- Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Assertions and future tense semantics.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4729-4747.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Rethinking the Acceptability and Probability of Indicative Conditionals.Michał Sikorski - 2022 - In Stefan Kaufmann, Over David & Ghanshyam Sharma (eds.), Conditionals: Logic, Linguistics and Psychology. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
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Are there counterexamples to the consistency principle?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
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Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance.Michał Sikorski, van Dongen Noah & Jan Sprenger - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:1-26.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Hierarchical Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):215-231.details
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Belief, information and reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
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Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
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Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief.Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.details
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Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation.Chenwei Shi, Sonja Smets & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1207-1243.details
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Collective Opinion as Tendency Towards Consensus.Chenwei Shi - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):593-613.details
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Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):589-594.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief.Martin Smith Philip A. Ebert - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.Krista Lawlor - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):1-27.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Moral pickles, moral dilemmas, and the obligation preface paradox.Daniel Immerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2087-2101.details
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What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? -- A Question for Kroedel.Franz Huber - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):333-342.details
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