Modalities explained through the idea of a logical space.

to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zurich, April 1973 Mario Bunge Preface In this book I have investigated the logical and methodological role of the much debated theoretical concepts in scientific theories. The philosophical viewpoint underlying my argumentation is critical scientific realism. My method of exposition has been to express ideas first in general terms and then to develop and elaborate them within a specific (...) formal framework. It is assumed in the book that the reader has a relatively good knowledge of the basic techniques and results of modern symbolic logic, including model theory. Examples from actual science are mostly from the social sciences. I have deliberately omitted a treatment of a number of characteristic features which are particular to theoretical concepts in the more developed sciences, such as modern physics. This book owes very much to Professor Jaakko Hintikka, to whom I wish to express my deep gratitude. Especially at the begin ning of this project in 1968/69 when I was doing research for my doctoral degree at Stanford University I worked with him closely. (shrink)

One of the most conspicuous features of contemporary modeling practices is the dissemination of mathematical and computational methods across disciplinary boundaries. We study this process through two applications of the Ising model: the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses and the Hopfield model of associative memory. The Hopfield model successfully transferred some basic ideas and mathematical methods originally developed within the study of magnetic systems to the field of neuroscience. As an analytical resource we use Paul Humphreys's discussion of computational and (...) theoretical templates. We argue that model templates are crucial for the intra- and interdisciplinary theoretical transfer. A model template is an abstract conceptual idea associated with particular mathematical forms and computational methods. (shrink)

Quine's areas of interest are panoramic, as this lively book amply demonstrates.

Provides comprehensive coverage of logical structure as well as the techniques of formal reasoning.

Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his...

A computational theory of induction must be able to identify the projectible predicates, that is to distinguish between which predicates can be used in inductive inferences and which cannot. The problems of projectibility are introduced by reviewing some of the stumbling blocks for the theory of induction that was developed by the logical empiricists. My diagnosis of these problems is that the traditional theory of induction, which started from a given (observational) language in relation to which all inductive rules are (...) formulated, does not go deep enough in representing the kind of information used in inductive inferences. As an interlude, I argue that the problem of induction, like so many other problems within AI, is a problem of knowledge representation. To the extent that AI-systems are based on linguistic representations of knowledge, these systems will face basically the same problems as did the logical empiricists over induction. In a more constructive mode, I then outline a non-linguistic knowledge representation based on conceptual spaces. The fundamental units of these spaces are "quality dimensions". In relation to such a representation it is possible to define "natural" properties which can be used for inductive projections. I argue that this approach evades most of the traditional problems. (shrink)

A. W. Moore argues in this bold, unusual, and ambitious book that it is possible to think about the world from no point of view. His argument involves discussion of a very wide range of fundamental philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject-matter of mathematics, realism and anti-realism, value, the inexpressible, and God. The result is a powerful critique of our own finitude.

Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.

This collection of newly comissioned essays by international contributors offers a representative overview of the most important developments in contemporary philosophical logic. Presents controversies in philosophical implications and applications of formal symbolic logic. Surveys major trends and offers original insights.

This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of changes are presented. It is then contrasted with Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantian account that seeks to render Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” as a communicatively rational historical event of conceptual development in the sciences. Like Friedman, we refer to the transition from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics as an example (...) of “deep conceptual change.” But we take the communicative rationality of radical conceptual change to be available prior to the philosophical meta-paradigms that Friedman deems indispensable for this purpose. (shrink)

With this treatise, an insightful exploration of the probabilistic connection between philosophy and the history of science, the famous economist breathed new life into studies of both disciplines. Originally published in 1921, this important mathematical work represented a significant contribution to the theory regarding the logical probability of propositions. Keynes effectively dismantled the classical theory of probability, launching what has since been termed the “logical-relationist” theory. In so doing, he explored the logical relationships between classifying a proposition as “highly probable” (...) and as a “justifiable induction.” Unabridged republication of the classic 1921 edition. (shrink)

In this paper a propositional logic of viewpoints is presented. The language of this logic consists of the usual modal operatorsL (of necessity) andM (of possibility) as well as of two new operatorsA andR. The intuitive interpretations ofA andR are from all viewpoints and from some viewpoint, respectively. Semantically the language is interpreted by using Kripke models augmented with sets of viewpoints and with a new alternativeness relation for the operatorA. Truth values of formulas are evaluated with respect to a (...) world and a viewpoint. Various axiomatizations of the logic of viewpoints are presented and proved complete. Finally, some applications are given. (shrink)

In this paper an analysis of scientific theories and theory change including meaning change is presented by using intensional logic. Several cases of scientific progress are distinguished and special attention is given to incommensurability. It is argued that ,in all cases the comparison of rival theories is possible via translation. Finally two different forms of theory-Iadenness of observation are analysed.

