"The Collected Works of Spinoza provides, for the first time in English, a truly satisfactory edition of all of Spinoza's writings, with accurate and readable translations, based on the best critical editions of the original-language texts, done by a scholar who has published extensively on the philosopher's work. The elaborate editorial apparatus--including prefaces, notes, glossary, and indexes--assists the reader in understanding one of the world's most fascinating, but also most difficult, philosophers. Of particular interest is the glossary-index, which provides extensive (...) commentary on Spinoza's technical vocabulary. A milestone of scholarship more than forty-five years in the making, The Collected Works of Spinoza is an essential edition for anyone with a serious interest in Spinoza or the history of philosophy." --Inside jacket flap. (shrink)

v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).

"This is an excellent, readable and vigorous translation of _The Prince_, but it is much more than simply a translation. The map, notes and guide to further reading are crisp, to-the-point and yet nicely comprehensive. The inclusion of the letter to Vettori is most welcome. But, above all, the Introduction is so gripping and lively that it has convinced me to include _The Prince_ in my syllabus for History of Western Civilization the next time that I teach it.... Great price, (...) too! And lovely printing and layout." --Rachel Fulton, _University of Chicago_. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking book, Daniel D. Novotny explores one of the most controversial topics of Suarez's philosophy: "beings of reason." Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle.

Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...) is false and, hence, that the literature on testimony has been shaped at its core by a view that is fundamentally misguided. She then defends a detailed alternative to this conception of testimony: whereas the views currently dominant focus on the epistemic status of what speakers believe, Lackey advances a theory that instead centers on what speakers say. The upshot is that, strictly speaking, we do not learn from one another's beliefs - we learn from one another's words. Once this shift in focus is in place, Lackey goes on to argue that, though positive reasons are necessary for testimonial knowledge, testimony itself is an irreducible epistemic source. This leads to the development of a theory that gives proper credence to testimony's epistemologically dual nature: both the speaker and the hearer must make a positive epistemic contribution to testimonial knowledge. The resulting view not only reveals that testimony has the capacity to generate knowledge, but it also gives appropriate weight to our nature as both socially indebted and individually rational creatures. The approach found in this book will, then, represent a radical departure from the views currently dominating the epistemology of testimony, and thus is intended to reshape our understanding of the deep and ubiquitous reliance we have on the testimony of those around us. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was one of the most important philosophers of all time; he was also one of the most radical and controversial. The story of Spinoza's life takes the reader into the heart of Jewish Amsterdam in the seventeenth century and, with Spinoza's exile from Judaism, into the midst of the tumultuous political, social, intellectual, and religious world of the young Dutch Republic. This new edition of Steven Nadler's biography, winner of the Koret Jewish Book Award for biography and (...) translated into a dozen languages, is enhanced by exciting new archival discoveries about his family background, his youth, and the various philosophical, political, and religious contexts of his life and works. There is more detail about his family's business and communal activities, about his relationships with friends and correspondents, and about the development of his writings, which were so scandalous to his contemporaries. (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is the definitive statement of the greatest philosopher in the English language. His arguments in support of reasoning from experience, and against the "sophistry and illusion"of religiously inspired philosophical fantasies, caused controversy in the eighteenth century and are strikingly relevant today, when faith and science continue to clash. The Enquiry considers the origin and processes of human thought, reaching the stark conclusion that we can have no ultimate understanding of the physical world, or indeed (...) our own minds. In either sphere we must depend on instinctive learning from experience, recognizing our animal nature and the limits of reason. Hume's calm and open-minded skepticism thus aims to provide a new basis for science, liberating us from the "superstition" of false metaphysics and religion. His Enquiry remains one of the best introductions to the study of philosophy, and his edition places it in its historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

The place of religion in society has changed profoundly in the last few centuries, particularly in the West. In what will be a defining book for our time, Taylor takes up the question of what these changes mean, and what, precisely, happens when a society becomes one in which faith is only one human possibility among others.

An overview of Stoicism in the Renaissance, c. 1350 to c. 1650.

