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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Chapter four. The authority of self-consciousness.Richard Moran - 2001 - In Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press. pp. 100-151.details
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G. E. Moore: Selected Writings.George Edward Moore - 1993 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.details
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Akratic Believers.Amelie Rorty - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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(1 other version)Remarks on the philosophy of psychology.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 1980 - Oxford: Blackwell.details
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Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person.Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness, reasons, and Moore's paradox.André Gallois - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moorean absurdity and showing what's within.Mitchell Green - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423-426.details
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(4 other versions)Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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(1 other version)G. E. Moore.Thomas Baldwin - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):376-379.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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(1 other version)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.details
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Deception and Division.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Russell's "Theory of Descriptions.".G. E. Moore - 1944 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (3):78-78.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Reason in theory and practice.Roy Edgley - 1969 - London,: Hutchinson.details
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Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic incontinence.John Heil - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):56-70.details
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“P and I Will Believe that not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):737-760.details
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(4 other versions)Ludwig Wittgenstein; A Memoir.Georg Henrik von Wright & Norman Malcolm - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):280-283.details
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G. E. Moore.Barry Stroud - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):875.details
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Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.details
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Wittgenstein's Late Views on Belief, Paradox and Contradiction.Laurence Goldstein - 1988 - Philosophical Investigations 11 (1):49-73.details
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Reason in Theory and Practice.A. D. Woozley - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):86-87.details
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(3 other versions)Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 189–198.details
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(3 other versions)Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-354.details
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G.E. Moore.Thomas Baldwin (ed.) - 1990 - New York: Routledge.details
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Comments on Moore's paradox and self-knowledge.Rogers Albritton - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.details
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Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.details
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Moorean absurdity : an epistemological analysis.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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(4 other versions)Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.Norman Malcolm - 1959 - Philosophy 34 (130):277-278.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.Neil Levy - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.details
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Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.details
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