- The Nature of Mind.David Malet Armstrong - 1981 - Australasian Medical Publishing Co..details
|
|
The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.details
|
|
(3 other versions)The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.details
|
|
There is no Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 65.details
|
|
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Science and subjectivity.Israel Scheffler - 1967 - Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co..details
|
|
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.details
|
|
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
|
|
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
The nature of mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive Vernon Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. New York,: Macmillan.details
|
|
From physics to physicalism.Barry Loewer - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):185-206.details
|
|
What is it like to be a phenomenologist?Kelly D. Jolley & Michael Watkins - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):204-9.details
|
|
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
|
|
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
|
|
(1 other version)A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.details
|
|
Consciousness as internal monitoring.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.details
|
|
Rigid designators and mind-brain identity.Grover Maxwell - 1979 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:9.details
|
|
Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. [REVIEW]David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.details
|
|
Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - In A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press. pp. 163--178.details
|
|
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.details
|
|
Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.details
|
|
A defense of the knowledge argument.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.details
|
|
Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument.Benj Hellie - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 333.details
|
|
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
|
|
Can we solve the mind-body problem?Colin Mcginn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.details
|
|
What is the "subjectivity" of the mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.details
|
|
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
|
|
What is it like to be boring and myopic?Kathleen Akins - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell.details
|
|
(1 other version)Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
|
|
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalism.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.details
|
|
Mortal Questions.Laurence Nemirow - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):473.details
|
|
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Ethics 98 (1):137-157.details
|
|
The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.details
|
|
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 43 (2):399-403.details
|
|
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.details
|
|
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.details
|
|
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):207-210.details
|
|
Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
|
|
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
[Omnibus Review].Barry Loewer - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1411-1413.details
|
|
Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound "I".Michael Lockwood - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What would count as explaining consciousness?Robert van Gulick - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.details
|
|
Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.details
|
|
In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
In defense of the knowledge argument.Jeff Mcconnell - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):157-187.details
|
|