L'Index scolastico-cartesien elabore par Etienne Gilson se concoit avant tout comme un instrument de travail apportant des materiaux pour l'application d'une these audacieuse qui sera plus tard developpee dans les Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, et que Gilson inaugure en ces termes : On a longtemps considere que le principal titre de gloire de Bacon et Descartes avait ete de constituer une philosophie radicalement detachee de toutes les philosophies anterieures, et d'en (...) construire l'edifice entier a nouveaux frais. [...] Une pareille conception du cartesianisme peut a la limite se soutenir en ce qui concerne la physique, mais la psychologie, la doctrine de la connaissance, la morale et la metaphysique de Descartes sont remplies d'elements empruntes a la scolastique. La doctrine du temps, des elements et qualites des corps, de Dieu et de ses attributs, des preuves de son existence, de la creation et conservation du monde, de la substance et de son rapport aux accidents, des idees innees et de notre mode de connaissance, des etats actifs et passifs de l'ame, du rapport de la volonte a l'entendement, enfin les vues de Descartes sur la religion et ses rapports avec la philosophie temoignent que sa pensee n'est pas sans devoir quelque chose a la philosophie de l'Ecole. (shrink)

Spinoza’s claims about true ideas are central to the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. It is therefore worth trying to reconstruct what he means when he says that an idea is true. I argue that the three leading interpretations – correspondence, coherence, and causal – don’t explain key passages. I then propose a new interpretation. Roughly, I propose that an idea is true if and only if it represents an essence and was derived in the right kind of (...) way by the intellect from an innate idea of one’s own essence. In the final section I sketch why I believe this interpretation extends to his claims about truth and adequacy in the Ethics. (shrink)

Originally published: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Wolfson's systematic presentation of the philosophy of Spinoza has long been a classic. It is with pride that we make it available again in a one-volume edition.

The text followed in this edition is that established by TH Green and TH Grose and printed in their critical edition of Hume's Essays, Moral, Political, ...

This edition contains the thirty-nine essays included in Essays, Moral, and Literary, that made up Volume I of the 1777 posthumous Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. It also includes ten essays that were withdrawn or left unpublished by Hume for various reasons. The two most important were deemed too controversial for the religious climate of his time. This revised edition reflects changes based on further comparisons with eighteenth-century texts and an extensive reworking of the index. - Publisher.

In Testimony, Trust, and Authority, Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence ...

Tout commentateur ne dit-il pas les choses autrement que l'auteur qu'il explique ? Sans cela, il devrait se borner à renvoyer au texte, et n'y rien ajouter. Mais nous ne rejoignons pas, en cela, ceux des critiques contemporains qui cherchent la signification profonde d'une doctrine en des idées auxquelles l'auteur n'a jamais pensé. S'il est vrai que Descartes n'a pas séparé, en son vocabulaire, ce que nous appelons être et ce que nous appelons objet, il demeure que, par sa théorie (...) de la création des vérités, par son doute, par son projet de fonder la science sur la métaphysique, il les a distingués, et a pris, de leur rapport, la conscience la plus claire. En traduisant parfois les pensées cartésiennes en un langage plus adapté à notre temps, en déclarant que Descartes a découvert métaphysiquement l'homme comme pouvoir de dépasser l'objet vers l'Etre, et comme signe de l'Être en ce monde, nous n'avons pas voulu moderniser Descartes, mais seulement dégager ce qui, dans sa philosophie, est éternel. (shrink)

German description: Descartes' Meditationen von 1641 haben bis heute die philosophische Reflexion immer wieder herausgefordert. In diesem Werk geht er von einer Haltung radikalen Zweifels aus, macht dann aber geltend, dass selbst ein ausserster Skeptizismus nicht die fundamentale Wahrheit, dass ich existiere, in Frage stellen kann: ego sum, ego existo. Ausgehend von dieser Gewissheit versucht Descartes, die Grundlagen einer neuen Wissenschaft zu legen. Ursprunglich auf Lateinisch verfasst, wurden die Meditationes 1647 ins Franzosische ubersetzt. Diese Ubersetzung wurde von Descartes selbst durchgesehen (...) und bearbeitet und unterscheidet sich in vielen Nuancen vom lateinischen Original. Diese Ausgabe ist die einzige, die neben der neuen Ubersetzung ins Deutsche den lateinischen Text wie auch die franzosische Version bietet. Erganzt wird sie durch einen umfangreichen Kommentar. Sie eignet sich damit besonders als Arbeitsbuch fur Studenten. (shrink)

