- Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Free will: sourcehood and its alternatives.Kevin Timpe - 2012 - London: Continuum.details
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Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed.Felipe Leon & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.details
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Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.details
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Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth.Robert Kane - 2001 - In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Frankfurt-style compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):231-248.details
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Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):231-248.details
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Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.details
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.details
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Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt.Eleonore Stump - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):413-422.details
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Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: The flicker of freedom. [REVIEW]Eleonore Stump - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.details
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Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.Helen Steward - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.details
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Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.details
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Living without Free Will.A. R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):119-137.details
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Alternative possibilities and causal histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138.details
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Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame.Michael Otsuka - 1998 - Ethics 108 (4):685-701.details
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Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?Carlos J. Moya - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.details
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Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.details
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Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):299-314.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities.Robert Kane - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):57-80.details
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The Dual Regress of Free Will and the Role of Alternative Possibilities.Robert Kane - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):57-79.details
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Libertarianism.Robert Kane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):35-44.details
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Free Will and Values.Mark Bernstein - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):557-559.details
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Ability and Responsibility.Peter van Inwagen - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (2):201 - 224.details
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Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives.David P. Hunt - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.details
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Moral responsibility and unavoidable action.David P. Hunt - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.details
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In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing.Carl Ginet - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.details
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Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.details
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The Frankfurt cases: The moral of the stories.John Martin Fischer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.details
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Recent work on moral responsibility.John Fischer - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):93–139.details
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Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.details
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Free will, chance, and mystery.Laura Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.details
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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.L. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-180.details
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Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism.Carlos J. Moya - 2006 - New York: Routledge.details
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Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - In Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell.details
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Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 184--199.details
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Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (7):363-372.details
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``Foreknowledge and Human Freedom".Linda Zagzebski - 1997 - In Philip Quinn & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 291-299.details
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