- Informed Altruism and Utilitarianism.Brian John Rosebury - 2021 - Social Theory and Practice 47 (4):717-746.details
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Imparcialidad y particularismo moral.Daniela Alegría - 2018 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 56:365-392.details
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Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues.Romy Eskens - 2024 - Utilitas 36 (1):64-82.details
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Eliciting and Assessing our Moral Risk Preferences.Shang Long Yeo - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):109-126.details
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Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Probability in ethics.David McCarthy - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 705–737.details
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Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
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Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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Consequentialist kantianism.Michael Ridge - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):421-438.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Moral rationalism and rational amoralism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):495–525.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation.John Pittard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2617-2637.details
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Against the Evidence-Relative View of Liability to Defensive Harm.Eduardo Rivera-López & Luciano Venezia - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):45-60.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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What is it like to be a group?David Sosa - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):212-226.details
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Risk, Rights, and Restitution.M. J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):285-311.details
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Prospective Possibilism.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):117-150.details
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On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.details
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In Defense of Prospectivism about Moral Obligation: A Reply to My Meticulous Critics.Michael Zimmerman - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):444-461.details
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Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value.Michael Zhao - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):144-161.details
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Clifford's Consequentialism.Brian Zamulinski - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (3):289-299.details
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Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances.Leszek Wroński - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12089-12105.details
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When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?Scott Woodcock - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):299-316.details
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Moral schizophrenia and the paradox of friendship.Scott Woodcock - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (1):1-25.details
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An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):229-244.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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Middle ground on liability for costs?Joachim Wündisch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3097-3115.details
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Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.details
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Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):340-359.details
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A risky challenge for intransitive preferences.Timothy Luke Williamson - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Liberal individualism, relational autonomy, and the social dimension of respect.Alistair Wardrope - 2015 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 8 (1):37-66.details
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The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.details
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Consequentialism and rational choice: Lessons from the Allais paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.details
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Decyzje w sytuacjach niepewności normatywnej.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2020 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 29 (2):53-72.details
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Consequentialism and our best selves.Miles Tucker - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):101-120.details
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Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.details
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A Non-proportional Hybrid Moral Theory.Tim Mulgan - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (3):291.details
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Rethinking the unfair advantage argument.Tena Thau - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (1):63-81.details
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Intuitions and the Demands of Consequentialism.Matthew Tedesco - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):94-104.details
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Does a discount rate measure the costs of climate change?Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):337-365.details
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Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.details
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Multidimensional Consequentialism and Risk.Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):49-57.details
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