" Il est à remarquer en tout ce que j'écris que je ne suis pas l'ordre des matières mais seulement celui des raisons, c'est-à-dire que je n'entreprends point de dire en un même lieu tout ce qui appartient à une matière, à cause qu'il me serait impossible de la bien prouver y ayant des raisons qui doivent être tirées de bien plus loin les unes que les autres, mais en raisonnant par ordre, a facilioribus ad difficiliora, j'en déduis ce que (...) je puis, tantôt pour une matière, tantôt pour une autre, ce qui est à mon avis le vrai chemin pour bien trouver et expliquer la vérité. " (Descartes à Mersenne, 24 décembre 1640). " Si l'ordre analytique est le seul à procurer la démonstration valable de la philosophie, si les Méditations qui se développent rigoureusement selon cet ordre, permettent seules de comprendre à coup sûr l'ensemble de la doctrine, il n'y a pas d'autre méthode pour comprendre les Méditations elles-mêmes que de mettre en évidence cet ordre par lequel seul elles démontrent leur vérité. " (Martial Gueroult). (shrink)

Descartes's concept of the mind, as distinct from the body with which it forms a union, set the agenda for much of Western philosophy's subsequent reflection on human nature and thought. This is the first book to give an analysis of Descartes's pivotal concept that deals with all the functions of the mind, cognitive as well as volitional, theoretical as well as practical and moral. Focusing on Descartes's view of the mind as intimately united to and intermingled with the body, (...) and exploring its implications for his philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Lilli Alanen argues that the epistemological and methodological consequences of this view have been largely misconstrued in the modern debate. Informed by both the French tradition of Descartes scholarship and recent Anglo-American research, Alanen's book combines historical-contextual analysis with a philosophical problem-oriented approach. It seeks to relate Descartes's views on mind and intentionality both to contemporary debates and to the problems Descartes confronted in their historical context. By drawing out the historical antecedents and the intellectual evolution of Descartes's thinking about the mind, the book shows how his emphasis on the embodiment of the mind has implications far more complex and interesting than the usual dualist account suggests. (shrink)

A key to modern studies of 18th century Western philosophy, the Treatise considers numerous classic philosophical issues, including causation, existence, freedom and necessity and morality. This abridged edition has an introduction which explain's Hume's thought and places it in the context of its times.

This book is the fruit of twenty-five years of study of Spinoza by the editor and translator of a new and widely acclaimed edition of Spinoza's collected works. Based on three lectures delivered at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1984, the work provides a useful focal point for continued discussion of the relationship between Descartes and Spinoza, while also serving as a readable and relatively brief but substantial introduction to the Ethics for students. Behind the Geometrical Method is actually (...) two books in one. The first is Edwin Curley's text, which explains Spinoza's masterwork to readers who have little background in philosophy. This text will prove a boon to those who have tried to read the Ethics, but have been baffled by the geometrical style in which it is written. Here Professor Curley undertakes to show how the central claims of the Ethics arose out of critical reflection on the philosophies of Spinoza's two great predecessors, Descartes and Hobbes. The second book, whose argument is conducted in the notes to the text, attempts to support further the often controversial interpretations offered in the text and to carry on a dialogue with recent commentators on Spinoza. The author aligns himself with those who interpret Spinoza naturalistically and materialistically. (shrink)

Ce livre n'est pas un expose de la metaphysique cartesienne, mais s'attache a la pensee qui l'anime et qui cherche en elle son expression. Ce mot expression introduit un premier postulat: une philosophie n'a de sens que par reference a une certaine vision du monde dont precisement elle veut etre l'expression. A l'origine il y a un esprit qui regarde l'univers, l'homme, Dieu et qui s'etonne de les voir comme on ne les a encore jamais vus: c'est cette vision neuve (...) qu'il veut exprimer dans un texte qui est, a la fois, pensee coherente et parole communicable. Qui dit expression dit donc volonte de communication. La vision du monde - c'est le second postulat - n'est en aucune facon une sorte d'essence intemporelle et elle ne peut etre separee de son environnement historique. Ainsi tout texte a deux contextes: l'ensemble ordonne d'idees duquel il tient son sens et un certain dialogue qu'il doit rendre propice a la transmission de ce sens, les interlocuteurs n'appartenant pas tous au meme milieu culturel, comme on dit aujourd'hui. (shrink)

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.

