- Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.details
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Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.details
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(1 other version)Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.details
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Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.details
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection.Frank Jackson - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):461-482.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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(1 other version)Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.details
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Being Rational and being Right.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance.Michael Zimmerman - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.details
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On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The "Prospective View" of Obligation.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9.details
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In defense of objectivism about moral obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.details
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Living with uncertainty.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (4):235-247.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Is moral obligation objective or subjective?Michael J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4):329-361.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Williamson's casual approach to probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment.Jacob Ross - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Utilitarianism and co-operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(2 other versions)Subjective rightness: Holly M. Smith.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):196-210.details
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Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.details
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On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):326-330.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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