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  1. Natural Deduction for Three-Valued Regular Logics.Yaroslav Petrukhin - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (2):197–206.
    In this paper, I consider a family of three-valued regular logics: the well-known strong and weak S.C. Kleene’s logics and two intermedi- ate logics, where one was discovered by M. Fitting and the other one by E. Komendantskaya. All these systems were originally presented in the semantical way and based on the theory of recursion. However, the proof theory of them still is not fully developed. Thus, natural deduction sys- tems are built only for strong Kleene’s logic both with one (...)
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  • Introduction to Metamathematics.Ann Singleterry Ferebee - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2):290-291.
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  • Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
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  • Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 2):211-231.
    The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy are two recent examples). A familiar observation is that virtually every putatively fundamental principle of logic has been challenged over the last century on broadly metaphysical grounds (however mistaken), with a consequent proliferation of alternative logics. However, this apparent contentiousness of logic is often treated as though it were (...)
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  • Cracow Circle and Its Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.Roman Murawski - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (3):359-376.
    The paper is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the philosophical views concerning logic and mathematics of the leading members of Cracow Circle, i.e., of Jan Salamucha, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski and Józef Maria Bocheński. Their views on the problem of possible applicability of logical tools in metaphysical and theological researches is also discussed.
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  • Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation.Christoph Lumer - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (1):41-69.
    This contribution discusses some problems of Pragma-Dialectics and explains them by its consensualistic view of the function of argumentation and by its philosophical underpinnings. It is suggested that these problems can be overcome by relying on a better epistemology and on an epistemological theory of argumentation. On the one hand Pragma-Dialectics takes unqualified consensus as the aim of argumentation, which is problematic, (Sect. 2) on the other it includes strong epistemological and rationalistic elements (Sect. 3). The problematic philosophical underpinnings of (...)
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  • Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
    Tn this paper I explore and to an extent defend HS. The main philosophical challenges to HS come from philosophical views that say that nomic concepts-laws, chance, and causation-denote features of the world that fail to supervene on non-nomic features. Lewis rejects these views and has labored mightily to construct HS accounts of nomic concepts. His account of laws is fundamental to his program, since his accounts of the other nomic notions rely on it. Recently, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  • Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas Van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
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  • The concept of truth in formalized languages.Alfred Tarski - 1931 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.
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  • On What There Is.W. V. O. Quine - 1948 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 221-233.
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  • Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
    Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. Moreover, a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way. The failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The best known theories of definite descriptions, those of Russell and Strawson, (...)
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  • Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  • A plea for non-naturalism as constructionism.Luciano Floridi - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):269-285.
    Contemporary science seems to be caught in a strange predicament. On the one hand, it holds a firm and reasonable commitment to a healthy naturalistic methodology, according to which explanations of natural phenomena should never overstep the limits of the natural itself. On the other hand, contemporary science is also inextricably and now inevitably dependent on ever more complex technologies, especially Information and Communication Technologies, which it exploits as well as fosters. Yet such technologies are increasingly “artificialising” or “denaturalising” the (...)
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  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]C. Mortensen - 2000 - Studia Logica 64 (2):285-300.
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  • The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
    Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, (...)
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  • Persistence and presentism.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.
    The ‘friends of temporal parts’ and their opponents disagree about how things persist through time. The former, who hold what is sometimes called a ‘4D’ theory of persistence, typically claim that all objects that last for any period of time are spread out through time in the same way that spatially extended objects are spread out through space — a different part for each region that the object fills. David Lewis calls this manner of persisting ‘perdurance’. The opposing, ‘3D’ theory (...)
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  • Fuzzy Sets.Lofti A. Zadeh - 1965 - Information and Control 8 (1):338--53.
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  • Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning.L. A. Zadeh - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):407-428.
    The term fuzzy logic is used in this paper to describe an imprecise logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, etc. The truth-value set, , of FL is assumed to be generated by a context-free grammar, with a semantic rule providing a means of computing the meaning of each linguistic truth-value in as a (...)
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  • Strict finitism.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):203 - 282.
    Dummett's objections to the coherence of the strict finitist philosophy of mathematics are thus, at the present time at least, ill-taken. We have so far no definitive treatment of Sorites paradoxes; so no conclusive ground for dismissing Dummett's response — the response of simply writing off a large class of familiar, confidently handled expressions as semantically incoherent. I believe that cannot be the right response, if only because it threatens to open an unacceptable gulf between the insight into his own (...)