Si l'histoire de la pensee medievale inclut celle de ses influences, comme l'histoire de la pensee moderne celle de ses sources, il est alors doublement legitime de se demander ce que peut nous apprendre sur la pensee cartesienne sa confrontation historique avec la pensee medievale, au contact de laquelle elle s'est formee, et a l'encontre de laquelle elle s'est developpee. Prenant la suite de travaux anterieurs, cet ouvrage d'Etienne Gilson envisage tout d'abord la confrontation dans une perspective genetique (en cherchant (...) dans certaines doctrines medievales les sources de theses cartesiennes comme l'inneisme, l'etude des meteores ou de la circulation sanguine), avant de considerer plus precisement le rapport de la metaphysique cartesienne et de la metaphysique medievale a travers l'examen de certains points de doctrine particulierement delicats. C'est ici notamment que sont rencontres et eclaircis les problemes de la critique cartesienne des formes substantielles, du dialogue de Descartes avec saint Augustin a l'occasion du cogito, avec saint Thomas dans la preuve de l'existence de Dieu par la causalite de l'idee, et avec saint Anselme dans la preuve dite ontologique. Le caractere novateur de la pensee cartesienne se trouve ainsi etabli avec une acuite inedite. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

Summary Until recently it was believed that Christian Huygens’ earliest publication of his pendulum invention was Horologium of 1658. He published the more famous general treatise, Horologium Oscillatorium, fifteen years later in 1673. Two years ago, an article1 suggesting an unknown collaboration in developing the clock pendulum between Huygens and the Paris clockmaker Isaac Thuret, presented the evidence of Benjamin Martin, an 18th century educationalist and retailer of scientific material. Martin described a Huygens publication of 1657 and reproduced the illustration (...) it contained. This illustration shows a different clock from the one drawn in Horologium and different also from those previously considered as Huygens’ earliest surviving examples. However, the illustration is similar to part of a plate in Horologium Oscillatorium and this similarity caused one historian to cast doubt on the existence of the 1657 publication.2 This article, with information presented for the first time, seeks to prove the existence of that work and thereby establish it in the canon of Huygens’ writings while re-examining the invention in the light that it casts. 1Whitestone, Sebastian, ‘The Identification and Attribution of Christiaan Huygens’ First Pendulum Clock', Antiquarian Horology, December (2008), 201–222. 2Plomp, R., ‘Letter', Antiquarian Horology, December (2009), 714–17. See also author's reply, ibid, 717–19. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

Coady misrepresents Hume as a reductivist about testimony. Hume occasionally writes carelessly as if what goes for beliefs based on induction will also go for beliefs obtained from testimony. But, in fact, he has no theory of testimony at all, though in his more considered remarks he rightly thinks, as does Reid, that the natural response to a bit of testimony is simply to accept the information which it contains. The sense in which we owe the beliefs we get from (...) testimony to experience, according to Hume, is this: we each learn about the business of testimony from being exposed to it, and in particular to cases where what is told is manifestly true. Hume is also interested in the question of how we may be prompted to view some testimonies with suspicion, and how we should then respond to them. It is wrong, however, to take his thoughts about this as embodying an implicit theory of the basic mechanism of testimony. In fact he has a problem accounting for the human propensity to accept extraordinary testimonies within the general framework of his doctrine; the Treatise solution is wisely abandoned in the Enquiry.Author Keywords: Hume; Reid; Coady; Testimony; Reductivism; Knowledge. (shrink)

Berkeley held that the moral duty of mankind was to obey God's laws; that--since God was a benevolent Creator--the object of His laws must be to promote the welfare and flourishing of mankind; and that, accordingly, humans could identify their moral duties by asking what system of laws for conduct would in fact tend to promote that object. This position--which is akin to that of 'rule' Utilitarianism--is neither unfamiliar nor manifestly untenable. He was surely mistaken, however, in his further supposition (...) that, if this theory were accepted, the resolution of all (or most) particular moral dilemmas would be simple and straightforward. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual evidence that, on (...) his account, people have the ability to form a judgment directly by an act will. I conclude by suggestion that understanding the position Descartes actually endorses (which I call ‘negative direct doxastic voluntarism’) has implications, more broadly, for contemporary participants in the doxastic voluntarism debate. (shrink)

Instead of reading Spinoza's account of the imagination in an anthropocentric way, as dependent on the traditional doctrine of human faculties, the author considers it as a consequence of his physics and cosmology. Knowledge by signs, as Spinoza calls imagination, has to be rooted in his theory of marks and images, and concerns all beings (human and non human) that are capable of marking and being marked by other bodies in the infinite semiosis of nature.

After a very brief introduction, Davidson begins with an informed and detailed account of the views of Aristotle and his major commentators, whose writings had enormous influence on the development of the medieval traditions. Davidson's account is supplemented with a critical exposition of the relevant teachings from the Plotiniana Arabica, from al-Kindi, and from a treatise on the soul attributed to Porphyry in the Arabic tradition. Impressive as all this is, it is simply stage setting for Davidson's detailed accounts of (...) the doctrines and arguments of al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. (shrink)