"The chief thesis I have to maintain", Bertrand Russell once wrote, "is the legitimacy of analysis". His reputation as the founder of the analytic tradition, secure for many decades, has come under some attack recently from the emphasis placed by Michael Dummett and others on the role played by Gottlob Frege. This collection of new essays from distinguished philosophers and Russell scholars explores Russell's own unique and enduringly important contribution to shaping the concerns and the methods of contemporary analytical philosophers. (...) It includes both general discussions of the nature of analytical philosophy and minutely detailed analyses of Russell's own arguments, and covers the whole range of Russell's famously varied output. (shrink)

Published in 1903, this book was the first comprehensive treatise on the logical foundations of mathematics written in English. It sets forth, as far as possible without mathematical and logical symbolism, the grounds in favour of the view that mathematics and logic are identical. It proposes simply that what is commonly called mathematics are merely later deductions from logical premises. It provided the thesis for which _Principia Mathematica_ provided the detailed proof, and introduced the work of Frege to a wider (...) audience. In addition to the new introduction by John Slater, this edition contains Russell's introduction to the 1937 edition in which he defends his position against his formalist and intuitionist critics. (shrink)

Gathered together here are the fundamental texts of the great classical period in modern logic. A complete translation of Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift--which opened a great epoch in the history of logic by fully presenting propositional calculus and quantification theory--begins the volume, which concludes with papers by Herbrand and by Gödel.

This is a long-awaited new edition of one of the best known Oxford Logic Guides. The book gives an introduction to intuitionistic mathematics, leading the reader gently through the fundamental mathematical and philosophical concepts. The treatment of various topics, for example Brouwer's proof of the Bar Theorem, valuation systems, and the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic, have been completely revised.

This book provides the original text of A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, which was first published in 1900. An example of Russell's early thought, the work took particular inspiration from the letters to Arnauld and the Discours de Métaphysique in developing a comprehensive theory of Leibniz's system. The text of the first edition is provided in its entirety, including an appendix containing extracts from Leibniz, classified according to subject. This book will be of value to anyone with (...) an interest in Leibniz and the early philosophy of Russell. (shrink)

The ideas of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege lie at the root of the analytic movement in philosophy; Michael Dummett is his leading modern critical interpreter and one of today's most eminent philosophers. This volume collects together fifteen of Dummett's classic essays on Frege and related subjects.

This volume contains English translations of Frege's early writings in logic and philosophy and of relevant reviews by other leading logicians. Professor Bynum has contributed a biographical essay, introduction, and extensive bibliography.

It is fairly well known that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's multiple‐relation theory of judgement had a devastating effect on the latter's philosophical enterprise. The exact nature of those criticisms however, and the explanation for the severity of their consequences, has been a source of confusion and disagreement amongst both Russell and Wittgenstein scholars. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of those criticisms which shows them to be consonant with Wittgenstein's general critique of Russell's conception of logic and which serves (...) to elucidate some of the notoriously enigmatic passages of the Tractatus. In particular, I seek to show the continuity of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the theory of judgement with his remarks on Russell's paradox and the theory of types. In addition, I place these issues in the context of Russell's own philosophical ambitions in order to reveal the deep divisions between the two over the nature of logical form and the analysis of propositional content. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION MATHEMATICAL logic differs from the traditional formal logic so markedly in method, and so far surpasses it in power and subtlety, ...

The fundamental texts of the great classical period in modern logic, some of them never before available in English translation, are here gathered together for ...

Equality1 gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form a = (...) b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not new every morning, but always the same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even to-day the identification of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of course. Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a = b could not differ from a = a (i.e. provided a = b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case the sentence a = b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means. But in many cases this is just what we want to do. If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the sign ‘b’ only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a = a becomes essentially equal to that of a = b, provided a = b is true.. (shrink)

The classic, influential essay in 'descriptive metaphysics' by the distinguished English philosopher.

Several of these essays have been printed whole in journals; others are in varying degrees new. Two main themes run through them. One is the problem of meaning, particularly as involved in the notion of an analytic statement. The other is the notion of ontological, commitment, particularly as involved in the problem of universals.

This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...

A respected Harvard logician and philosopher gathers together twenty-nine writings dealing with the foundations of mathematics, Rudolf Carnap, lin-guistics, ...

A collection of all but two of the author's philosophical essays and lectures originally published or presented before August 1976.

Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted understanding of Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference . Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. He then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications (...) for our understanding of this essay. (shrink)

G. E. Moore was one of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. This selection of his writings makes the best of his work once again available, and also includes previously unpublished writings. Moore's first published writings, represented in this collection by his papers "The Nature of Judgment" and "The Refutation of Idealism," contributed decisively to the break with idealism which led to the development of analytic philosophy. Moore went on to develop his (...) own style, which combined a defense of the common sense view of the world with a controversial analysis of the content of this view. Also included is Moore's famous "Proof of an External World," which marked a return late in his career to the critique of idealism. Other papers address perception and important issues in logical theory. The collection ends with three new pieces which illustrate Moore's relationship with Wittgenstein. In these pieces Moore discusses his "paradox" whichso fascinated Wittgenstein; the nature of our knowledge of our own sensations; and Malcolm's views about doubt and knowledge which were themselves inspired by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

First published in 1984 as part of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell , Theory of Knowledge represents an important addition to our knowledge of Russell's thought. In this work Russell attempts to flesh out the sketch implicit in The Problems of Philosophy . It was conceived by Russell as his next major project after Principia Mathematica and was intended to provide the epistemological foundations for his work. Russell's subsequent difficulties in presenting his theory of knowledge, brought on by what (...) he considered to be devastating criticisms of Wittgenstein, led to both his abandonment of this work and to a major transformation in his thought. Theory of Knowledge , now available for the first time in paperback, gives us a picture of one of the great minds of the twentieth century at work. It is possible to see the unsolved problems left without disguise or evasion. This second edition has retained the full scholarly introduction. The photographs of the manuscript, appendices, and notes on textual matters have been eliminated to provide a concise and accessible guide to understanding both Russell's own thought and his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy has become the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. This book illuminates that tradition through a historical examination of a crucial period in its formation: the rejection of Idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the subsequent development of Russell's thought in the period before the First World War.

