- Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2012 - In Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge.details
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Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.details
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Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Ponovno razmatranje ekstremnog permisivizma.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):1-5.details
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Permissivist Evidentialism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Permissivism and Intellectual Virtue.Troy Seagraves - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs.Giulia Luvisotto - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):761-776.details
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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A New Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support.Paul Forrester - forthcoming - Episteme:1-22.details
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Agent-centered epistemic rationality.James Gillespie - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-22.details
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Institutional Review Boards and Public Justification.Anantharaman Muralidharan & G. Owen Schaefer - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):405-423.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Conditional Uniqueness.Erhan Demircioglu - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (2):268-274.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Permissivism and self-fulfilling propositions.Anantharaman Muralidharan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):217-226.details
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Evidential nihilism.P. D. Magnus - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):674-683.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1721-1733.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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A Note Concerning Conciliationism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to Matheson.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.details
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Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (2):145-159.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013–1033.details
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Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 201-215.details
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Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.details
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Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will.Phillip Hintikka Kieval - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-12.details
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