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  • How Philosophical is Informal Logic?John Woods - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (2).
    Consider the proposition, "Informal logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy". The best chance of showing this to be true is showing that informal logic is part of logic, which in turn is a part of philosophy. Part 1 is given over to the task of sorting out these connections. If successful, informal logic can indeed be seen as part of philosophy; but there is no question of an exclusive relationship. Part 2 is a critical appraisal of the suggestion that informal (...)
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  • Epistemology Mathematicized.John Woods - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):292-331.
    Epistemology and informal logic have overlapping and broadly similar subject matters. A principle of methodological symmetry is: philosophical theories of sufficiently similar subject matters should engage similar methods. Suppose the best way to do epistemology is in highly formalized ways, with a large role for mathematical methods. The symmetry principle suggests this is also the best way to do the logic of the reasoning and argument, the subject matter of informal logic. A capitulation to mathematics is inimical to informal logicians, (...)
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  • Relative duties in the law.Carl Wellman - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):183-202.
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  • Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.
    We have good reason to condemn lying more strongly than misleading and to condemn bullshit assertion less harshly than lying but more harshly than misleading. We each have good reason to mislead rather than make bullshit assertions, but to make bullshit assertions rather than lie. This is because these forms of deception damage credibility in different ways. We can trust the misleader to assert only what they believe to be true. We can trust the bullshitter not to assert what they (...)
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  • The third man argument in the parmenides.Gregory Vlastos - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (3):319-349.
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  • On a classification of theories without the independence property.Viktor Verbovskiy - 2013 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 59 (1-2):119-124.
    A theory is stable up to Δ if any Δ-type over a model has a few extensions up to complete types. We prove that a theory has no the independence property iff it is stable up to some Δ, where each equation image has no the independence property.
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  • Structuring the universe of universal logic.Vladimir L. Vasyukov - 2007 - Logica Universalis 1 (2):277-294.
    . How, why and what for we should combine logics is perfectly well explained in a number of works concerning this issue. But the interesting question seems to be the nature and the structure of the general universe of possible combinations of logical systems. Adopting the point of view of universal logic in the paper the categorical constructions are introduced which along with the coproducts underlying the fibring of logics describe the inner structure of the category of logical systems. It (...)
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  • Logic and metalogic.Nicolas A. Vasil'év - 1993 - Axiomathes 4 (3):329-351.
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  • Narration in judiciary fact-finding: a probabilistic explication.Rafal Urbaniak - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (4):345-376.
    Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be modeled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Bayesian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.
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  • Permission to Cheat.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):205 - 214.
    Seizing the opportunity to apply what they had learned, the students declared a cheating competition. Outspoken participants (future lawyers, politicians, and captains of industry) bragged about their ruses. But to their chagrin, an ethics student prevailed.
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  • Eigenlogic in the Spirit of George Boole.Zeno Toffano - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):175-207.
    This work presents an operational and geometric approach to logic. It starts from the multilinear elective decomposition of binary logical functions in the original form introduced by George Boole. A justification on historical grounds is presented bridging Boole’s theory and the use of his arithmetical logical functions with the axioms of Boolean algebra using sets and quantum logic. It is shown that this algebraic polynomial formulation can be naturally extended to operators in finite vector spaces. Logical operators will appear as (...)
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  • The Neglect of Epistemic Considerations in Logic: The Case of Epistemic Assumptions.Göran Sundholm - 2019 - Topoi 38 (3):551-559.
    The two different layers of logical theory—epistemological and ontological—are considered and explained. Special attention is given to epistemic assumptions of the kind that a judgement is granted as known, and their role in validating rules of inference, namely to aid the inferential preservation of epistemic matters from premise judgements to conclusion judgement, while ordinary Natural Deduction assumptions serve to establish the holding of consequence from antecedent propositions to succedent proposition.
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  • Logically-consistent hypothesis testing and the hexagon of oppositions.Julio Michael Stern, Rafael Izbicki, Luis Gustavo Esteves & Rafael Bassi Stern - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (5):741-757.
