- Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression.Briana Toole - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (4):598-618.details
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Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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The Truth Problem for Permissivism.Sophie Horowitz - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):113-131.details
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Knowing and Not‐knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:433-447.details
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(1 other version)Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge.Rebecca Kukla - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):80-95.details
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Critical reflection: an alleged epistemic duty.Paul Tidman - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):268-276.details
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Mandatory Disclosure and Medical Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):409-424.details
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(1 other version)Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.details
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The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.details
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Why standpoint matters.Alison Wylie - 2003 - In Robert Figueroa & Sandra G. Harding (eds.), Science and other cultures: issues in philosophies of science and technology. New York: Routledge. pp. 26--48.details
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Feminist Standpoint Theory.T. Bowell - 2011 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Why we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):276-296.details
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Is Standpoint Theory a Resource for Feminist Epistemology? An Introduction.Sharon Crasnow - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):189 - 192.details
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Standpoint and Creativity.Miriam Solomon - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):226 - 237.details
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Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity.Sharon Crasnow - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):413-423.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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.Peter van Inwagen - 1988details
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The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.details
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It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.Peter van Inwagen - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder & Jeff Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 137-154.details
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(1 other version)Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
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(1 other version)Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist.details
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Epistemic norms and theoretical deliberation.Christopher Hookway - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):380–397.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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(1 other version)Objectivity and perspective in empirical knowledge.Rebecca Kukla - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):80-95.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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The Place of Standpoint Theory in Feminist Science Studies.Janet A. Kourany - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):209 - 218.details
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Uniqueness revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.details
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