- The Frankfurt cases: The moral of the stories.John Martin Fischer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.details
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Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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(1 other version)Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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On linking dispositions and conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.details
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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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Responsibility and manipulation.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):145-177.details
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(2 other versions)Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.details
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Where Frankfurt and Strawson meet.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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'Can' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis.Keith Lehrer - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 241-270.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities.Joseph Keim Campbell - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):339-44.details
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Global control and freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1320-1347.details
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(3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680-681.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Margaret Olivia Little - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):541-544.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.details
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A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities.Joseph Keim Campbell - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):319-330.details
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(3 other versions)Living without Free Will.A. R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.details
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(1 other version)Exploring Evil and Philosophical Failure.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (4):458-474.details
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Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):307-330.details
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Consciousness.Willem A. Devries - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):263.details
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(3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Watson G. (ed.), Free will. 2nd edition. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-24.details
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(1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Freedom Within Reason.Susan Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.details
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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
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Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-decisional’ Intervention.Simon Kittle - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.details
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(1 other version)Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility.Peter A. French (ed.) - 2006 - Wiley-Blackwell.details
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