- Restrictionism and Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & Shane Reuter - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):200-222.details
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Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
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How philosophers use intuition and ‘intuition’.John Bengson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.details
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Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.details
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Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
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Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethnoepistemology.Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Publishing. pp. 227--247.details
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(6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.details
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Intuitions and meaning divergence.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):419-426.details
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Survey-Driven Romanticism.Simon Cullen - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.details
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What knowledge is and what it ought to be: Feminist values and normative epistemology.Sally Haslanger - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:459-480.details
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What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds.Sally Haslanger - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):89-118.details
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Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?Sally Haslanger - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):31–55.details
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Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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(1 other version)The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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An explication of 'explication'.Joseph F. Hanna - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (1):28-44.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
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Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.details
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Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering.Steffen Koch - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1955-1975.details
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There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch.Steffen Koch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2279-2291.details
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The threat of the intuition-shaped hole.Ethan Landes - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):539-564.details
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What Ought a Fruitful Explicatum to be?Mark Pinder - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):913-932.details
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Speaker’s reference, stipulation, and a dilemma for conceptual engineers.Max Deutsch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3935-3957.details
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P-curving x-phi: Does experimental philosophy have evidential value?Michael T. Stuart, David Colaço & Edouard Machery - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):669-684.details
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Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering.Sarah Sawyer - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9):1001-1022.details
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(1 other version)Talk and Thought.Sarah Sawyer - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 379-395.details
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Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.details
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Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy.Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1507-1527.details
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The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering.Steffen Koch - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):327–348.details
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Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.Herman Cappelen - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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How To Conceptually Engineer Conceptual Engineering?Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.details
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The Importance of Concepts.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):127-147.details
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Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering.Herman Cappelen - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Expertise and Intuitions about Reference.Edouard Machery - 2012 - Theoria 27 (1):37-54.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
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(6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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(1 other version)Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Mind 62 (245):86-99.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual Ethics I.David Plunkett Alexis Burgess - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.details
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(6 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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The Myth of the Intuitive.Max Deutsch - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.details
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Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.details
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Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.details
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