    Although logical consistency is desirable in scientific research, standard statistical hypothesis tests are typically logically inconsistent. To address this issue, previous work introduced agnostic hypothesis tests and proved that they can be logically consistent while retaining statistical optimality properties. This article characterizes the credal modalities in agnostic hypothesis tests and uses the hexagon of oppositions to explain the logical relations between these modalities. Geometric solids that are composed of hexagons of oppositions illustrate the conditions for these modalities to be logically (...)
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  • Vagueness has no function in law.Roy Sorensen - 2001 - Legal Thoery 7 (4):385--415.
    Islamic building codes require mosques to face Mecca. The further Islam spreads, the more apt are believers to fall into a quandary. X faces Y only when the front of X is closer to Y than any other side of X. So the front of the mosque should be oriented along a shortest path to Mecca. Which way is that? Does the path to Mecca tunnel through the earth? Or does the path follow the surface of the earth?
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  • Permission to cheat.R. Sorensen - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):205-214.
    Seizing the opportunity to apply what they had learned, the students declared a cheating competition. Outspoken participants (future lawyers, politicians, and captains of industry) bragged about their ruses. But to their chagrin, an ethics student prevailed.
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  • Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive.Roy Sorensen - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264.
    Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of (...)
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  • Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.
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  • The calculus of terms.Fred Sommers - 1970 - Mind 79 (313):1-39.
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  • Inconsistency and scientific reasoning.Joel M. Smith - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):429-445.
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  • Logical Geometries and Information in the Square of Oppositions.Hans5 Smessaert & Lorenz6 Demey - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4):527-565.
    The Aristotelian square of oppositions is a well-known diagram in logic and linguistics. In recent years, several extensions of the square have been discovered. However, these extensions have failed to become as widely known as the square. In this paper we argue that there is indeed a fundamental difference between the square and its extensions, viz., a difference in informativity. To do this, we distinguish between concrete Aristotelian diagrams and, on a more abstract level, the Aristotelian geometry. We then introduce (...)
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  • Paraconsistent logics?B. H. Slater - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):451 - 454.
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  • Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies.Harvey Siegel & John Biro - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (3):277-292.
    In Biro and Siegel we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.
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  • On engendering an illusion of understanding.Dana Scott - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):787-807.
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  • Existence and description in formal logic.Dana Scott - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (1):181--200.
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  • Zur Miete bei Frege – Rudolf Hirzel und die Rezeption der stoischen Logik und Semantik in Jena.Sven Schlotter, Karlheinz Hülser & Gottfried Gabriel - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (4):369-388.
    It has been noted before in the history of logic that some of Frege's logical and semantic views were anticipated in Stoicism. In particular, there seems to be a parallel between Frege's Gedanke (thought) and Stoic lekton; and the distinction between complete and incomplete lekta has an equivalent in Frege's logic. However, nobody has so far claimed that Frege was actually influenced by Stoic logic; and there has until now been no indication of such a causal connection. In this essay, (...)
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  • Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):525-571.
    The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It (...)
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  • Generalized definitional reflection and the inversion principle.Peter Schroeder-Heister - 2007 - Logica Universalis 1 (2):355-376.
    . The term inversion principle goes back to Lorenzen who coined it in the early 1950s. It was later used by Prawitz and others to describe the symmetric relationship between introduction and elimination inferences in natural deduction, sometimes also called harmony. In dealing with the invertibility of rules of an arbitrary atomic production system, Lorenzen’s inversion principle has a much wider range than Prawitz’s adaptation to natural deduction. It is closely related to definitional reflection, which is a principle for reasoning (...)
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  • Definitional Reflection and Basic Logic.Peter Schroeder-Heister - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (4):491-501.
    In their Basic Logic, Sambin, Battilotti and Faggian give a foundation of logical inference rules by reference to certain reflection principles. We investigate the relationship between these principles and the principle of Definitional Reflection proposed by Hallnäs and Schroeder-Heister.
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  • Just go ahead and lie.Jennifer Saul - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):3-9.
    The view that lying is morally worse than merely misleading is a very natural one, which has had many prominent defenders. Nonetheless, here I will argue that it is misguided: holding all else fixed, acts of mere misleading are not morally preferable to acts of lying, and successful lying is not morally worse than merely deliberately misleading. In fact, except in certain very special contexts, I will suggest that – when faced with a felt need to deceive – we might (...)
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  • Did Clinton say something false?J. M. Saul - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):255-257.
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