- (1 other version)Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Nicholas Makins - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):580-594.details
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(4 other versions)Desire-as-Belief Revisited.Richard Bradley & Christian List - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):31-37.details
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General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.details
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Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.details
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Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):794-799.details
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A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, R. Kang-Xing Jin & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1-21.details
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Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.details
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(1 other version)Desire as belief.David Lewis - 1988 - Mind 97 (418):323-32.details
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Desire as belief II.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):303-13.details
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Desire Beyond Belief.Philip Pettit & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.details
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Weighing risk and uncertainty.Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (2):269-283.details
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Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.details
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(1 other version)Mixed-up meta-ethics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):235-256.details
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Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty.John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):719-735.details
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Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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Are children moral objectivists? Children's judgments about moral and response-dependent properties.Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett - 2003 - Cognition 90 (2):23-32.details
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Evaluation, uncertainty and motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.details
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A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications.Marc Hauser, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, J. I. N. Kang-Xing & John Mikhail - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):1–21.details
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Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.details
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Moral objectivism across the lifespan.James R. Beebe & David Sackris - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.details
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Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories1.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):580-589.details
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The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism.Jennifer C. Wright, Piper T. Grandjean & Cullen B. McWhite - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):336-361.details
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The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.details
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After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.details
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(1 other version)Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?Michael Ridge - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:51-76.details
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A triviality result for the “Desire by Necessity” thesis.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2535-2556.details
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