- Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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(1 other version)Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.details
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Defeaters and higher-level requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.details
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Level-Confusions in Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.details
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(1 other version)Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.details
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Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
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Lucky to be rational.Adam Elga - 2008details
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(1 other version)Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.details
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The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.details
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