- On choosing between deterministic and indeterministic models: underdetermination and indirect evidence.Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2243-2265.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences.Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: Freedom and Responsibility. MIT Press.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl - 1983 - Brain 106 (3):623--664.details
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Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.Hanna Pickard - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):209-224.details
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Minor Tweaks, Major Payoffs: The Problems and Promise of Situationism in Moral Philosophy.Hagop Sarkissian - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's the illusion of conscious will. [REVIEW]Eddy A. Nahmias - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):527-541.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.details
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Neuroscience and the possibility of locally determined choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias.Marcelo Fischborn - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):198-201.details
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“Local determination”, even if we could find it, does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn.Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):185-197.details
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Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1128-1141.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan.James Andow & Florian Cova - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566.details
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Experimental philosophy needs to matter: Reply to Andow and Cova.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Brittany Nelson - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):567-569.details
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Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.details
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Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the "Order of Explanation": An Intervention.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):208-240.details
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(1 other version)Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2025-2049.details
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Four Views on Free Will.John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas - 2007 - Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by John Martin Fischer.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain.Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes - 2008 - Nature Neuroscience 11 (5):543--545.details
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Why Libet's Studies Don't Pose a Threat to Free Will.Adina L. Roskies - 2011 - In . pp. 11--22.details
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Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Revisionism.Manuel Vargas - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Causal determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Free will, the self and the brain.Gilberto Gomes - 2007 - Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2 (25):221-234.details
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(1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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Determinism and Indeterminism.Charlotte Werndl - 2014 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific Challenges to Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):197-207.details
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Responsibility without Blame: Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice.Hanna Pickard - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.details
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Does consciousness cause behaviour?Susan Pockett - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.details
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This Isn’t the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do.Andrew E. Monroe, Garrett L. Brady & Bertram F. Malle - 2016 - Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (2):191-199.details
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(1 other version)Review of John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Gideon Yaffe - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):429-434.details
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