theory of existential psychoanalysis in this treatise on human reality.
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  • Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action.Scott Glover - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):3-24.
    Evidence for a dichotomy between the planning of an action and its on-line control in humans is reviewed. This evidence suggests that planning and control each serve a specialized purpose utilizing distinct visual representations. Evidence from behavioral studies suggests that planning is influenced by a large array of visual and cognitive information, whereas control is influenced solely by the spatial characteristics of the target, including such things as its size, shape, orientation, and so forth. Evidence from brain imaging and neuropsychology (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  • Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration.Lawrence Weiskrantz - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of `consciousness' is intrinsically related to one's awareness of one's self, of time, and of the physical world. What, then, can be learned about consciousness from people who have suffered brain damage such as amnesia which affects their awareness? This is the question explored by Lawrence Weiskrantz, a distinguished neuropsychologist who has worked with such patients over 30 years. Written in an engaging and accessible style, Consciousness Lost and Found provides a unique perspective on one of the most (...)
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  • A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as (...)
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  • In the theatre of consciousness: Global workspace theory, a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.
    Can we make progress exploring consciousness? Or is it forever beyond human reach? In science we never know the ultimate outcome of the journey. We can only take whatever steps our current knowledge affords. This paper explores today's evidence from the viewpoint of Global Workspace theory. First, we ask what kind of evidence has the most direct bearing on the question. The answer given here is ‘contrastive analysis’ -- a set of paired comparisons between similar conscious and unconscious processes. This (...)
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  • The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence.Bernard J. Baars - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.
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  • (2 other versions)Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):275-305.
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  • Ouch! An essay on pain.Christopher S. Hill - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
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  • Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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  • Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics.Barry M. Loewer (ed.) - 1990 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  • Thoughts: An Essay on Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.
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  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
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  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  • Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
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  • Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Stanford, CA: MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
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  • The phenomenal concept strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.
    A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his.
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • Consciousness and Qualia.Leopold Stubenberg - 1998 - John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
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  • Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue (...)
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  • Back to Brentano?Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.
    For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...)
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  • (1 other version)Thinking that one thinks.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: psychological and philosophical essays. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
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  • Aristotle on consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.
    Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of (...)
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  • Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  • Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections.Richard E. Aquila - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87.
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  • Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1996 - John Benjamins.
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
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  • Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
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  • Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  • (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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  • (1 other version)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory.David John Chalmers - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists.Jacob Berger - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):503-526.
    According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
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