What makes a visually appealing landscape? How can the design and use of a landscape be harmonised? In this significantly revised and updated third edition of Simon Bell's seminal text, he further explores the answers to these questions by interrogating a range of design principles, applications and ideas. Written for students, instructors and professionals, the book unveils a visual design vocabulary for anyone involved with landscape aesthetics including landscape architects, architects, planners, urban designers, landscape managers, foresters, geographers and ecologists. Structured (...) around key design terms, which are explained and illustrated using an extensive range of examples from around the world, including North America, Europe and Asia, this book enables you to describe, debate and design the visual landscape. It starts with basic elements, before moving onto variable design components, and then the ways these elements are organized into compositions, in order to demonstrate how landscapes are created and how meanings and patterns are perceived within them. This new full colour edition contains over 240 images; an updated introduction; examples from China, Vietnam, and central Asia; a chapter on how to read and understand visual design elements in the landscape; a teaching model for instructors; and expanded appendix materials including a glossary, references and further reading. (shrink)

First published in 1984 as part of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Theory of Knowledge represents an important addition to our knowledge of Russell's thought. In this work Russell attempts to flesh out the sketch implicit in The Problems of Philosophy. It was conceived by Russell as his next major project after Principia Mathematica and was intended to provide the epistemological foundations for his work. Russell's subsequent difficulties in presenting his theory of knowledge, brought on by what he considered (...) to be devastating criticisms of Wittgenstein, led to both his abandonment of this work and to a major transformation in his thought. Theory of Knowledge, now available for the first time in paperback, gives us a picture of one of the great minds of the twentieth century at work. It is possible to see the unsolved problems left without disguise or evasion. This second edition has retained the full scholarly introduction. The photographs of the manuscript, appendices, and notes on textual matters have been eliminated to provide a concise and accessible guide to understanding both Russell's own thought and his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.

What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...) accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation, this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. Making It Explicit is the first attempt to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use--in short, to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices. -/- At the center of this enterprise is a notion of discursive commitment. Being able to talk--and so in the fullest sense being able to think--is a matter of mastering the practices that govern such commitments, being able to keep track of one’s own commitments and those of others. Assessing the pragmatic significance of speech acts is a matter of explaining the explicit in terms of the implicit. As he traces the inferential structure of the social practices within which things can be made conceptually explicit, the author defines the distinctively expressive role of logical vocabulary. This expressive account of language, mind, and logic is, finally, an account of who we are. (shrink)

F. H. Bradley was the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist school, which came to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century. Bradley, who was a life fellow of Merton College, Oxford, was influenced by Hegel, and also reacted against utilitarianism. He was recognised during his lifetime as one of the greatest intellectuals of his generation and was the first philosopher to receive the Order of Merit, in 1924. His work is considered to have been important to the (...) formation of analytic philosophy. In metaphysics, he rejected pluralism and realism, and believed that English philosophy needed to deal systematically with first principles. This work, first published in 1893, is divided into two parts: 'Appearance' deals with exposing the contradictions that Bradley believed are hidden in our everyday conceptions of the world; and in 'Reality', he builds his positive account of reality and considers possible objections to it. (shrink)

This work stresses the illogical manner in which mathematics has developed, the question of applied mathematics as against 'pure' mathematics, and the challenges to the consistency of mathematics' logical structure that have occurred in the twentieth century.

Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens / von Dr. Gottlob Frege,...Date de l'edition originale : 1879Ce livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees (...) par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65658c. (shrink)

This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished "substitutional" theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the unity of Russell's (...) philosophy of logic and offers new avenues for a genuine solution of the paradoxes plaguing Logicism. (shrink)

Traces the development of British philosopher Russell's (1872-1970) ideas on mathematics from the 1890s to the publication of his Principles of mathematics in 1903. Draws from Russell's unpublished manuscripts, correspondence, and published works to point out the influence of Hegel, Cantor, Whitehead, Peano, and others. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This volume contains all of Frege's extant unpublished writings on philosophy and logic other than his correspondence, written at various stages of his career.

Die Grundlagen gehören zu den klassischen Texten der Sprachphilosophie, Logik und Mathematik. Frege stützt sein Programm einer Begründung von Arithmetik und Analysis auf reine Logik, indem er die natürlichen Zahlen als bestimmte Begriffsumfänge definiert. Die philosophische Fundierung des Fregeschen Ansatzes bilden erkenntnistheoretische und sprachphilosophische Analysen und Begriffserklärungen. Studienausgabe aufgrund der textkritisch herausgegebenen Jubiläumsausgabe (Centenarausgabe). Mit Einleitung, Anmerkungen, Literaturverzeichnis und Namenregister.