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The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief.James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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