- (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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Tarski's Theory of Truth.Hartry Field - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):347.details
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
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(1 other version)``The Problem of the Essential Idexical".Perry John - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.details
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(1 other version)'He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1966 - Ratio 8:130-157.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.details
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The analytic and synthetic.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 33-69.details
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(1 other version)From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The ways of paradox, and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1976 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Realism and truth.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.details
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Proper names, propositional attitudes and non-descriptive connotations.Diana Ackerman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.details
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Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
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Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.details
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Putting humpty dumpty together again.Keith S. Donnellan - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):203-215.details
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Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.details
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On the logic of self-knowledge.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1967 - Noûs 1 (1):9-21.details
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Who, Me?Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466.details
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(1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
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(1 other version)Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):573-591.details
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(1 other version)The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.details
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(2 other versions)Beyond belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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Tacit belief.William G. Lycan - 1986 - In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Toward a homuncular theory of believing.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Cognition and Brain Theory 4 (2):139-59.details
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Mental representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.details
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Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Natural Kinds, Concepts, and Propositional Attitudes.Diana Ackerman - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):469-486.details
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Thinking about an Object: Comments on Pollock.Diana Ackerman - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):501-508.details
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Beliefs and Propositions: Comments on Clark.Herbert Heidelberger - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):525-532.details
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Thinking about an Object.John L. Pollock - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):487-500.details
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Donnellan’s distinction.Michael Devitt - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):511-526.details
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A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle about Belief.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):501-510.details
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(1 other version)Logic and knowledge: essays, 1901-1950.Bertrand Russell - 1956 - New York: Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by P. T. Geach & Max Black.details
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(1 other version)Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - New York,: Philosophical Library. Edited by P. T. Geach & Max Black.details
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Designation.Michael Devitt - 1981 - New York: Columbia University Press.details
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The semantics of singular terms.Brian Loar - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.details
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Names and the 'de re — de dicto' distinction.G. W. Fitch - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (1):25 - 34.details
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Proper names and identifying descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1970 - Synthese 21 (3-4):335 - 358.details
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Brian Loar on singular terms.Michael Devitt - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (3):271 - 280.details
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Knowledge and belief: 'De dicto' and 'de re'. [REVIEW]Roderick Chisholm - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (1):1 - 20.details
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On quantifying into epistemic contexts.Robert C. Sleigh - 1967 - Noûs 1 (1):23-31.details
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Critical notice.Michael Devitt - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):211 – 221.details
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Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.details
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About de re belief.Mark J. Pastin - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):569-575.details
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Attitudes and their objects.Robert Kraut - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):197 - 217.details
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Kaplan on Quine and suspension of judgment.Herbert Heidelberger - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):441 - 443.details
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Suspension of judgment: A response to Heidelberger on Kaplan. [REVIEW]Michael Devitt - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):17 - 24.details
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