This book, which can be read independently, deals with more specifically linguistic problems in semantics and contains substantial original material.

Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...) theorized forty years ago. Using the example of color vision in humans to illustrate how his theory of “perspectivism” works, Ronald N. Giere argues that colors do not actually exist in objects; rather, color is the result of an interaction between aspects of the world and the human visual system. Giere extends this argument into a general interpretation of human perception and, more controversially, to scientific observation, conjecturing that the output of scientific instruments is perspectival. Furthermore, complex scientific principles—such as Maxwell’s equations describing the behavior of both the electric and magnetic fields—make no claims about the world, but models based on those principles can be used to make claims about specific aspects of the world. Offering a solution to the most contentious debate in the philosophy of science over the past thirty years, Scientific Perspectivism will be of interest to anyone involved in the study of science. (shrink)

Drawing on work in psychophysics, psychometrics, and sensory neurophysiology, Clark analyzes the character and defends the integrity of psychophysical explanations of qualitative facts, arguing that the structure of such explanations is sound and potentially successful.

This volume tackles the slippery subject of 'meaning'.

The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.

According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions (...) of location and access. If we choose to follow the second approach, instead of the first one, the internal structure of a PoV is not directly addressed, and the emphasized features of PoV are related to the function that PoV are intended to have. That is, PoV are directly identified by their role and they can solely be understood as ways of accessing the world that bring some kind of perspective about it. Having this in mind, we would like to propose a notation that explains how to understand such access as a sort of models (that can allow the creation of concepts), independently of whether the precise PoV under consideration is impersonal or non-impersonal, its kind of content, and its subjective or objective character. First, we will present an account of some previous approaches to the study of points of view. Then, we will analyze what kind of structure the world is assumed to posses and how the access to it is possible. Third, we will develop a notation that explains PoV as qualitative dimensions by means of which it is possible to valuate objects and states of the world. (shrink)

Problems of practical reasoning often arise as the result of a clash between two different points of view. What do we mean when we say that while from the point of view of prudence there is no reason to rescue one's drowning enemy, from the point of view of morality there is reason to do so? In this essay we examine how the idiom of points of view arises in practical discourse, and offer a clarification of it. We will be (...) particularly concerned with a common argument for assigning a privileged status to the moral point of view, an argument which can be seen to be fallacious once certain features of Judgments made from a point of view are clearly discerned. (shrink)

Many philosophers doubt that one can provide any successful explanation of sensory qualities - of how things look, feel, or seem to a perceiving subject. To provide such an explanation, one would need to explain qualitative facts in non-qualitative terms. Attempts to construct such explanations have seemed, in principle, doomed. Austen Clark examines the strategy used in psychophysics, psychometrics, and sensory neurophysiology to explain qualitative facts. He argues that this strategy could succeed: its structure is sound, and it can answer (...) the various philosophical objections lodged against it. On this basis Professor Clark presents an analysis of senosry qualities that offers the possibility of explaining at least some qualia, and he sketches how this scheme might eventually reduce to neurophysiology. If he is correct, we are not doomed to an eternity of mere acquaintance with our qualia. (shrink)

The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.

In this dissertation, a logical analysis of points of view is presented. It is based on the concept of determinable presented by Johnson in his book Logic. A point of view is a set of Determinables. Determinables generate a many-dimensional conceptual space. Concepts are subsets of this space, and their relations form a lattice. A logical system to present points of view is introduced and proved to be complete. Some applications of this logic are demonstrated (relative identity, scientific change, inductive (...) logic etc.). (shrink)

The modern materialist approach to life has conspicuously failed to explain such central mind-related features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, and value. This failure to account for something so integral to nature as mind, argues philosopher Thomas Nagel, is a major problem, threatening to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. (...) And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history, either. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such. Nagel's skepticism is not based on religious belief or on a belief in any definite alternative. In Mind and Cosmos, he does suggest that if the materialist account is wrong, then principles of a different kind may also be at work in the history of nature, principles of the growth of order that are in their logical form teleological rather than mechanistic. In spite of the great achievements of the physical sciences, reductive materialism is a world view ripe for displacement. Nagel shows that to recognize its limits is the first step in looking for alternatives, or at least in being open to their possibility. (shrink)

This is the basis of the first part of the book.

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P , because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there (...) is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)